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This doctoral thesis consists of three independent chapters, each 
of which contributes towards a distinct area of research.  
Chapter two explores the importance of taking into consideration 
higher statistical moments for the purposes of portfolio 
management within the Islamic Finance sector. Chapter three 
uses incentivised and controlled laboratory experiments to study 
the role of context in determining agent risk-preferences. Chapter 
four also employs the experimental approach to investigate 
whether social-preferences are sensitive to changes in subject 
choice-sets.  
The good fortune of graduate students lies in their exposure to 
stimulating research, platforms encouraging the exchange of 
ideas and the ability to interact with erudite academics. Having 
had the honour of experiencing such an environment over the 
course of my Ph.D. studies, my curiosity and interests began to 
develop across diverse areas of research. The encouragement and 
advice imparted upon me to follow the pursuit of my research 
interests has culminated into the completion of the three 
standalone chapters that form this thesis.  
Chapter two contributes towards the literature on portfolio 
management within the Islamic Finance sector. This Islamic 
Finance sector has attracted considerable attention in recent 
times due to its impressive performance and phase on expansion 
since the subprime financial crisis. In particular, since the turn of 
the millennium, the industry has experienced an annualised 
growth rate of approximately 15% in global assets, which fell in 
the region of $200bn in 2003, $2.2tn in 2017 and are forecasted to 
cross $3.8tn by 2022 (Thomson Reuters (2007) and the City 
United Kingdom Islamic Finance Report (2015)). 
11 
 
In chapter two, I argue that in spite of its remarkable expansion 
since inception, the Islamic Finance sector is highly vulnerable to 
extreme shocks. More precisely, from a theoretical perspective, 
the stringent restrictions imposed upon Islamic portfolio 
managers, such as the prohibition of a) trade in derivative 
contracts b) short-selling strategies c) interest-based contracts 
and d) the inability of diversifying across what are considered to 
be unethical markets, collectively act to increase the riskiness of 
Shariah-compliant portfolios (see Usmani (1998) and Gait and 
Worthington (2007)). In part, this is due to an inability to 
efficiently hedge against economic shocks (Hesse et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the e) underdevelopment and thinness of secondary 
capital markets alongside f) an acute lack of supply and shortages 
of liquidity in Islamic Bond markets further exacerbates the 
vulnerability to extreme events (Hesse et al. (2008), Sole (2008) 
and Kammer et al. (2015)). 
The regulatory constraints necessitated by the Shariah has 
instigated extensive empirical research into the benefits of both 
inter and intra asset-class diversification with the Islamic 
Finance sector, as this offers portfolio managers a relatively 
simple and compliant form of risk-management (e.g. Madjoub and 
Mansour (2014), Abbess and Trichilli (2015) and Yilmaz et al. 
(2015)). However, despite the overt vulnerability to tail-events, 
chapter two – to the best of my knowledge – provides the first 
study that takes into consideration the role of higher statistical 
moments when examining the benefits of portfolio diversification 
within Islamic Finance.  
As such, chapter two demonstrates that ignoring higher statistical 
moments, such as the skewness and kurtosis of the returns’ 
distribution, can lead to substantially misleading inferences 
regarding the performance and benefits of diversified Shariah-
compliant portfolios. More specifically, I show that evaluating the 
performance of Islamic securities using the first two moments i.e. 
mean and standard deviation – as is customary – rather than 
using the first four moments, which captures a more accurate 
description of the distribution of returns, can lead to a non-trivial 
underestimation of portfolio risk during the most extreme market 
conditions.     
A general finding from studies comparing risk-preferences across 
faith groups is that religious agents tend to display greater levels 
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of risk-aversion in comparison to the non-religious (e.g. Bartke 
and Schwarz (2008), Hilary and Hui (2009) and Noussair et al. 
(2012)). This result has sometimes been explained by the fact that 
irreligious agents essentially take the riskier option in Pascal’s 
wager. Thus, it has been argued that relative to religious 
individuals, the irreligious are more likely, in general, to display a 
greater appetite for risk (Miller and Hoffman 1995). 
However, as alluded to above, the Islamic Finance sector has 
experienced robust rates of growth despite its lack of 
development, standardisation and its prohibitive stance towards 
common instruments used for the purposes of risk-mitigation. 
This observation reveals that the appetite for risk of faith-based 
agents may be dependent upon whether the channel of 
investment or the particular action involved is in conflict with the 
pursuit of satisfying their religious convictions. It is this insight 
that motivates the third chapter of this thesis.  
To be specific, much of the existing experimental research 
eliciting measures of risk-aversion typically has the decision-task 
faced by subjects framed in terms of lotteries and gambles (e.g. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997), Eckel and Grossman (2002) and 
Benjamin et al. (2010)). Therefore, in chapter three, we argue that 
the measurement of risk-aversion may in fact interact with 
religiosity. Given that gambling has seemingly been stigmatised 
throughout history by the world’s major religions (see Binde 
2007), it then follows that the use of a gambling frame could 
potentially create a bias in the measurement of risk-aversion for 
religious subjects. 
Hence, chapter three tests the proposition that the way in which 
the decision-task is framed can influence risk-taking behaviour. 
We do this by maintaining an identical numerical problem across 
treatments whilst manipulating the way in which the decision-
task is framed. We implement a gambling frame – which conflicts 
with religiosity – and an investment frame – which has no 
apparent conflict with religiosity. Alongside our framing 
manipulation, we also test whether priming subjects to make 
religion (or more accurately a broader notion of ethics and 
morality) salient influences behaviour. Finally, in a novel setup, 
we conduct an adapted version of our framing experiment within 
a religious setting. Specifically, we conduct a one-shot version of 
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our main experiment with Muslim participants within a Mosque 
immediately following a religious service.     
Across our two experimental studies, we find risk-taking in the 
investment frame to be rather consistent. We do not observe any 
difference because of prime or setting. In contrast, we observe 
large differences in subjects’ appetite for risk across prime and 
setting in the gambling frame. Overall, we show that subjects 
were significantly less risk-tolerant in the gambling frame than in 
the investment frame.  
The results from chapter three corroborate the findings from a 
broad and growing strand of literature showing that the 
behaviour of agents displays situational instability. That is, there 
is ample evidence to suggest that the observed behaviour of 
individuals is sensitive to, among other things, framing (Schubert 
et al. (1999)), choice-sets (List (2007) and Bardsley (2008)), gains 
versus losses (Weber and Hsee 1999), method of endowment 
determination (Cherry et al. (2002), Carpenter et al. (2010) and 
Erkal et al. (2011)), context (Zizzo and Oswald (2001), Weber et 
al. (2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011)) and the number of decision 
makers i.e. unilateral versus bilateral action (Simunovic et al. 
(2013)). 
The intuition underlying chapter four of this thesis is similar to 
that of chapter three. Whilst chapter three investigates the 
context-specificity of risk-preferences, chapter four contributes 
towards the literature exploring the stability of social-preferences. 
A plethora of studies have shown the existence of prosocial 
behaviour in the lab (see Andreoni et al. (2007) and Engel (2011)). 
However, more recent work has also reported non-negligible 
evidence of antisocial behaviour in the lab (e.g. Zizzo and Oswald 
(2001) and Abbink and Sadrieh (2009)). In chapter four, we 
contribute towards the literature on social-preferences by testing 
the extent to which altering subject choice-sets influences the 
level of prosocial and antisocial behaviour between competing 
individuals.  
Prior studies have focussed on the study of whether individuals 
are willing to give or take from an opponent under various 
settings. In a novel approach, we extend a baseline choice-set 
which includes the option to give, take, or do nothing by 
introducing an option to purchase insurance. This allows us to not 
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only test the extent to which individuals possess other-regarding 
preferences, as in previous studies, but also whether subjects are 
sufficiently concerned about the possibility of others taking money 
from them and as a result willing to invest resources to avoid this. 
Furthermore, we test if there is any difference in the observed 
behaviour of subjects when any amount stolen from their 
opponent is kept versus when it is simply burned (wasted). 
Importantly, subjects are asked to make these decisions after 
having competed for an endowment in a winner-takes-all 
tournament setting.  
Our results show that extending the available choice-set by 
including the option to insure crowds out voluntary donations by 
competition winners even when insurance represents a dominated 
strategy in monetary terms. Moreover, switching the context of 
the problem from potentially having one’s endowment stolen and 
kept to having it burned by an opponent lowers prosociality in 
terms of average donation size. In contrast, our data shows 
considerable evidence of sabotage and antisocial behaviour by 
contest losers that remains consistent across treatments. We 
argue that the reduction in prosociality is driven by subjects’ 
unwillingness to steal from their poorer counterparts when there 
is uncertainty regarding their chosen action whereas the 
consistent taking by poor subjects is motivated by a strong 
aversion towards disadvantageous inequality. The findings from 
chapter four adds further support to the growing consensus on the 
existence of other-regarding preferences as well as the situational 
instability of preferences (List (2007), Bardsley (2008) and 
Dohmen et al. (2011)).   
Chapter five provides a brief summary and conclusion of our 











CHAPTER TWO  
 
2. Is Asset-Class Diversification 






In this chapter, we study a) whether diversifying across asset-
classes by including commodities and Sukuk could improve the 
performance of an equity-only Islamic portfolio b) the benefits of 
diversification over historically significant bull and bear markets 
to test the relevance of diversification during volatile and 
trending markets c) the dynamic conditional correlation between 
the aforementioned asset-classes to study how the relationship 
across markets is affected during crisis regimes and d) we employ 
a convenient tail-risk measure of performance which includes the 
importance of an assets skewness and kurtosis to study whether 
taking into account the shape of the returns distribution provides 
further insight into the potential benefits of diversification. Our 
findings suggest that the benefit of diversifying beyond an equity-
only portfolio is limited during normal times but much greater 
during crisis periods, with improvement in both risk-return 
profiles and the probability of extreme losses. Our most important 
finding relates to the estimation of portfolio tail-risk. In 
particular, we find that using a standard two-moment Value-at-
Risk measure, which assumes normally distributed returns, 
rather than a four-moment Value-at-Risk, which incorporates an 
assets skewness and kurtosis, can lead to a substantial 
underestimation of portfolio risk during the most extreme market 
conditions. This result is especially important for Islamic portfolio 
managers as Islamic securities are more likely to deviate from a 
normal distribution for reasons such as market thinness, market 
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illiquidity, the lack of product standardization and the inability to 





The Islamic finance sector has attracted considerable attention 
recently due to its impressive performance and phase of 
expansion since the subprime financial crisis. In particular, the 
industry has experienced an annualized growth rate of 
approximately 15% in global assets over the past decade, which 
were in the region of $200 billion in 2003, $2.2 trillion in 2017 and 
are forecasted to cross $3.8 trillion by 20221.  
Shariah-compliant finance caters primarily for faith-based 
economic agents whose religious motivation requires them to 
operate under a dual-regulatory framework. That is, they must 
incorporate both country-specific and religious-based legislation 
within their decision-making framework, which seeks to 
maximize both present and some notion of an afterlife utility. 
Therefore, whilst the conceptual function of both conventional and 
Islamic finance is identical i.e. facilitating agents in their desire to 
smooth consumption patterns across time and space, Shariah-
compliance necessitates the imposition of additional constraints, 
including a) the prohibition of interest b) the prohibition of 
speculation and contractual ambiguity c) the exclusion of 
financing and dealing with what the Islamic faith deems socially 
irresponsible or unethical activities and d) a requirement that all 
transactions be directly linked to the real underlying economic 
transaction (Usmani (1998) and Gait and Worthington (2007)).   
Islamic finance essentially imposes various screening criterion, 
based on non-pecuniary value-judgements, to filter out what are 
considered to be compliant investments out of the broader 
universe of investable assets. In fact, such screening based on 
subjective beliefs and value-judgements is what relates Shariah 
compliant investing to the growing market for Socially-
Responsible Investments (SRI). Although there isn’t a 
                                                   
1 See Thomson Reuters (2017) and The City United Kingdom 
Islamic Finance Report (2015) 
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unanimously agreed definition of what constitutes a socially-
responsible investment, EUROSIF (2014) defines SRI as any type 
of investment process that combines investors’ financial objectives 
with their concerns about environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues. Hence, this leads to similarities between SRI and 
Islamic finance as they both restrict or shrink the set of assets, 
based on subjective values, in which their adherents may invest.  
For example, both Islamic and SRI funds typically prohibit 
investment into tobacco companies. That said, perhaps the key 
difference between the two is that the filtering criterion may not 
always be in alignment. This is exemplified by the fact that SRI 
also involves, for example, screening investments based on 
environmental issues, company governance structures and 
engaging with companies that aim to improve social welfare. By 
contrast, such strategies are typically not deemed necessary and 
thus not implemented by Shariah compliant investors.  
While there has been no empirical consensus in the literature, 
several authors have argued that the additional constraints 
imposed by Shariah compliance, which often alters the 
characteristics and underlying structure of Islamic securities, 
creates a theoretical heterogeneity between the conventional and 
Islamic finance sectors that could result in differences in the 
stability of either sector and their response to economic shocks 
(Chapra (2008) and Hassan (2009))2. For example, Hassan and 
Dridi (2010) describe how the Islamic banking sector initially 
absorbed the financial crisis shock better than the conventional 
sector due to factors attributed to their differing principles, such 
as greater stringency on leverage ratios and the prohibition of 
investing in so-called toxic derivative markets. However, Hassan 
and Dridi (2010) also show that once the ramifications of the crisis 
penetrated deeper into the real-economy, a combination of poor 
risk-management and excessive sectoral concentration caused 
substantial damage to the balance-sheets of Islamic financial 
institutions. 
The regulatory requirements put-forth by the Shariah create 
several issues for Islamic portfolio managers. For instance, the 
                                                   
2 For studies finding no significant differences, see Cevik and 
Charap (2011) and Chong and Lio (2009). For an alternative view, 
see Rosly et al. (2003), Cakir and Raei (2007), Beck et al. (2013) 
and Farooq and Zaheer (2015).  
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prohibition of ambiguity and uncertainty in contracts has 
generally led Shariah boards and scholars to rule out any trade in 
derivatives (Jobst and Sole 2012). Although the impermissibility 
of investing in derivative contracts shielded Islamic portfolios 
from subprime loans during the financial crisis, this constraint 
may not be as beneficial in a wider context. That is, derivatives 
help the economy achieve an efficient allocation of risk, assist in 
completing markets, provide financial market participants with 
information and may help reduce or hedge against risks (Sill 
1997). This is further exacerbated by the prohibition of strategies 
such as short-selling which violates the Islamic teaching that one 
must not sell something that they do not possess or own (Usmani 
1998). Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, Islamic portfolios 
are more vulnerable to large fluctuations in value due to the 
inability to use such financial instruments to hedge against 
economic shocks (Hesse et al. 2008).  
Secondly, the prohibition of investing in certain markets that are 
deemed illegitimate e.g. alcohol, concentrates wealth across fewer 
sectors, thus limiting the potential for diversification and 
increasing the vulnerability of Shariah compliant portfolios to 
extreme events and idiosyncratic shocks within particular 
markets. Furthermore, given the relative infancy of the Islamic 
finance sector, market participation is still relatively low and 
there is an absence of mature secondary markets for important 
securities such as Sukuk. This market thinness makes Shariah 
compliant portfolios more susceptible to large fluctuations in 
valuation. Moreover, there is a prevalence of buy-and-hold 
investors within Sukuk markets. While this has been attributed 
to an acute lack of supply, the shortage of liquidity this creates 
not only hampers market growth but makes the valuation of 
Sukuk more volatile during periods of crises (Hesse et al. (2008), 
Sole (2008) and Kammer et al. (2015)).   
A wider problem facing Islamic securities relates to the process of 
their approval. That is, securities such as Sukuk must be 
approved by a Shariah board prior to issuance. While the 
existence of multiple boards creates issues pertaining to 
standardization due to differences in the interpretation of Islamic 
scripture (Ellis (2012) and Godlewski et al. (2014)), a further 
concern brought to light in recent history is that these rulings 
aren’t immune from being challenged post-issuance. More 
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precisely, a recent issuance of Islamic bonds was announced as 
being non-compliant roughly three years after being on the 
market and prior to the date of maturity. Although the legislative 
basis for this declaration was contested, such issues within the 
industry can greatly amplify risk and uncertainty (Ellis (2012) 
and Jackson (2018)).  
Recent evidence shows that Islamic portfolios are highly 
concentrated within certain geographic regions, asset-classes and 
market sectors. For example, in 2017, 87% of the Islamic asset-
management sector was concentrated within three countries i.e. 
Iran, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, where oil dependence is crucial 
to growth (see Thomson Reuters 2018 report). Furthermore, 
Islamic investors tend to have substantial equity holdings with 
minimal diversification across asset-classes (see HSBC Amanah 
(2011) and Mauro et al. (2013)). The aforementioned issues are 
further exacerbated by the shrinking of the potential sectors 
across which Islamic investors may diversify, which leads to 
greater concentration in some specific sectors, such as Basic 
Materials, Industrials, Oil, Gas and Technology, thus inducing 
greater volatility in returns (Hussein and Omran (2005), 
Dewandaru et al. (2015) and Charles et al. (2015)). For instance, 
Charles et al. (2015) show that Shariah-screening reduces the 
number of stocks included in the Islamic index by up to 60-70%. 
Having access to the composition and sectoral breakdown of the 
Islamic index, Charles et al. (2015) show that 73% of the Islamic 
index is concentrated within the Technology, Health-Care, 
Industrials, Oil, Gas and Basic Material sectors. In comparison, 
they show that the corresponding figure for the conventional 
index was only 49%.  
In addition to the aforementioned challenges that compliant 
portfolio managers face, a further and broader issue has been the 
growing financial integration and interdependence between world 
economies. That is, it is relatively well-established that greater 
levels of financial liberalisation and globalisation have resulted in 
tighter cross-border integration and interdependencies among 
global equity markets (Kasa (1992), Corhay et al. (1993) and 
Blackman and Thomas (1994)). A direct corollary of this 
unprecedented increase in financial globalisation and the 
subsequent increase in financial interdependence is that global 
financial systems are now more vulnerable to systematic risk, 
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thus saturating the potential for cross-border diversification 
opportunities within asset-classes. The increasing convergence of 
risk-factors that global equity markets face has led several 
authors to advocate for diversification across asset-classes.  
Roll (2013) highlights the importance of diversifying across asset-
classes by arguing that even relatively well-diversified portfolios, 
such as the S&P 500, are quite volatile during certain periods and 
could benefit from extending their holdings across asset-classes to 
diversify across risk-factors. Well-diversified portfolios within an 
asset-class are highly-correlated, whereas well-diversified 
portfolios across different asset-classes are less correlated. The 
first point implies that there is a unique systematic factor that 
limits diversification within an asset-class and the second implies 
that each asset-class is mainly driven by its unique factor. 
Studies such as Fugazza and Nicodano (2009), Arouri and Nguyen 
(2010) and Daskalaki and Skiadopolous (2011) show that the 
returns of securities within a particular asset-class display a 
much higher correlation than they do with securities from 
alternative asset-classes. Intuitively, this has to do with 
heterogeneity in the underlying risk-factors across asset-classes. 
This point is reinforced by Baur and Lucey (2010), Baur and 
McDermott and Chan et al. (2011) who find that during periods of 
higher risk-aversion i.e. economic downturns or crisis regimes, 
investors attempt to preserve their wealth by shifting their 
portfolios towards a greater allocation into so-called safe-haven 
assets such as precious metals and treasuries, which tend to 
display lower volatility and favourable hedging characteristics.    
While the arguments in favour of multi asset-class portfolios have 
gained considerable traction and support recently (Cheung and 
Miu (2010), Su and Lau (2010), Hammoudeh et al. (2010), Arouri 
et al. (2011) and Daskalaki and Skiadopolous (2011)), Chan et al. 
(2011) argue that the benefits of diversification are highly regime-
specific. They find that during crisis regimes, the correlation 
across asset-classes tends to increase, leaving little benefit from 
diversification once transaction costs are accounted for.  
In light of the regulatory restrictions the Shariah imposes on 
Islamic securities and investors, in this chapter we study a) 
whether diversifying across asset-classes by including 
commodities and Sukuk could improve the performance of an 
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equity-only Islamic portfolio b) the benefits of diversification over 
historically significant bull and bear markets to test the relevance 
of diversification during volatile and trending markets c) the 
dynamic conditional correlation between the aforementioned 
asset-classes to study how the relationship across markets is 
affected during crisis regimes and d) as explained earlier, given 
that Islamic portfolios are more vulnerable to extreme events, we 
employ a convenient tail-risk measure of performance which 
includes the importance of an asset’s skewness and kurtosis to 
study whether taking into account the shape of the returns’ 
distribution provides further insight into the potential benefits of 
diversification.  
An important objective of this study is to provide a comparative 
analysis between the level of risk estimated when we use a 
measure that assumes normally distributed returns versus a 
measure that incorporates higher moments, such as an assets 
skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, given the overall motivation of 
our study, we use the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model for a few 
important reasons. First, there is a lack of studies within the 
Islamic finance literature that employ methods which are directly 
understood and implementable by industry practitioners. The 
VaR is beneficial in this regard since it is ubiquitous and thus 
very well-known among practitioners. The Value-at-Risk was also 
considered an attractive methodology for our analysis as it can be 
used for non-normally distributed assets. The four-moment VaR, 
covered in Section 2.3 (see Favre and Galeano 2002), adjusts the 
Gaussian quantile function for skewness and kurtosis using the 
Cornish-Fisher expansion (Cornish and Fisher 1937), thus 
allowing us to provide a direct comparison between the level of 
risk estimated by the standard two-moment and higher-moment 
VaRs.  
Hence, not only is the VaR straightforward in terms of 
implementation, able to measure risk with just one easily 
understandable number and able to incorporate higher-moments, 
but this approach has a further added advantage of having been 
embraced by European regulators (see EIOPA 2016). That is, 
regulators such as the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) has adopted the Cornish-Fisher based VaR as 
a standardised method to be used in order to report the embedded 
risk of packaged retail investment and insurance based products 
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(PRIIPs), which generally include stocks, bonds, insurance 
policies, structured funds, deposits and products. 
However, although our approach does offer the advantages stated 
above, an important limitation for the general purposes of 
portfolio management is that the VaR is based upon a univariate 
distribution. An alternative approach to modelling various risks 
and the study of extremal events under a multivariate 
distribution is that of copula analysis. The copula methodology, 
first introduced by Sklar (1959), has received great attention in 
the banking industry since it was first used for financial 
applications by Embrechts et al. (1999). Therefore, although we 
adopt the VaR for the reasons outlined above, an interesting 
extension of our work, especially if there is a broader availability 
of data on various Islamic assets, would be to use copula-analysis 
to study portfolio management and extreme events within the 
realm of Islamic finance.  
2.2 PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
The literature exploring the potential for diversification in 
portfolios incorporating both Islamic and conventional equities 
has increased substantially over the past decade. In particular, 
much attention has been devoted towards studying the 
relationship and co-movement between conventional and Islamic 
equity markets. This is because researchers have primarily been 
interested in testing whether Islamic stocks represent a unique 
asset-class or whether they fall within the general class of 
conventional equities (Hakim and Rashidian (2004), Hassan and 
Girard (2010), Guyot (2011), Saiti and Masih (2014), Alexakis et 
al. (2015), Ajmi et al. (2014) and Mensi et al. (2017)).  
The empirical research on diversification both within and across 
asset-classes that are specifically considered Shariah compliant 
has been less forthcoming. Madjoub and Mansour (2014) study 
the relationship between the Islamic equity indices of the U.S. 
and a set of five emerging markets. The authors find evidence of 
the U.S. market being only weakly correlated with the emerging 
markets under consideration, which they attribute to the 
principles of Islamic finance. Madjoub and Mansour (2014) argue 
that the stringent restrictions on leverage ratios, interest-based 
transactions and the asset-backed nature of Islamic investments 
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reduces the exposure of markets to volatility spillovers and thus 
provides investors with diversification opportunities.  
Similar to Madjoub and Mansour (2014), Abbess and Trichilli 
(2015) investigate the potential benefits of diversifying Islamic 
portfolios by combining stocks from developed and emerging 
markets. Using a multivariate cointegration approach, Abbes and 
Trichilli (2015) find that the degree of interdependence varies 
depending on the level of economic similarity between the 
markets under consideration. While markets within a particular 
economic grouping i.e. developed or emerging display higher 
levels of integration, there is some evidence that this relationship 
is a lot weaker for those from opposing groups, suggesting that 
there may be some scope for cross-border diversification in Islamic 
equities.  
Khan et al. (2015) investigate the time-varying correlation 
dynamics between the Dow Jones Islamic equity index and 
various commodity indices to determine the potential for 
diversification between them. The authors find evidence of 
instability in correlations which show a general tendency towards 
increasing during periods of market stress, implying limited 
diversification during bearish periods. However, Khan et al. 
(2015) argue that the commodity sector cannot be considered a 
homogenous asset-class, as the time-varying relationships vary 
significantly depending on the type of commodity under 
consideration. In a similar study, Abdullah, Saiti and Masih 
(2016) find that the degree of interdependence between Islamic 
equity and commodity markets is country-specific. Their findings 
suggest that there may be scope for diversification based on 
differences in risk-factors, which in some instances can have a 
significant overlap between asset-classes within the realm of 
Islamic finance. For example, oil prices are likely to be a lot more 
correlated with equity prices in major oil-producing nations such 
as Saudi Arabia than they are in those where oil production is 
less significant, such as Pakistan.  
Yilmaz et al. (2015) study the correlation dynamics between ten 
Islamic equity sector indices i.e. stocks within the healthcare and 
energy sectors, belonging to the family of Dow Jones Islamic 
indices. Covering the period from 1999 to 2014, Yilmaz et al. 
(2015) find an increase in the degree of sectoral integration and 
interdependence over time, implying limited scope for 
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diversification within the equity asset-class. The authors argue 
that a period of increasing global financialization has weakened 
the importance of fundamentals and real economic factors in 
determining equity prices which are now instead increasingly 
driven by factors such as capital flows, risk-appetite, behavioural 
factors and investment strategies.     
Alaoui et al. (2015) explore the co-movement dynamics between 
various regional equity indices within the Gulf Cooperation 
Council and a global Sukuk index. They find strong evidence of 
time-varying correlations, greater contagion between markets in 
closer proximity and a flight-to-quality during the recent financial 
crisis whereby investors sought to shift their portfolio weights 
towards a greater allocation of Sukuk relative to equity holdings.   
Nagayev et al. (2016) examine the extent to which commodity 
markets co-move with Islamic equities. Their findings show that 
the return correlations between equities and commodities are 
time-varying and highly volatile, showing a substantial and 
persistent increase in correlations during the global financial 
crisis of 2008. Moreover, using a wavelet coherence model, 
Nagayev et al. (2016) find that the benefit of investing in 
commodities is dependent on an investor’s time-horizon. While 
some commodities can provide short-term benefits, they may not 
do so in the longer-run. However, once transaction costs are taken 
into consideration, these short-term benefits may also be limited.  
As described above, the existing literature on portfolio 
diversification within the realm of Islamic finance primarily 
focuses on econometric methods aimed at capturing correlations, 
interdependencies and contagion effects between markets. Higher 
statistical moments, such as skewness and kurtosis have 
generally been ignored as a criterion for evaluating portfolio-
management decisions. However, it is well established in the 
literature that financial returns typically display significant 
skewness and kurtosis. Early researchers such as Rubinstein 
(1973) argue that skewness and kurtosis cannot be ignored unless 
asset returns are normally distributed and the investor’s utility 
function is quadratic. If these two conditions were satisfied, the 
first two moments would be sufficient for maximizing expected 
utility. This is because a normal distribution implies that the 
entire distribution of an assets returns could be inferred through 
its mean and variance, making higher-moments irrelevant. 
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Likewise, if returns aren’t normally distributed but investors 
have quadratic utility functions, then by construct, this would 
assume that investors are indifferent to other features of the 
distribution. However, quadratic utility assumes that investors 
are equally averse to deviations above the mean as they are to 
deviations below the mean, and that they sometimes prefer less 
wealth to more wealth, which isn’t borne out by the data 
(Cremers, Kritzman and Page 2004).  
In a seminal paper, Harvey et al. (2010) propose a theoretical 
model for optimal portfolio allocation that incorporates higher-
moments. The authors find that including higher-moments in the 
decision process alters the optimal portfolio allocation and 
increases expected utility. This general result has been reinforced 
by a growing strand of empirical literature. You and Daigler 
(2010) use a novel approach by exploring whether the inclusion of 
higher-moments affects the purported benefits of diversifying 
across international equity markets. Using a four-moment Value-
at-Risk methodology, the authors find that ignoring higher-order 
moments, in particular an assets skewness and kurtosis, can lead 
to an underestimation of the true level of portfolio risk.  
Our main contribution towards the literature is to apply this four-
moment Value-at-Risk methodology to investigate whether 
incorporating a more complete description of the shape of the 
returns’ distribution of Shariah compliant financial securities 
could provide Islamic portfolio managers with additional 
information regarding a) the level of tail-risk contained within 
their portfolios b)  the extent to which diversifying across asset-
classes could potentially improve tail-risk and c) whether 
neglecting higher moments affects the interpretation of portfolio 
tail risk over bearish and bullish markets.   
 
2.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
We obtain daily closing prices3 quoted in US dollars for the S&P 
500 Shariah Index, Dow Jones Islamic Developed Market Equity 
                                                   
3 The issue of selecting an appropriate frequency for the data has 
been a sensitive topic in the literature. While daily-data could 
arguably better capture the fast-paced information transmission 
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Index, Dow Jones Islamic Emerging Market Equity Index, Dow 
Jones Sukuk Index and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Spot 
Indices for the Energy, Livestock, Agriculture, Industrial and 
Precious Metal sectors. While investing in commodity futures isn’t 
permissible under the principles of Shariah, spot trading, of 
certain commodities, is deemed acceptable under several 
standards (Usmani 1998). All data was sourced through the 
Bloomberg Terminal. To perform our analysis, we generate daily 
returns using the conventional formula:  
 
𝑅𝑡 = (ln⁡(𝑃𝑡) − ln⁡(𝑃𝑡−1)) ∗ 100 
 
(2.1) 
Our dataset runs from the 8th of October 2007 to the 15th of March 
2015 i.e. the beginning of the subprime financial crisis to the S&P 
peak in March 2015, for a total of 1919 observations per series. 
We split our data into two time periods to study the role of 
diversification over a bear market period i.e. October 2007 to 
March 2009 and the subsequent expansion or bull-period, albeit 
with periodic market corrections, running from March 2009 to 
March 2015. Our rationale for this is particularly to determine 
the effects of the most extreme market conditions in recent times 
i.e. the subprime financial crisis, which was the only major crisis 
within the range of the available data.  
 
The substantial evidence of time-varying correlation dynamics 
between financial securities is especially relevant when assessing 
the benefits of diversification (Longin and Solnik (1995), Tse 
(2000) and Goetzmann et al. (2005)). This is because examining 
how the behaviour and degree of interdependence between 
securities changes during volatile periods or in response to 
economic shocks provides information about the extent to which 
                                                                                                                                 
and co-movements in financial-markets, as well as providing a 
richer data-set in terms of observations, daily-data can also 
involve greater statistical noise. In contrast, while using lower 
frequency data could mitigate the problems associated with 
excessive noise, it may result in biased estimations due to the 
lower number of observations available. This issue is of great 
relevance in the Islamic Finance sector as the poor-availability of 
data exacerbates the trade-off between minimising noise and the 
number of observations. More precisely, for our sample-interval, 
using weekly-data would have provided approximately 360 
observations whereas monthly-data would have only provided 





their underlying risk-factors are aligned. Therefore, we employ 
the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model introduced by 
Engle (2002). This model builds upon the framework of 
ARCH/GARCH-type models developed by Engle (1982) and 
Bollerslev (1986). Assuming that 𝑟𝑡 denotes a vector consisting of 
two return series, 𝐴(𝐿) the lag polynomial and 𝜀𝑡 the error term 
vector, then the return and conditional variance can be 
represented as: 
 









Where⁡𝐷𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{√ℎ1,𝑡√ℎ2,𝑡} is the diagonal matrix of time-varying 
standard deviations estimated from the univariate 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻⁡(1,1) 
models and 𝑅𝑡 is the time-varying conditional correlation matrix. 
That is, in the first-stage of the DCC estimation, univariate 
GARCH models are fit for both return series. In the second-stage, 
the standardized residuals from the prior stage are used to obtain 
the conditional correlation coefficients. The 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻⁡(1,1) variance 
is represented by: 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑡−1, 𝜔𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖,𝛽𝑖 > 0, 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 < 1⁡⁡ 
 
(2.4) 
Where 𝜔𝑖 represents the weighted long-run variances whilst the 𝛼 
and 𝛽 coefficients determine the short-term dynamics of the 
volatility series resulting from the equation.  






Where 𝑄𝑡 is the symmetric positive definite matrix of the 
conditional variances-covariances and 𝑄𝑡
∗−1 is an inverted 
diagonal matrix consisting of the square root of the diagonal 



























𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝜃1 − 𝜃2)?̅? + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1𝜀𝑡−1




If both parameter estimates for 𝜃1, which measures the effect of 
past shocks on current conditional correlation, and 𝜃2, which 
measures the impact of past correlations, are significant, then 
this would indicate that the conditional correlation between the 
two series isn’t constant.  
The dynamic conditional correlation between two assets, 1 and 2, 








The coefficients in the DCC model are estimated by a two-step 
maximum likelihood method, where the maximum likelihood 












Deviations from constant correlations are not the only concern 
when evaluating diversification benefits. Another common issue is 
the potential deviation from a normal distribution. It is well 
known that most financial returns data aren’t normally 
distributed but rather often display non-zero skewness and 
positive excess kurtosis values. Following the financial crisis, 
market participants and academics have begun to question the 
usefulness of standard deviation as a measure of risk. Many 
financial-agents have begun the adoption of alternative models to 
quantify portfolio risk, with the standard Value-at-Risk being 
among the most common. This approach quantifies negative tail-
risk by identifying the expected potential loss with a hypothetical 
fall in the market by a specified number of standard deviations 
(Uludag and Ezzat 2016). 
Coupled with the greater vulnerability of Shariah-compliant 
assets to extreme events for reasons mentioned earlier, this 
motivates the need to consider the role of higher statistical 
moments when determining potential diversification benefits. We 
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follow You and Daigler (2010) by employing the four-moment 
Value-at-Risk measure to incorporate skewness and excess 
kurtosis in measuring tail-risk. We compare this measure both 
across portfolios and to the more commonly adopted two-moment 
Value-at-Risk. This approach not only has the benefit of being 
able to provide insight into whether the inclusion of higher 
moments affects the perceived benefits of diversification but also 
its ease of implementation and ability to incorporate important 
information into a single number makes it an appealing tool for 
industry practitioners.  
Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures combine the relevant statistical 
moments into one number, allowing us to compare portfolio 
performance across markets in terms of tail risk. Therefore, the 
VaR provides straightforward comparisons which is consistent 
with the interests of portfolio managers in evaluating the 
downside risks of portfolios. The two-moment VaR, which is 
currently the more popular measurement of downside risk, is 
given by: 
 




Where 𝜇𝑝 is the mean of the daily returns of the portfolio, 𝜎𝑝 is the 
portfolio’s standard deviation and 𝑧 is the negative of the number 
of standard deviations that specifies the probability level 
associated with the tail-risk. The two-moment VaR assumes an 
underlying normal distribution for the returns by only considering 
the return and standard deviation of the assets. 
The four-moment Modified Value-at-Risk measure given below 
incorporates all four return moments, providing a method to 
determine the potential downside risk at a given probability level 
for a portfolio with a specific set of return, risk, skewness and 

























Where 𝜇𝑝, 𝜎𝑝, 𝑆𝑝⁡and 𝐾𝑝 are the first four moments of portfolio 𝑃, 
and 𝑧𝑐 is the negative number of standard deviations that 
specifies the tail probability level associated with the four-
moment VaR. the two-moment VaR is a special case of this four-
moment VaR when the skewness and excess kurtosis are zero.  
 
2.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 2.1 reports the first four moments for each individual asset. 
With the exception of the Precious Metals sector, each asset 
displays a lower average return during period 1 (bear market) 
than in period 2 (bull market) whereas every asset displays a 
higher standard deviation during period 1. Most of the assets 
under consideration display negative skewness and positive 
excess kurtosis which, as evidenced by the Jarque-Bera tests 
reported in the final column of Table 2.1, implies that returns do 
not follow a normal distribution and thus motivates the need to 
include higher moments when assessing the potential benefits of 
portfolio diversification.  
 
On average, Islamic equity markets outperform commodities and 
Sukuk in terms of risk-adjusted returns during the bull market. 
This finding is reversed during the bear market where 
commodities and Sukuk outperform equities. Shariah compliant 
equities, on average, display greater positive kurtosis than 
commodities while Sukuk have the largest kurtosis values. This 
reinforces our earlier argument regarding the relatively greater 
vulnerability of Islamic securities to extreme events. The thinner 
tails and superior performance of commodities during the bear 
market could make them valuable to compliant portfolio 
managers for purposes of risk-mitigation. 
 
Tables 2.2 reports the two and four-moment VaRs at one, two and 
three standard deviations for each of the assets individually. 
Intuitively, a higher standard deviation implies that we are 
further into the left-hand tail of the distribution and thus 
progressively considering higher volatility or more extreme 








Period 2: Bull Market (March 2009-March 2015)  
  Return Std.Dev Skew Kurt Sharpe4 Omega5 Jarque-Bera 
Precious Metals 4.66 19.87 -0.75 6.19 0.23 1.04 0.00 
Agriculture 1.14 21.01 0.08 1.53 0.05 1.01 0.00 
Industrial Metals 7.73 22.92 -0.07 1.83 0.34 1.06 0.00 
Energy 4.57 26.06 -0.17 3.05 0.18 1.03 0.00 
Livestock  8.22 13.05 -0.03 0.54 0.63 1.11 0.00 
S&P 500 Shariah 16.88 15.98 -0.17 3.70 1.06 1.21 0.00 
Dow Jones Islamic Developed 15.34 15.33 -0.26 3.42 1.00 1.20 0.00 
Dow Jones Islamic Emerging  12.21 16.66 -0.15 3.02 0.73 1.14 0.00 
Dow Jones Sukuk 5.40 6.91 5.87 153.47 0.78 1.41 0.00 
Period 1: Bear Market (October 2007-March 2009)  
Precious Metals 13.55 30.04 0.12 1.65 0.45 1.07 0.00 
Agriculture -13.64 33.62 -0.38 0.98 -0.41 0.93 0.00 
Industrial Metals -56.92 35.74 -0.11 0.63 -1.59 0.76 0.00 
Energy -36.23 47.79 -0.16 1.09 -0.76 0.87 0.00 
Livestock  -5.61 16.55 -0.23 0.46 -0.34 0.94 0.00 
S&P 500 Shariah -44.37 34.89 0.18 5.18 -1.27 0.79 0.00 
Dow Jones Islamic Developed -49.65 30.61 -0.16 4.90 -1.62 0.73 0.00 
Dow Jones Islamic Emerging  -64.43 35.55 -0.24 3.88 -1.81 0.72 0.00 
Dow Jones Sukuk -9.81 7.79 -5.99 60.20 -1.26 0.44 0.00 
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Assets 
 
Comparing the two and four-moment VaRs across both periods, 
we find that the latter is smaller than the former at a one 
standard deviation cut-off value. In other words, the two-moment 
VaR, which is based upon the assumption of a normal 
distribution, overestimates portfolio tail risk when one 
investigates a less extreme scenario and underestimates the level 
of risk for more extreme events. This finding is consistent with 
                                                   
4 Given the prohibition of interest in Islamic finance, we calculate 
the Sharpe Ratio as the assets average return divided by its 
standard deviation. This provides us with a simple ratio to 
compare risk-adjusted return. 
5 In calculating the Omega Ratio, we set the threshold to zero. 
Hence, these figures are equivalent to the Gain-Loss Ratio 
introduced by Bernardo and Ledoit (2000)  
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that of You and Daigler (2010). The failure to take into 
consideration the impact of an asset’s skewness and kurtosis can 
lead to markedly different inferences regarding portfolio risk. For 
instance, at three standard deviation units, the expected loss in 
the Sukuk portfolio under the MVaR measure is 8.52 during 
period 1 and 31.72 during period 2, whereas the corresponding 
figures are 1.28 and 1.51 according to the VaR measure.  
  Bull-Market Bear-Market 
  VaR 1 VaR 2 VaR 3 VaR 1 VaR 2 VaR 3 
Precious Metals 1.23 2.49 3.74 1.84 3.73 5.62 
Agriculture 1.32 2.64 3.97 2.17 4.29 6.41 
Industrial Metals 1.41 2.86 4.30 2.48 4.73 6.98 
Energy 1.62 3.27 4.91 3.15 6.16 9.18 
Livestock 0.79 1.61 2.43 1.07 2.11 3.15 
S&P 500 Shariah 0.94 1.95 2.95 2.37 4.57 6.77 
Dow Jones Islamic Developed 0.90 1.87 2.84 2.13 4.05 5.98 
Dow Jones Islamic Emerging 1.00 2.05 3.10 2.50 4.73 6.97 
Dow Jones Sukuk  0.41 0.85 1.28 0.53 1.02 1.51 
  Bull-Market Bear-Market 
  MVaR 1 MVaR 2 MVaR 3 MVaR 1 MVaR 2 MVaR 3 
Precious Metals 0.65 3.48 10.03 1.58 3.87 7.63 
Agriculture 1.15 2.76 5.33 2.02 4.81 8.71 
Industrial Metals 1.19 3.13 6.42 2.36 4.97 8.36 
Energy 1.21 3.82 8.99 2.89 6.66 12.17 
Livestock 0.75 1.66 2.80 1.03 2.26 3.77 
S&P 500 Shariah 0.63 2.34 5.94 1.43 5.31 14.70 
Dow Jones Islamic Developed 0.64 2.26 5.58 1.34 4.99 13.43 
Dow Jones Islamic Emerging 0.74 2.39 5.67 1.78 5.70 14.06 
Dow Jones Sukuk  -3.90 2.64 31.72 -0.47 2.02 8.52 
 
Table 2.2. Two (Top-Half) and Four-Moment (Bottom-Half) VaR 
for Individual Assets 
 
2.4.1. Dynamic Conditional Correlations 
 
As mentioned earlier, focusing primarily on the unconditional 
static correlations between the assets that comprise a portfolio 
can result in suboptimal decision making regarding the allocation 
of wealth. The results from the dynamic conditional correlation 
estimations are presented in Figures 2.1-2.8. As shown, there is 
clear evidence of the correlations between assets fluctuating over 
time and consistently deviating from their unconditional averages 
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(dashed lines). The unconditional average correlations are, as 
expected, highest within the equity asset-class and followed by 
the industrial metal and energy sectors. This may be attributed to 
the fact that the industrial metal and energy sectors have a 
strong relationship with the real-economy, as they serve as inputs 
to production. Given the tight link between the Islamic finance 
sector and the real-economy, it is natural to expect a higher 
correlation among these assets.  
 
The precious-metal and Sukuk sectors display noticeably distinct 
behaviour. First, neither market shows a clear secular trend in 
correlations, which implies that they are largely determined by 
their unique market factors. Although there is some movement 
during crisis periods, in comparison with other asset-classes these 
are much more transitory. As shown, both markets display 
negative correlations during the crisis. This could be due to a 
flight-to-quality phenomenon as found by Alaoui et al. (2015) 
where Islamic investors invest in safer sovereign-issued Sukuk. 
Similarly, precious-metals have traditionally been shown to be 
refuge instruments during periods of crisis, implying a safe-haven 
role, as found by Baur and Lucey (2010). However, compared to 
the relationship found between conventional bond and equity 
markets, Sukuk display extremely volatile and unstable 
correlations with respect to the Shariah equity index (Andersson 
et al. 2008). Given the growing importance of Sukuk within the 
Islamic finance industry, determining the risk-factors of Sukuk 
and the relative significance of market and institutional factors in 
influencing Sukuk prices could be an important avenue for future 
research and ultimately support practitioners in developing risk-
management strategies.  
 
A closer inspection of the diagrams clearly outlines a comparable 
relationship or characteristics between most pairwise correlations 
during periods of financial stress. After an initial drop in 
correlations immediately following the 2008 collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, which has been attributed to a temporary loosening of 
conditional links between price returns in the very short-run, a 
combination of a flight-to-quality phenomenon, herding and 
macroeconomic factors are likely to have subsequently caused a 
sharp increase in correlations and their volatilities (Creti et al. 
(2013), Delatte and Lopez (2013), Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) 
and Nagayev et al. (2016)). These results corroborate the findings 
of previous studies such as Choi and Hammoudeh (2010) who 
show the existence of regime-induced correlation dynamics 



















Figure 2.4. Livestock 
 
 










Figure 2.7. Emerging Market Equities  
 
 
Figure 2.8. Sukuk 
 
Figures 2.1-2.8: Dynamic Conditional Correlations between S&P 
500 Shariah and Stated Assets (Dashed Line Represents Static 
Correlations)  
 
Following the crisis we generally find a persistent correlation 
dynamic, with correlations remaining high until a dip in 2012. 
This has been attributed to a combination of macroeconomic, 
political, financial and behavioural factors over the 2008-2012 
period (Nagayev et al. 2016). The systemic nature of the crisis 
caused widespread panic and negative market sentiment at a 
global scale that affected most markets in similar ways (Bain 
2014). The increased dependence and spill-over between asset-
markets was likely due to liquidity constraints faced by investors 
as sources of borrowing dried up, which forced investors to sell 
assets at fire-sale prices in order to restore balance-sheets 
(Delatte and Lopez 2013). In turn, this led to asset prices 
generally moving in the same direction, which again highlights 
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the fact that Islamic equities aren’t insulated from general 
market conditions. 
More generally, a sharp increase in the popularity of commodity 
investing over the past decade has triggered an unprecedented 
inflow of institutional funds into commodity futures markets 
(Basak and Pavlova 2015). This phenomenon has been referred to 
as the financialization of commodities. From a theoretical 
perspective, the fundamental valuation of an asset is determined 
by its expected discounted cash flows. However, since the 
financialization of commodities, it has been argued that factors 
other than the primary supply and demand of commodities, such 
as the speculation phenomenon often seen in energy markets, 
which are also susceptible to behavioural biases, now have a 
significant influence on commodity prices. A direct corollary of the 
increased financialization has been argued to be greater volatility 
in commodity markets and correlations between commodity and 
equity markets (Tang and Xiong 2012).  Given the relationship 
between futures and spot prices, activity in the futures market 
has a direct feedback into spot markets (Girardi 2012). Coupled 
with the tight-link between the Islamic sector and the real-
economy, which is affected by commodity prices, these factors 
imply that Islamic portfolios with commodity holdings are not 
insulated from activity in the conventional sector, as reflected by 
the fact that the correlation dynamics closely resemble those 
found between conventional equity and commodity markets6. 
These findings raise additional concerns regarding immunization 
strategies for Islamic portfolio managers as it further limits their 
potential to hedge and diversify risk.  
However, correlations between Islamic equity and commodity 
returns have shown a decline since 2012. Various explanations 
have been put-forth regarding this apparent reversal in 
correlations. Terazono (2015) argues that according to the 
physical supply and demand view, commodity markets are now 
normalizing and will likely return to an era where they are more 
influenced by individual supply and demand fundamentals. Bain 
(2014) suggests that commodity valuations have been impacted by 
uncertainty regarding the economic growth trajectory of countries 
such as China. Based on the financialization view, the reduction 
of activity in commodity markets has led to the decrease in 
                                                   
6 See, for example, Creti et al. (2013). 
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correlations. A combination of tighter regulation, growing capital 
requirements and the peaking possibility of the commodity super-
cycle has led to large financial institutions lowering their 
exposure to commodity markets (Sheppard (2014) and Kaminska 
(2014)).  
 
2.4.2. Portfolio Diversification7  
 
Following You and Daigler (2010), You and Nguyen (2013) and 
Daigler et al. (2017), we compose the desired portfolios by 
adopting a straightforward risk-return framework in order to 
identify the Markowitz mean-variance optimal allocations.  
 
For a portfolio 𝑃 with 𝑛 assets, the portfolio’s return 𝜇𝑝⁡and risk 𝜎𝑝
2 
characteristics are calculated as: 

























𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2,… 𝑛 
 
(2.15) 
Where 𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝑖, and 𝑥𝑖 are the mean, standard deviation, and weight 
of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ asset in the portfolio. We implement the procedure by 
composing portfolios that maximise the Sharpe Ratio, so as to 
calculate the most efficient portfolio weights. Furthermore, to 
remain compliant with the principles of Islamic Finance, we 




impose a constraint that prohibits short-sales. The optimal 
portfolio weights are presented in Table 2.38.  
 
Portfolio Average Bear Bull 
Precious Metals 38% 83% 27% 
Agriculture 36% 83% 24% 
Industrial Metals 26% 33% 24% 
Energy 29% 65% 21% 
Livestock  41% 67% 35% 
Dow Jones Islamic Developed 40% 17% 46% 
Dow Jones Islamic Emerging  32% 17% 36% 
Dow Jones Sukuk 60% 50% 63% 
 
Table 2.3. Portfolio Weights 
 
Table 2.4 provides the descriptive statistics for all diversified 
portfolios (that have been combined with our benchmark S&P 500 
Shariah Index).  
 
With the exception of the precious metals portfolio, we find no 
evidence of diversification improving the risk-return profile of the 
standard equity-only portfolio during period 2 (bull market) but in 
all cases there is evidence of the diversified portfolios resulting in 
higher Omega ratios. In contrast, our results show that during 
period 1 (bear market), in all but one case, diversification 
improves both the risk-return profile and Omega ratio of the 
equity-only portfolio. On average, commodities provide the 
greatest diversification benefits in terms of risk-return and 
Omega ratios whereas intra asset-class diversification i.e. 
combining alternative equities, offers the least benefit. Our 
findings suggest that diversification may have little benefit in 
terms of improving an equity-only portfolios risk-return ratio 
during normal times. However, diversification can improve the 
risk-return ratio during downturns and add stability to the 
portfolio valuation by mitigating the probability of extreme losses 
during both bullish and bearish periods.    
 
Tables 2.5 reports the two and four-moment VaRs for the 
diversified portfolios over both periods. According to the normally 
                                                   
8 Note that all portfolios consisted of two assets. The benchmark 
Islamic equity index and the asset listed in Table 2.2. So, for 
example, the first row of the table illustrates that, on average, the 
portfolio with precious metals and the Islamic index was 




distributed VaR measure at three standard-deviation units, 
precious metals, livestock and Sukuk could lower tail-risk of an 
equity-only portfolio during period 2 by 8%, 19% and 41%, 
whereas the industrial metals and energy sectors increase risk by 
6% and 13%. During period 1 (bear market), agriculture, livestock 
and Sukuk reduce tail-risk by 10%, 13% and 15%. In contrast, 
precious-metals, industrial metals and energy commodities 
increase tail-risk by 3%, 6% and 16%. Similar to the earlier 
measures of performance, we find no evidence of intra asset-class 
diversification i.e. alternative equity markets, providing any 
significant benefit in terms of lowering tail-risk.   
 
Period 2: Bull Market (March 2009-March 2015)  
  Return Std.Dev Skew Kurtosis Sharpe Omega 
Precious Metals 17.23 14.68 -0.29 2.71 1.17 1.35 
Agriculture 15.65 15.66 -0.02 1.63 1.00 1.32 
Industrial Metals 13.27 16.83 -0.20 2.00 0.79 1.26 
Energy 13.29 18.00 -0.47 4.69 0.74 1.24 
Livestock 13.67 12.92 0.21 3.07 1.06 1.40 
Developed Equity 5.68 15.57 -0.31 3.75 0.36 1.24 
Emerging Equity 12.69 15.78 -0.22 4.25 0.80 1.30 
Sukuk 5.51 9.27 0.29 10.13 0.59 1.46 
Period 1: Bear Market (October 2007-March 2009)  
Precious Metals 9.87 37.16 0.22 3.99 0.27 1.06 
Agriculture -3.06 32.04 -0.46 1.41 -0.10 0.98 
Industrial Metals -18.89 37.40 0.12 3.67 -0.51 0.91 
Energy 18.69 41.88 -0.06 2.38 0.45 1.08 
Livestock -6.60 31.06 0.33 8.60 -0.21 0.96 
Developed Equity -43.86 34.70 0.17 5.34 -1.26 0.79 
Emerging Equity -34.74 35.27 0.08 5.01 -0.99 0.83 
Sukuk -15.54 30.26 0.34 10.12 -0.51 0.88 
 
Table 2.4. Descriptive Statistics of Optimized Portfolios 
 
The Modified VaR, which takes into account higher statistical 
moments, provides different conclusions. According to the MVaR 
at three standard-deviation units, every commodity sector, except 
for energy, provides sizeable reductions in portfolio tail-risk 
during period 2, ranging from 17% to 33%. While Sukuk does 
lower tail-risk substantially at one and two standard deviation 
units, there is no noticeable reduction at three standard deviation 
units. During the bear market, all commodities except for energy 
lower tail-risk at three standard deviation units from between 
10% to 39%. However, in contrast to the normally distributed 
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VaR, which suggests that Sukuk reduces tail-risk by 15% during 
the bear market at three standard deviation units, the inclusion 
of higher moments suggests an increase of 30% in downside risk 
under the same setting. Hence, while Sukuk may offer some 
benefits during less extreme periods, their distributional 
properties make them vulnerable to extremely large losses during 
downturns. Similar to our earlier findings, we find no evidence of 
alternative equities or energy commodities reducing tail-risk 




  VaR 1 VaR 2 VaR 3 VaR 1 VaR 2 VaR 3 
Precious Metals 0.86 1.78 2.71 2.30 4.64 6.98 
Agriculture 0.92 1.91 2.90 2.03 4.05 6.07 
Industrial Metals 1.01 2.07 3.13 2.43 4.79 7.14 
Energy 1.08 2.22 3.35 2.56 5.20 7.84 
Livestock 0.76 1.57 2.39 1.98 3.94 5.90 
Developed Equity 0.96 1.94 2.92 2.36 4.55 6.73 
Emerging Equity 0.94 1.94 2.93 2.36 4.58 6.80 
Sukuk 0.56 1.15 1.73 1.97 3.87 5.78 
  Bull-Market Bear-Market 
  MVaR 1 MVaR 2 MVaR 3 MVaR 1 MVaR 2 MVaR 3 
Precious Metals 0.65 2.11 4.86 1.53 5.14 13.18 
Agriculture 0.79 2.05 4.13 1.83 4.68 8.98 
Industrial Metals 0.83 2.34 4.96 1.71 5.36 13.21 
Energy 0.66 2.88 7.78 2.04 5.81 17.43 
Livestock 0.55 1.69 3.99 0.60 4.98 12.77 
Developed Equity 0.66 2.38 5.98 1.39 5.33 14.93 
Emerging Equity 0.60 2.39 6.33 1.43 5.41 14.89 
Sukuk 0.07 1.55 5.89 0.38 5.11 19.12 
 
Table 2.5. Two and Four-Moment VaRs for Optimized Portfolios 
 
2.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The Islamic finance sector has attracted considerable attention 
recently due to its impressive performance since the turn of the 
millennium. Despite the substantial growth and expansion of the 
sector, Islamic portfolio managers face several constraints which 
limit their ability to diversify and hedge against risk. These 
include the prohibition of investing in derivative contracts, 
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engaging in short-selling, investing in markets considered 
illegitimate by the Shariah and the insufficient liquidity and lack 
of standardization in Islamic bond markets. This is further 
exacerbated by the more general finding that the process of 
financial globalisation has resulted in increasing integration, 
interdependence and contagion between international equity 
markets. 
In light of these issues, in this chapter we studied a) whether 
diversifying across asset-classes by including particular compliant 
commodities and Sukuk could improve the performance of equity-
only Islamic portfolios b) the benefits of diversification over 
historically significant bull and bear markets to test the relevance 
of diversification during volatile and trending markets c) the 
dynamic nature of correlations between the aforementioned asset-
classes and d) given that Islamic portfolios are more vulnerable to 
extreme events, we employed a convenient tail-risk measure of 
performance which includes the importance of an assets skewness 
and kurtosis to study whether taking into account the shape of 
the returns distribution provides further insight into the potential 
benefits of diversification.  
Our findings show that the benefit of diversifying beyond an 
equity-only portfolio is minimal during normal times in terms of 
improvement in risk-return profiles but there is some evidence 
that diversification can lower the chances of extreme losses 
during such periods. In contrast, we find that the benefits of 
diversification are much greater during crisis periods, with 
improvement in both risk return profiles and Omega ratios. 
However, our most important finding relates to the estimation of 
portfolio tail-risk. In particular, we find that using a standard 
two-moment Value-at-Risk measure, which assumes normally 
distributed returns, rather than a four-moment Value-at-Risk, 
which incorporates an assets skewness and kurtosis, can lead to a 
substantial underestimation of portfolio risk during the most 
extreme market conditions. This result is especially important for 
Islamic portfolio managers as Islamic securities are more likely to 
deviate from a normal distribution for reasons such as market 
thinness, market illiquidity, the lack of product standardization 
and the inability to diversify across a broader range of markets.  
While these findings could motivate several strands of future 
research, such as extending our analysis to cover additional 
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markets and securities as well as studying the risk-factors of 
Islamic securities, the challenges facing the Islamic finance 
industry, such as the lack of market liquidity, insufficient hedging 
instruments, inadequate secondary markets and the lack of 
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3. Does Religious Priming and Decision-




We report the results of two experiments in which we explore the 
extent to which elicited risk attitudes are influenced by framing 
and religious priming. We find that risk-taking is significantly 
higher when an identical task is framed in terms of investment 
rather than gambling. We also find that a religious prime or 
setting (a Mosque) significantly lowers risk-taking in the 
gambling frame. One implication of our results is that risk 
elicitation methods should avoid a gambling frame. In the 
gambling frame we find that elicited risk-aversion is influenced by 
a range of factors, including gender, ethical standards and the 
















Risk-aversion constitutes one of the most fundamental properties 
of human behaviour. The seminal and pioneering work of 
Bernoulli9 on gambling and the St. Petersburg Paradox in the 17th 
century instigated substantial academic discourse and research 
devoted towards developing a greater understanding of the 
human decision-making process in situations involving risk. A 
significant focus of this research has been on measuring risk-
aversion at the individual level and exploring factors, such as 
gender, that may influence the extent of risk-aversion (Weber et 
al. 2002).   
Estimates and measures of risk-aversion have been studied and 
developed in various settings (see Harrison and Röstrom (2008) 
and Holt and Laury (2014) for a review). These include lab 
experiments and surveys (Gneezy and Potters (1997), Eckel and 
Grossman (2002), Lejuez et al. (2002), Holt and Laury (2002), 
Weber, Blais and Betz (2002), Charness and Gneezy (2010) and 
Dohmen et al. (2011)), labor-supply behaviour (Chetty 2006), 
portfolio choices among financial investors (Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) and Guiso and Paiella (2008)), option prices (Ait-Sahalia 
and Lo 2000), deductive choices in insurance contracts (Szpiro 
(1986) and Cohen and Einav (2007)), auction behaviour (Lu and 
Perrigne 2008) and even contestant behaviour on game shows 
(Post, Van Den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008) and 
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rustrom (2008)).  
While the catalogue of studies providing methods of estimating 
risk-preferences is clearly voluminous, considerable research has 
documented evidence that measured risk-attitudes often vary 
within individuals across elicitation techniques (See Johnson and 
Rojas 2007). Importantly, it is not the case of there being a scaling 
effect in that a particular method simply makes everyone seem 
more or less risk-averse by a given proportion. Rather, there 
seems to be a significant reordering of individuals in terms of the 
ranking of their implied risk-parameters (Isaac and James 2000). 
These results are consistent with the findings from a vast 
literature within psychology showing that risk-preferences are 
domain-specific (MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1986) and Weber et 
                                                   
9 See Bernoulli (1954) 
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al. (2002)). More precisely, individual risk-preferences do not 
display cross-situational stability, which implies that even if the 
objective numerical risk-return profiles are identical across two 
domains, individuals may actually prefer or be less-willing to take 
risks in one of those domains.  
A leading explanation for why we may observe differences in risk-
taking across domains has been the individual’s perception and 
trade-off between an activity’s benefits and risk. That is, 
analogous to risk-return models in finance, such as the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, researchers have argued that risk-attitude 
may be more usefully conceptualized in a psychological risk-
return framework. Psychological risk-return models treat 
perceived riskiness as a variable that can differ between 
individuals and as a function of content and context (Deck et al. 
2010). This provides for multiple ways in which characteristics of 
the decision maker and/or situation can affect choices under risk. 
Apparent risk-taking by the same decision-maker may differ if 
they perceive the risks and benefits to differ in magnitude across 
the two domains e.g. in a recreational versus a financial decision, 
while their attitude towards perceived risk essentially remains 
identical across both domains.  
Therefore, if an individual is faced with two opportunities that 
offer identical objective risk-return profiles but they consider one 
activity as either being less beneficial or riskier to engage in, 
perhaps for some wider subjective reasons, then we may observe 
differences in behaviour across those two domains. In other 
words, it is conceivable that there exist deeper considerations, 
such as the content-specificity of the action, which individuals 
take into account during their decision-making process, rather 
than purely basing their actions on quoted monetary values.  
The existing evidence relating to the significance of the content 
and domain specificity of risk-preferences could have important 
ramifications for research eliciting measures of risk aversion. This 
is because much of the experimental research eliciting risk-
preferences has the decision-task framed or presented in terms of 
lotteries and gambling. For example, in the well-known Gneezy 
and Potters (1997) experiment, participants are asked to decide 
the portion of their endowment they “wish to bet in the following 
lottery”, Eckel and Grossman (2002) measure risk attitudes by 
presenting participants with six possible “gambles” and asking 
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them to choose the one they would most prefer to play. Similarly, 
Benjamin et al. (2010) study how social identity affects risk-
preferences by presenting participants with 18 binary choices 
between a safe option and a gamble, with their instructions 
stating that “gambles would be resolved by drawing from a bag of 
red and blue marbles.”  
Frames like the three examples above suggest a gambling 
connotation which could be influencing results. Intuition behind 
this claim stems from the observation that gambling ostensibly 
seems to be stigmatized across multiple cultures. While there 
have been various explanations for why this may be, one possible 
explanation is that the world’s major religions don’t look upon 
gambling favourably (Binde 2007). Although there are varying 
degrees of ambiguity in the condemnation of gambling across 
religions10, the consensus among most sects across religious 
ideologies considers gambling as being morally objectionable11. 
Therefore, this argument postulates that due to the historically 
influential role religion has had on the human race, the aversion 
towards gambling may possibly have been ingrained into us over 
the centuries.  
If there is indeed a negative aura surrounding gambling, then 
using lottery-type tasks to elicit risk-preferences could be 
inadvertently priming subjects in a way that leads to an 
underestimation of overall risk-preferences, with this effect being 
more pronounced for particular demographics, such as the 
religious. Moreover, using results from abstract gambling tasks as 
proxies for risk attitudes to be applied in any context may lead to 
misleading inferences. In other words, previous studies that have 
been based on gambling frames have used their results to argue 
that religious agents display higher levels of risk-aversion than 
the irreligious. In this chapter, we argue that the religious may 
appear more risk-averse in these studies since the task is framed 
as a gamble (religious subjects are more likely to dislike 
                                                   
10 For instance, in Hinduism, Karma plays a central role and so 
the precise motives behind why exactly it is that someone is 
gambling will often have to be taken into consideration before 
determining whether or not such actions are deemed acceptable. 
11 Christianity: Exodus 20:17, Timothy 6:10. Luke 12:15, Matthew 
6:24 and Hebrews 13:15, Judaism: Talmud (Sanhedrin: 24), 
Islam: Quran (5:90), Hinduism: Rigveda Mandala 10, Sukta 34, 
Buddhism: Sigalovada Sutta.  
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gambling). Hence, if one interprets the results from such studies 
as religious people displaying greater levels of risk-aversion in 
general, then this wouldn’t be correct as gambling frames may be 
biasing the results.  
In this study, we contribute towards the literature in three ways. 
First, we test the proposition that the way in which the decision-
task is framed can influence risk-taking behaviour. We do this by 
maintaining an identical numerical problem and manipulating 
the framing of the decision-task to see whether this influences the 
risk-appetite of participants in an incentivised lab experiment. 
The two frames we use are an investment frame and a gambling 
frame. Across two experiments, we observe significantly less risky 
behaviour in gambling than in investing. This is consistent with 
the notion that a gambling frame overestimates risk aversion. 
Second, alongside employing a framing manipulation, we also test 
whether priming subjects to make religion, or perhaps more 
accurately some broader notion of ethics and morality, salient 
influences behaviour. The purpose of priming one’s religious 
identity is that it can temporarily increase the strength of one’s 
affiliation with that identity category, causing their behaviour to 
shift towards the category’s norms (Benjamin et al. 2016). Our 
motivation in using the priming task was to see if the investment 
versus gambling framing effect is more pronounced when subjects 
are given a religious prime. This would be evidence that ethics 
and morality are factors behind an aversion to gambling. Our 
results point to an interesting dynamic effect in which those given 
the religious prime react differently to a loss. This ultimately 
means that those given a religious prime gamble less.    
Finally, in a novel setup, we conduct a framing experiment within 
a religious setting. More precisely, we ran an experiment with 
Muslim participants, within the Mosque, immediately following a 
religious service. The purpose of doing so was to test whether 
greater religious intensity leads to a more pronounced difference 
in risk-taking across the gambling and investment frames. The 
framing effect we observed was extreme with hardly any risk 
taking in the gambling frame. This finding reinforces results from 
across our experimental studies that the framing effect varies 
predictably with situation and individual characteristics.  
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Across our two experimental studies risk taking in the investment 
frame was remarkably constant. We did not observe any 
difference because of prime (religious or neutral) or setting 
(Mosque, computer lab or classroom). Moreover, there was no 
gender difference. By contrast, in the gambling frame we observe 
big variations across prime, setting and gender. We would 
suggest, therefore, that studies looking to elicit an individual’s 
general attitude to risk should not use a frame that alludes to 
gambling. Instead more neutral frames should be employed. 
Whilst evidence of a significant framing effect has clear 
implications in terms of experimental research on risk-
preferences, such religious or ethical framing may also have real-
world applications. In general, the relevance of framing can be 
deduced by how ubiquitous the emphasis and advertisement of 
the ethical and moral aspects of businesses has become. For 
instance, firms commonly utilise marketing campaigns to promote 
and differentiate themselves from competitors through 
emphasising fair-trade policies, ethically-raised and free-from 
produce, employee pay and working conditions, environmental 
sustainability, charitable activities, gender equality and various 
other ethical or moral features of their business. The importance 
of framing or promoting such aspects of a business is clearly 
importance since a recent report found that 92% of millennials are 
more likely to purchase from what they consider an ethical 
company and 66% are likely to invest in a company well-known 
for its corporate social responsibility program (Aflac 2015).  
In addition, to provide an example that perhaps more directly 
relates to our research, consider a simple loan contract. Lenders 
provide borrowers with funding in exchange for an overall 
repayment that exceeds the amount initially lent. This excess 
demanded over the original amount borrowed typically contains 
compensation for the level of risk assumed by the lender and is 
commonly referred to as an interest rate. However, under Islamic 
law, interest is strictly prohibited. Modern Islamic banking 
circumvents this issue by essentially rephrasing or repackaging 
such compensation as a “profit-rate”. In other words, assuming 
two identical loan contracts, simply manipulating or reframing 
the compensation for risk as profit rather than interest can alter 
whether certain agents consider the contract permissible or not. 
Although there is little research in this area, evidence of a 
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significant framing effect in our experiment suggests that it may 
be of interest to test how altering the framing of interest rates for 
mortgage contracts or student-loans influences participation and 
enrolment by Islamic agents in such productive investments.    
3.2. PRIOR LITERATURE 
 
There are two strands of literature related to our study. The first 
strand compares risk-preferences between different faith-groups 
and between religious and non-religious. The second looks at 
framing effects on risky behaviour.  
A general finding from studies comparing risk-preferences across 
faith groups is that the religious appear (weakly) more risk-averse 
than the irreligious (e.g. Bartke and Schwarz 2008, Hilary and 
Hui 2009, Noussair et al. 2012). This result has sometimes been 
explained through the fact that irreligious individuals essentially 
take the riskier option in Pascal’s wager12 and are thus in general 
more likely to display a greater appetite for risk than religious 
individuals. The basic theme of our study, however, is that 
measurement of risk aversion may interact with religiosity. It is 
important, therefore, to consider how risk aversion is measured 
and whether this may bias results.  
An interesting comparison is that between Barsky et al. (1997) 
and Halek and Eisenhaur (2001). Measuring risk aversion using 
hypothetical questions about whether the person would take a job 
that could improve or worsen family income, Barsky et al. (1997) 
find evidence that Protestants are more risk averse than 
Catholics who are more risk averse than Jewish.13 By contrast, 
Halek and Eisenhaur (2001) using life-insurance data, find that 
                                                   
12 See Miller and Hoffman (1995) 
13 It’s interesting to note that the sample used by Barsky et al. 
(1997) was restricted to adults aged between 51 and 61. Some 
authors have argued that religion becomes more salient during 
older ages as individuals approach the later stages of their 
lifecycle and could thus be more inclined to play the safer option 
in Pascal’s wager. In this case using lottery-based tasks seems 
undesirable since the conflict between gambling and religion 
could be influencing the behaviour of participants and thus not 
providing a true reflection of risk-aversion in other domains. 
58 
 
Catholics are marginally more risk averse than Protestants.14 
They also, though, are able to measure risk aversion using the 
same hypothetical questions as Barsky et al. (1997). Here they 
find, consistent with Barsky et al. (1997) that Protestants are 
more risk averse than Catholics.  
Halek and Eisenhaur (2001) put this ‘flipping’ of risk attitudes 
down to different preferences for speculative risk. For instance, 
they point out that Protestants are more likely to view gambling 
as sinful (see also Kumar et al. (2011) and Benjamin et al. (2016)). 
If so, this would illustrate that attitudes to risk are sensitive to 
context. There is the additional concern that choices made in 
hypothetical situations may not reflect actual behaviours when 
real money is at stake. Furthermore, evidence from experimental 
economics suggests that respondent’s reports of their own 
attitudes don’t always reflect their actual behaviours (e.g. 
Glaesers et al. 2000). In emotive contexts such as religion, 
questionnaire responses may be particularly subject to 
conformity, self-image or desirability biases.  
A further illustration of the way risk preferences can be 
influenced by the interaction between religion and context is 
provided by Leon and Pfeifer (2013). They use a German survey 
data to investigate whether religiosity explains a household’s 
willingness to take financial risks. Compared to the irreligious, 
Christians were more willing to take financial risks through 
holding larger positions in equities whereas Muslims were less 
risk-taking with relatively larger investments in real-estate 
compared to equities. However, Leon and Pfeifer (2013) also find 
that Muslims are less likely to invest in life insurance compared 
to the irreligious whereas Christians were more likely to do so. 
Given that these results seem contradictory, as we would expect 
risk-averse individuals to be more likely to purchase life-
insurance, one potential explanation of these findings could be 
that the Islamic faiths prohibition on certain types of investment 
are driving the decisions to abstain from equity and insurance 
market investments.  
Another study related to our work is that of Benjamin et al. 
(2016). In their study, an unscrambling exercise was used to make 
                                                   
14 The sample size for Jewish is small but in terms of the raw 
coefficient they display more risk aversion than Catholics. 
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religion salient for some participants. The sentences varied 
depending on whether the subject was part of the religion-salient 
condition or the control group.15 Benjamin et al. (2016) then use a 
multiple price type lottery experiment to elicit risk attitudes. The 
authors find that religious identity salience causes both Catholics 
and the irreligious to become less risk-averse, but has no 
significant effect for Protestants and Jews. The authors argue 
that the strength of the identity salience manipulation could vary 
by religious group, making them more likely to find null effects in 
some groups than in others. Even so, it is a surprise to see less 
risk-aversion with the religious prime. We obtain different results 
as we shall discuss more below.  
We will highlight one further study on risk aversion and religion 
as it is one of the studies that has data on Muslims. Bartke and 
Schwarz (2008) use self-reported survey data to examine the 
relationship between religion and risk-aversion among German 
immigrants. Muslim migrants were found to be more risk-averse 
than their Christian counterparts, which was attributed to the 
degree of strictness or comprehensiveness of the behavioural rules 
embedded within a particular religion.  
The preceding discussion has highlighted how risk preferences 
may depend on an interaction between religion and context or 
framing. The more general notion that elicited risk preferences 
depend on context and framing of choice is well known. Indeed, 
research has shown that there is little situational stability in 
preferences (Deck et al. 2010). That is, there is little consistency 
in people’s risk-taking attitudes across decision domains, 
including gains versus losses (Weber and Hsee 1999), money 
versus time domains (Weber and Milliman 1997), and gambling, 
financial investing, business decisions and personal decisions 
(MacCrimmon and Wehrung 1986, 1990).  
Schubert et al. (1999) provide a particularly interesting example 
of how the context and framing of a question can influence 
                                                   
15 Five of the ten sentences unscrambled by religion-salient 
subjects contained religious content. The possible unscrambled 
sentences for this group were as follows 1) she felt the spirit 2) the 
desert was divine 3) her presence was appreciated 4) do it once 
more 5) I mailed it over 6) give thanks to God 7) he finished it 
yesterday 8) the book was sacred 9) prophets reveal the future 
and 10) I was somewhat prepared. 
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findings and the subsequent policy prescriptions derived from 
them. Several studies have found evidence of strong gender-
effects whereby women display significantly greater levels of risk-
aversion than their male counterparts (e.g. Croson and Gneezy 
(2009) and Booth and Nolen (2012)). However, Schubert et al. 
(1999) argue that such studies are strongly dependent on the 
framing of the decision task. That is, while gender specific risk 
propensities do arise in abstract gambling tasks, with males 
showing a greater appetite for risky behaviour, the authors argue 
that such differences in risk-attitudes are eliminated when the 
decision task is reframed as an investment decision. Hence, they 
suggest that abstract gambling experiments may be inadequate 
for the analysis of gender-specific risk attitudes towards financial 
decisions as in practice risky financial decisions are inherently 
contextual (Schubert et al. 1999). Our results will reinforce this 
conclusion. 
In an influential paper, Weber et al. (2002) introduce the so-called 
Domain Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) Scale. This simple 
psychometric scale assesses individual risk-attitudes by asking 
respondents to rate the likelihood that they would engage in 
domain-specific risky activities, as well as their perceptions of the 
magnitude of the risks and expected benefits of engaging in each 
domain. This data is then used to generate domain-specific risk-
taking propensities that are then used as a predictor of risk-
taking behaviour. Covering five content domains i.e. ethical, 
financial, health, social and recreational in their original study, 
Weber et al. (2002) find that risk-taking varied across domains. 
However, perceived, rather than apparent, risk and benefits 
jointly explained a significant proportion of the variability in risk-
taking across domains.16  
In a more recent paper, Dohmen et al. (2011) find that a general 
survey-based question on risk-propensity, where participants are 
asked to rank how risk-taking they consider themselves in 
                                                   
16 Several studies have both adapted and tested the construct 
validity of the original DOSPERT scale. For instance, Zuniga and 
Bouzas (2006) found that scores on both the recreational and 
health and safety risk-taking subscales significantly predicted 
estimated blood alcohol concentrations in Mexican high-school 
students. Similarly, Hanoch et al. (2006) find that smokers were 
significantly more likely to have a higher risk-taking propensity 
score in the health and safety subscale. 
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general on a scale from 1-10, provides a good all-round 
explanatory variable for risk-taking across many domains. 
However, although less successful across particular domains, they 
find that the single best risk measure in any given context is the 
measure incorporating the corresponding specific context, which 
is akin to the DOSPERT Scale developed by Weber et al. (2002). 
For instance, the best predictor of smoking is the question about 
willingness to take risks in health matters, rather than the 
general risk question. This again, reinforces the need for 
measurement of risk preferences to be specific to the context. On 
the flip side, it suggests we should avoid contexts that are 
unlikely to be representative of general risk preferences. We 
argue that a gambling frame is such a context. 
 




Our first experimental study employs a 2x2 design, crossing 
prime – religious or neutral – with frame – gamble or investment 
– to give us four treatments, as outlined in Table 3.1. The 
experiment consists of three stages.  
First, participants are asked to answer five questions, at their 
own speed. These questions, listed in Table 3.2, were used to 
prime subjects and therefore differed in content depending on 
whether the participant was part of the primed or control group. 
As can be seen, the religious prime questions are intended to 
capture a broad notion of ethics and morality. This has the benefit 
of adding subtlety in the sense that we were not obviously 
targeting religion.17 We also anticipated that our sample may not 
contain too many fervently religious participants.  
In the first three questions subjects were asked to provide short 
written answers. This was intentional as research in cognitive 
neuroscience suggests that recognition type questions i.e. multiple 
choice or matching, such as that used by Benjamin et al. (2016), 
stimulate less activity in the brain than recall questions i.e. essay 
                                                   
17 Wheeler and Petty (2001) argue that subtle primes more 
reliably cause behaviour to conform to norms.  
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or short-written answer questions (Cabeza et al. 1997). Therefore, 
we hoped this would create a stronger prime. For the final two 
questions, participants were asked to choose their answers from a 
five-point Likert scale i.e. strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree or strongly disagree. The neutral prime was 
designed to replicate the religious prime as closely as possible 
while focussing on neutral topics. 
  Frame 
Prime Investment Gambling 
Religious Religious Investment (RI) Religious Gambling (RG) 
Neutral  Neutral Investment (NI) Neutral Gambling (NG) 
 
Table 3.1. Treatments 
 
Once participants completed the first stage of the experiment, 
they moved onto the second stage, which was the main decision-
task. The decision-task we use was based on the seminal work of 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). We use the Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
framework not only due to its simplicity, which makes it more 
readily understood by subjects, but also the ease with which the 
framing could be changed. The decision-task consisted of eight 
identical rounds. In each round, participants are given an 
endowment of 100 tokens and are asked to decide, depending on 
the framing, how many tokens, with a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 100, they would like to bet or invest. We shall refer to 
the choice as the amount allocated to the risky option. The 
probability of winning in any round was 33% and the probability 
of losing was 67%. If participants won a particular round, they 
would earn a 250% return on the amount allocated. In the case of 
a loss, participants simply lost the number of tokens allocated. 
Whatever sum wasn’t allocated was kept by the participants. 
Subjects received feedback on whether they had won at the end of 
each round. 
As alluded to earlier, the decision problem remains identical 
across frames. The only difference between the investment and 
gambling frame, as shown in Figures 3.1A and 3.1B, is the 
graphic participants see as well as a slight manipulation of 
wording. In the investment frame participants were told ‘For 
instance, you might imagine that you can make a business 
investment into the Research and Development programme of one 
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of the fastest tech start-ups specialising in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI).’ The instructions then talk of investment throughout. By 
contrast, in the gambling frame participants were asked how 
many tokens they would like to bet. The instructions to both 
frames are available in the appendix.  
 
  Prime 
  Religious    Neutral  
1) 
 
Do humans serve a greater 
purpose beyond the pleasures or 
satisfaction derived from 
engaging in our daily activities? 
   
What features of social 
media sites, such as 
Facebook, do you 
believe have caused 
them to resonate with 
so many people? 
2) 
 
Are humans born with morality 
embedded within them or is it 
socially constructed? In other 
words, is morality intrinsic i.e. 
present within us from birth, or 
learned from our environment? 
   
Is there a difference 
between the sport you 
enjoy playing most and 




Would the promise of eternal 
immortality cause you to alter 
your day-to-day behaviour? 
   
What aspect(s) of 




Whether a lie is judged to be 
moral or immoral depends upon 
the circumstances surrounding 
the action. 
   
I rely on some form of 




One shouldn’t perform an action 
that could harm or threaten the 
welfare of an innocent other. 
   
I think it is better to 
watch than to 
participate in sport. 
 
Table 3.2. Priming Questions 
 
Payoffs were calculated as the cumulative earnings over each of 
the eight rounds, plus a £2 participation fee. As the number of 
tokens allocated was bounded by 0-100 in any single round, and 
they simply lost the amount allocated if the round was lost, there 
was no situation in which subjects could have negative earnings. 
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Participants received feedback on the outcome of a round before 
going to the next round. Following the completion of the second 
stage of the experiment i.e. the decision-task, subjects then moved 
onto the final stage which involved answering a questionnaire 
that was intended to gather information on demographic and 
other control variables. The experiment was programmed and run 
using Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Our sample consisted of 85 
undergraduate and postgraduate students studying at the 
Canterbury campus of the University of Kent.  
 
 
Figure 3.1A. Graphic Shown in Investment Frame 
 
Figure 3.1B. Graphic Shown in Gambling Frame 
 
3.3.2. Hypotheses 
In the Gneezy and Potters (1997) task there is a positive return 
from allocating tokens to the risky option and so a risk neutral 
65 
 
individual should allocate all 100 tokens in each round. 
Specifically, if an individual allocates 100 tokens then his 
expected payoff is a third of 350, or 115 tokens, which is more 
than a sure 100 tokens. In reality, few individuals invest 100 
tokens. The average number of tokens a participant allocates can, 
therefore, be used as a measure of risk-taking. This is the main 
outcome measure we shall focus on.  
Our main hypothesis concerns the comparison between the 
investment and gambling frame.  
Hypothesis One: Allocations to the risky option will be higher in 
the investment frame than in the gambling frame.  
There are least two plausible mechanisms that motivate this 
hypothesis. First, gambling is stigmatized across multiple 
cultures and religious faiths as morally objectionable. Investment, 
or having an entrepreneurial spirit, by contrast, is typically 
looked upon favourably. This, of itself, would lead to less risk-
taking in the gambling frame and is the main effect we are 
interested in studying. Second, loss-aversion is known to be 
domain specific (Li et al. 2012) and a gambling frame may make 
someone focus more on losses. In essence it may feel worse to lose 
in a gambling frame than investment frame. Hence, an individual 
may be more reluctant to gamble than invest. Note that, if true, 
this bias is likely a consequence of the different cultural norms 
around gambling. Hence we obtain a direct moral effect from a 
gambling frame and an indirect loss aversion effect.  
Recall that our work is motivated by the idea that a gambling-
investment framing effect may bias measures of risk aversion. 
This is a particular concern if the effect systematically differs 
depending on personal characteristics. Prior work suggests the 
framing effects are partly mediated by gender. We would expect 
the gambling-investment framing effect would also be mediated 
by the level of religiosity. 
Hypothesis Two: The gambling-investment framing effect will be 
more pronounced in females than males and the religious than 
irreligious.  
If the stigmatization of gambling is due to issues of religion and 
morality then priming participants to think about morality should 
lower allocations in the gambling frame. So, risk taking should be 
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lowest among participants who were both religiously primed and 
faced a gambling task. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that 
religion and gambling are potentially in conflict, there is no 
indication of any mainstream religion discouraging investment. 
So, we expect the religious prime to have less effect in the 
investment frame.  
Hypothesis Three: The gambling-investment framing effect will be 
larger with the religious prime.  
Hypotheses 1 to 3 focus on the overall amount allocated to the 
risky option. A further consideration is that the frame or prime 
could have a dynamic effect. Specifically, primed participants in 
the gambling frame may react differently to losses from previous 
rounds than those that face a neutral prime.  This is because 
making religion salient could intensify the regret or guilt 
participants feel when engaging in and subsequently losing a 
gamble.  
Hypothesis Four: Allocations to the risky option are more 
sensitive to loss in the gambling frame than investment frame 
and religious prime than neutral prime. 
3.3.3. Results 
 
Following Gneezy and Potters (1997), we use the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney test to analyse treatment effects18. Furthermore, 
as some authors have argued that non-parametric tests may have 
relatively low power, we additionally report results from the 
                                                   
18 While the Gneezy and Potters (1997) task offers a clean method 
of studying framing effects in terms of statistically testing for 
differences in the levels of investment across treatments, a 
disadvantage of this method is that it cannot distinguish between 
risk-seeking and risk-neutral preferences (Charness et al. 2013). 
That is, data from the Gneezy and Potters (1997) experiment 
cannot be readily used to calculate the range of the parameter of 
risk-aversion. Recent studies such as Kortajarene et al. (2015) use 
more elaborate methodologies such as finite mixture models to 
extract measures of risk-aversion from the Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) data based on a CRRA specification, which has, however, 
been argued to be inadequate at explaining the behaviour 
observed in the Gneezy and Potters (1997) study (Harrison and 
Rustrom 2008). We leave further exploration of this point for 
future work.  
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bootstrapped t-test to provide greater robustness to our findings 
(see Moffatt 2015). The null-hypothesis across all tests is that the 
number of tokens allocated to the risky option is equal across 
groups. We summarize our findings in six key results. 
Result 1: Allocations to the risky option are significantly higher in 
the investment frame than in the gambling frame. 
To ease comparison, we take the average percentage of 
endowment allocated to the risky option in blocks of two rounds. 
These averages and the corresponding standard deviations are 
presented in Table 3.3. The final column of Table 3.3 gives the 
average percentage of endowment allocated over all rounds. We 
find that the average allocation is significantly higher in the 
investment than gambling frame. Indeed, the average allocation 
is between 37% and 49% higher in the investment frame. 
Therefore, we find strong evidence in favour of our first 
hypothesis.  
 
Table 3.3. Average Allocation to the Risky Option across Frames 
 
Result 2: Investment is lowest in the treatment with a religious 
prime and gambling frame. 
Table 3.4 reports the average allocation to the risky option by 
treatment. Overall (Rounds 1-8), allocations are lowest in the RG 
treatment. Consistent with Hypothesis 3 we find that the framing 
effect is more pronounced with a religious prime (statistically 
significant increase in amount invested of 49% compared to 
statistically insignificant increase of 37%). Even so, over rounds 1-
4, risk-taking is higher in the RG treatment than for the NG 
treatment. It is in Rounds 5 to 8 that the RG treatment really 
  Rounds 1-2 Rounds 3-4 Rounds 5-6 Rounds 7-8 Rounds 1-8 
Avg. Gamble (n = 38) 15.34 17.18 19.61 22.00 18.53 
Avg. Investment (n = 47) 21.46 25.50 29.13 30.05 26.53 
Std.Dev (Gamble) 16.76 16.92 23.55 24.94 18.08 
Std.Dev (Investment) 14.16 22.60 24.41 26.73 18.15 
Mann-Whitney 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.01 
Bootstrapped T-Test 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.04 
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stands out as having lower investment. This points towards a 
dynamic effect of the prime.  
 
  Rounds 1-2 Rounds 3-4 Rounds 5-6 Rounds 7-8 Rounds 1-8 
Avg. Tokens Invested 
RI (n = 22)  21.48 21.16 28.75 32.91 26.07 
RG (n = 20) 16.48 18.45 16.93 18.23 17.52 
NI (n = 25) 21.44 29.32 29.46 27.54 26.94 
NG (n = 18)  14.08 15.78 22.58 26.19 19.66 
Mann-Whitney P-Values 
RI = RG 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 
NI = NG 0.05 0.19 0.35 0.48 0.24 
Bootstrapped T-Test P-Values 
RI = RG 0.28 0.64 0.07 0.04 0.09 
NI = NG 0.12 0.03 0.38 0.88 0.21 
 
Table 3.4. Evidence for Result 2 and Hypothesis 3 
 
Result 3: The change in allocation following a loss is negative in 
the treatment with a religious prime and gambling frame while 
positive in all other treatments. 
Figure 3.2 displays the average percentage change in allocation to 
the risky option in round 𝑡 following a loss in round 𝑡 − 1. As 
illustrated, while those who faced a religious prime seemed to be 
more cautious following a loss than those with a neutral prime, 
we find a substantially greater contraction for those in the 
religious gambling treatment. The reaction to a loss is 
significantly different between the RG and NG treatments (p = 
0.03 Mann Whitney, 0.01 T-test). This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4. This effect is even more pronounced by the fact that 
in three treatments we observe an increase in allocation following 
a loss, possibly in an attempt to recover losses, while in the RG 
treatment we observe a decrease. As hypothesized this suggests 




Figure 3. 1. Average Percentage Change in Allocation to the Risky 
Option Following Loss in Previous Round 
Result 4: The gambling-investment framing effect is stronger in 
females than males. 
Female 
  Rounds 1-2 Rounds 3-4 Rounds 5-6 Rounds 7-8 Rounds 1-8 
Avg. Gamble (n = 23) 15.93 13.33 15.09 17.37 15.43 
Avg. Investment (n = 29) 24.26 24.90 27.59 29.84 26.65 
Std.Dev (Gamble) 19.72 14.61 20.84 18.38 17.56 
Std.Dev (Investment) 14.11 23.49 19.37 27.74 18.17 
Mann-Whitney 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 
Bootstrapped T-Test 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 
Male 
Avg. Gamble (n = 15) 14.43 23.10 26.53 29.10 23.29 
Avg. Investment (n = 18) 16.94 26.47 31.61 30.39 26.35 
Std.Dev (Gamble) 11.38 18.95 26.43 31.99 18.42 
Std.Dev (Investment) 13.39 21.72 31.37 25.81 18.65 
Mann-Whitney 0.73 0.80 0.66 0.56 0.72 
Bootstrapped T-Test 0.55 0.63 0.61 0.90 0.62 
 
Table 3.5. Average Allocation to the Risky Option by Gender 
 
Table 3.5 reports the average allocation to the risky option across 
frames by females and males. For female participants we observe 
a strong gambling-investment framing effect with allocations 
significantly higher in the investment frame. For males we 
observe a much smaller and statistically insignificant effect. This 
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is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and corroborates the findings of 
Schubert et al. (1999) regarding the content-specificity of the 
decision-task and the apparent aversion towards gambling among 
female participants. 
Result 5: The gambling-investment framing effect is stronger in 
subjects who are religious and ethical. 
We classify a religious participant as someone who identifies as 
being part of a particular religious faith-group whilst on average 
not attending any church service(s) in any given month. An 
actively religious participant not only identifies as being part of a 
particular religious faith-group but also attends at-least one 
church service a month, on average. While the economic effect is 
somewhat larger for the actively religious, we find that both 
groups are less-willing to take risks in the gambling frame than in 
the investment frame. Specifically, we observe a significant 
framing effect for both actively religious (17.49 versus 29.54, p = 
0.05 Mann Whitney, n = 12 Gambling, n = 21 Investment) and 
religious (19.52 versus 27.82, p = 0.02 Mann Whitney, n = 24 
Gambling, n = 40 Investment). We do not find a significant effect 
for the non-religious (16.85 versus 19.21, Mann-Whitney 0.55, n = 
14 Gambling, 7 Investment).  
However, what seems to have a stronger effect than religion is 
whether an individual identifies as being ethical. We define a 
participant as being ethical if they either agreed or strongly 
agreed that ethical and moral decisions influence their decisions 
on where or how to spend their money. Ethical participants 
allocated almost 130% less to the risky option in the gambling 
frame than in the investment frame (11.87 versus 27.15, p = 0.01 
Mann Whitney, n = 19 Gambling, n = 28 Investment) In contrast, 
no significant framing effect was found for non-ethical 
participants (25.20 versus 25.63, p = 0.38, Mann-Whitney, n = 19 
Gambling, n = 19 Investment).  
Participants were also asked whether they strongly agreed, 
agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed or strongly 
disagreed, with the statement that they would generally be 
willing to accept a lower return on socially responsible 
investments. Categorising participants who responded that they 
agreed or strongly agreed with the above statement as socially-
responsible, we find that the average allocation is almost 95% 
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higher in the investment frame (12.53 versus 24.39, p = 0.05 
Mann Whitney, n = 12 Gambling, n = 20 Investment). For those 
not classified as socially-responsible, the average allocation was 
around 76% higher in the investment frame (21.3 versus 28.13, p 
= 0.05, n = 26 Gambling, n = 27 Investment). 
Result 6: There is marginal evidence that the gambling-
investment framing effect is stronger in subjects who self-report 
being loss-averse. 
In the questionnaire participants were asked whether they 
strongly agreed, agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, disagreed 
or strongly disagreed, with the statement that they were more 
concerned about the probable losses than probable gains when 
making a financial decision. We categorise anyone who either 
agreed or strongly agreed with the above statement as being loss-
averse and subsequently test for any framing effect among this 
group of participants. We find that loss-averse participants on 
average allocated 37.2% more tokens to the risky option in the 
investment frame than in the gambling frame (25.06 versus 
18.27) although the effect is only marginally significant (p = 0.06 
Mann Whitney, n = 28 Gambling, n = 30 Investment).  No 
significant framing effect was found for non-loss averse 
participants although the absolute effect is still large (29.14 
versus 19.28, p = 0.13 Mann Whitney, n = 10 Gambling, n = 17 
Investment). 
To corroborate the findings reported above, Table 3.6 presents the 
results from a simple regression analysis. From Table 3.6, we find 
that a gambling frame significantly lowers the amount of tokens 
invested, as illustrated earlier. Moreover, while we do not find 
any significant effect of moral priming on the amount of tokens 
invested, we do find further evidence of a dynamic priming effect. 
As shown, on average, subjects that had experienced a loss in the 
previous round (𝑡 − 1), increased the amount, though 
insignificantly, of tokens invested in the subsequent round (𝑡). By 
contrast, subjects that faced the moral, rather than neutral, 
priming questions, significantly lowered the amount of tokens 






























No. of Observations 595 
 
Table 3.6. Regression Analysis19 
3.3.4. Discussion 
 
We observe a large gambling-investment framing effect. 
Specifically allocations to the risky option were around 40% 
higher when the task was framed in terms of investment. So, 
framing matters. More important for our purposes is that we see 
this framing effect systematically varies according to the 
characteristics of the participant. In particular, males and those 
who are irreligious or not ethical seem to be largely unaffected by 
the frame. By contrast, we see that women, the religious and 
those classified as being ethical are significantly affected. This is 
important because it means that risk preference elicitation 
methods framed in a way that brings to mind gambling may 
produce biased estimates of general risk preferences. 
We conjectured that the gambling frame would decrease risk 
taking because of the cultural norms around gambling. That we 
                                                   
19 (Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects 




observe a bigger framing effect amongst the religious is consistent 
with this. It is clear, however, that being religious is not the only 
factor. First, we have the gender divide. Second, the correlation 
between being ethical and religious among our sample was only 
0.14.20 Therefore, it seems as though gambling is deemed 
unethical by people beyond those belonging to a particular 
religious faith group. This could be because of norms, which have 
been shaped by religion, influencing those who are not actively 
religious. 
We saw that the religious prime primarily had a dynamic effect. 
In particular participants exposed to the religious prime 
decreased allocation to the risky option if they were exposed to a 
loss. This meant that allocations in the treatment where subjects 
were exposed to a religious prime and gambling frame was 
ultimately significantly lower than in the other three treatments. 
Put another way, participants exposed to a neutral prime and 
gambling frame increased risk-taking over time. This suggests 
that the effects of the frame wore off over time if participants 
were not exposed to the religious prime. The prime, therefore, had 
a long run impact, potentially by shaping how participants 
reacted to outcomes. 
 
3.4. EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Although we find a strong treatment effect for religious 
participants in our main experiment, the average gamble is still 
positive. If religion prohibits gambling, then it is reasonable to 
question why religious participants still decided to bet some 
portion of their endowments rather than simply refusing to bet 
anything at all. One explanation could be people identify as being 
part of a religious faith without actually having too deep an 
understanding about the principles or tenets of their chosen 
religious ideology. Simply put, religion may serve more as a label 
than something which is strictly abided by. This is arguably more 
likely to be the case among a sample of university students given 
the common finding in the literature that the fervency of religious 
                                                   




belief declines with education (Inglehart and Baker 2000, Glaeser 
and Sacerdote 2008).  
Another related explanation is the environment in which 
individuals act. That is, behaviour could vary, where individuals 
act in a way that is more closely aligned to religious teachings 
when they are in a religious or more natural environment. For 
instance, university students may decide to gamble when faced 
with the task in a laboratory setting but wouldn’t actively decide 
to gamble outside of the laboratory. This again could vary 
depending on religious intensity. For example, given the 
possibility that university students are likely to be less stringent 
in their following of religion, they may decide to take a small risk 
in the moment whereas those with stricter religious inclinations 
may be less willing to do so.  
The broader point here is that elicited risk preferences may not 
only be subject to the frame and individual characteristics, as 
shown in Experiment 1, but also the environment where the 
preferences are elicited. To test for such an effect we conducted a 
follow-up experiment inside a Mosque, with a control group in a 
classroom. Conducting the experiment within the premises of the 
Mosque essentially offers a much stronger priming effect as 
participants are surrounded by a religious atmosphere. Our main 




To conduct the experiment within the Mosque we condensed 
Experiment 1 into a simple one-shot version without the initial 
priming questions. Participants simply read the instructions, 
made their choice, pulled a number out of a bag to determine 
whether they won or not, and then were paid accordingly. This 
took around 5 minutes.  
The main part of the experiment was conducted inside a Mosque 
situated nearby the Canterbury campus of the University of Kent. 
Following congregational prayers, an announcement was made 
that a research experiment was being conducted in a designated 
area of the Mosque. The experiment was conducted in both the 
male and female areas of the Mosque to obtain a balanced sample. 
We were able to recruit 43 participants.  
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As a control we recruited a further 20 subjects from the general 
student population. These participants were exposed to the same 
one-shot version of the experiment as those in the Mosque. The 
control was carried out in a small lecture theatre at the 
university. In both the Mosque and classroom we were careful to 
make sure that participants were only exposed to their frame and 
could not see the alternative frame.  
3.4.2. Hypotheses 
 
Our main hypothesis remains, 
Hypothesis One: Risk-taking will be higher in the investment 
frame than in the gambling frame.  
Here, however, we expect a stronger effect caused by the 
particular religious setting and the fact that Islam explicitly 
prohibits aleatory transactions such as gambling, wagering or 
betting (Schacht 1982). Note that investment is not prohibited 
and is positively encouraged in Islam. 
Hypothesis five: We will observe a larger framing effect in the 
Mosque than in the classroom or Experiment 1.  
3.4.3. Results 
 
We summarize our findings in two main results. 
Result 7: We observe a very large gambling-investment framing 
effect with virtually no gambling in the Mosque.  
Table 3.7 presents the average allocation to the risky option by 
treatment for participants in the Mosque. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 5 we see a very large framing effect. The observed 
increase of allocations in the investment frame of 785% compares 
to 43.2% in Experiment 1. Moreover, 71.4% of subjects in the 
Mosque did not allocate anything to the risky option in the 
gambling frame (and 86% gambled with less than three tokens of 
their endowment). In contrast, every participant who faced the 
investment task allocated a positive amount to the risky option. 
Moreover, we observe a large gambling-investment framing effect 




              
  Complete Sample Females Males Loss-Averse Ethical SRI  
Avg. Gamble 4.95 5.55 4.30 4.25 4.44 11.33 
Avg. Investment 38.86 46.50 32.50 41.25 33.67 37.08 
Std. Dev Gambling 11.86 11.77 12.56 11.62 11.33 16.46 
Std. Dev Investment 24.49 27.49 20.73 22.88 21.00 22.71 
Mann-Whitney 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Bootstrapped T-Test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 43 21 22 20 31 21 
 
Table 3.7. Average Allocation to the Risky Option by Participants 
in the Mosque 
 
Result 8: We observe a significant but less pronounced gambling-
investment framing in the classroom compared to Mosque.  
Figure 3.3 shows average allocations to the risky option in the 
control group compared to the Mosque. We see that, for the 
control group, the average allocation is lower in the gambling 
frame (22.73 versus 40.0, Mann-Whitney 0.11, T-Test 0.07, n = 11 
Gambling, n = 9 Investment). This is further evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 1. The framing effect is, however, notably lower in 
our control than in the Mosque, lending further support to 
Hypothesis 5. This is consistent with the mediating effect of 
religion and moral views as well as the importance of the setting. 
 





This experiment reinforces the general point that behaviour is 
influenced by the frame, this time in a one-shot setting. The 
experiment also powerfully shows that the situational context can 
influence the gambling-investment framing effect. Clearly, the 
Mosque is a very particular setting with a strong religious 
priming effect. Even so, the very large framing effect we observe 
illustrates that we can, more generally, expect the setting to 
matter. It is particularly noteworthy that we observe a large 
framing effect for men as well as women. This compares to 
Experiment 1 where the effect was small for men. This nicely 
demonstrates that both personal characteristics (male and female 
in Experiment 1) and setting (Mosque or lab) influence the 
magnitude of the framing effect.   
 
3.5. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Through implementing a simple framing manipulation, we show 
that an individual’s propensity to bear risk varies depending on 
the framing of the choice they face. This result corroborates the 
findings of several earlier studies that provide evidence of the 
domain and context-specificity of risk-preferences (MacCrimmon 
and Wehrung (1986), Schubert et al. (1999), Weber et al. (2002), 
Hanoch et al. (2006), Dohmen et al. (2011)). The significance of 
this framing effect varied across demographic groups. Most 
notably, female and religious participants displayed a significant 
aversion towards gambling, relative to investment. It also varied 
across situational settings. For instance, both men and women 
showed an aversion to gambling in a Mosque.  
Our results add to the literature exploring the often observed 
gender disparities across economic domains such as the labor 
market (see Blau and Kahn 2000 for a review), and saving, 
investment and consumption behaviour (Croson and Gneezy 
(2009) and Fisher (2010)). These differences have been 
hypothesized to have been driven by gender-specific differences in 
preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Several experimental 
studies using both real and hypothetical payoffs with either an 
explicit or implicit lottery-based framing have consistently found 
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males as being more risk-prone than females (Schubert et al. 
(1999), Holt and Laury (2002), Hartog et al. (2002), Eckel and 
Grossman (2002) and Charness and Gneezy (2012)). However, if 
females are inherently more averse to gambling tasks than males, 
as our results indicate, then the results from the aforementioned 
studies may not be generalizable beyond the domain of gambling.  
Eckel and Grossman (2008), in reviewing the evidence for risk 
aversion, conclude that there is no consistent evidence of gender 
differences in contextual environments (as opposed to gambling 
environments where the evidence is clear). Schubert et al. (1999), 
for instance, find that reframing the decision-task as an 
investment eliminates the gender-effect that is found when the 
problem is presented as an abstract gamble. Similarly, (see Table 
3.5) we observe no difference between men and women in an 
investment frame but find a significant difference in the gambling 
frame. Moreover, in the setting of the Mosque, we find no 
difference between men and women in either the investment or 
gambling frame. There are contextual frames where females are 
more risk averse than men (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2008b). 
Overall, however, we would suggest that the evidence for greater 
risk taking in males may well be an artefact of how risk 
preferences are elicited.    
Evidence of a significant framing effect for religious, ethical and 
socially-responsible participants suggests that people take into 
account deeper considerations beyond monetary payoffs during 
their decision-making process. Understanding differences in risk-
preferences that are derived from cultural or religious 
heterogeneity could contribute towards our understanding of 
individual differences in socio-economic outcomes (Iannaccone 
(1998) and Hoffmann (2013)) such as entrepreneurship decisions 
(Audretsch et al. 2007), wealth accumulation (Keister 2003), 
savings behaviour (Renneboog and Spaenjers 2012) and labor 
market outcomes (Giavazzi et al. 2009). Moreover, if such 
differences in individual risk-attitudes are responsible for distinct 
economic choices, then they may further provide a microeconomic 
foundation for divergent aggregate outcomes21.  
                                                   
21 This has been an area of growing interest, with studies on the 
macroeconomic consequences of religion and culture on economic 
growth (Barro and McCleary 2003), economic development 
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The existing literature comparing risk-preferences between 
religious groups has typically found that Catholics are more risk-
prone than Protestants and that the religious are more risk-
averse than the irreligious (Barsky et al. (1997), Hilary and Hui 
(2009), Kumar et al. (2011), Noussair et al. (2012) and Benjamin 
et al. (2016)). However, the existing experimental studies have 
typically been based around lottery-type tasks. As our findings 
show, religious participants are likely to be more sensitive to 
framing which resembles gambling. This could explain the 
common finding of Protestants being more risk-averse than 
Catholics, given the stronger anti-gambling norm among 
Protestants, and the religious being more risk-averse than the 
irreligious. If participants from particular religious backgrounds 
have an unfavourable bias towards gambling whereas non-
religious participants don’t, then similar to the case with gender, 
such results may not be reliably generalized to domains beyond 
gambling.    
In addition to studying framing effects, we also study whether 
making religion salient through priming would influence 
behaviour. We do not find evidence of the religious prime causing 
any difference in risk-taking in terms of the initial investments 
made. However, we find that primed participants were more 
sensitive to losses i.e. a loss in the previous round led to a sharper 
contraction of investment in the subsequent round in comparison 
to those with a neutral prime. This effect was strongest for those 
given the religious frame which suggests an important dynamic 
priming effect. To the best of our knowledge such dynamic effects 
have not been considered before. But they are potentially an 
important mechanism through which religion can influence 
aggregate outcomes.   
Let us finish the discussion by clarifying that we are not arguing 
gender and religion have no influence on risk attitudes. In our 
second experiment we saw a dramatic decrease in the amount 
gambled in the Mosque and so religion and religious context 
clearly matter. The point we want to make is more that eliciting 
risk preferences using a frame involving gambles and lotteries 
may give a biased picture. The broader point is that risk 
preferences systematically vary depending on individual 
                                                                                                                                 
(Alesina et al. 2003), governmental systems (La Porta et al. 1999) 
and savings and investment ratios (Guiso et al. 2006). 
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characteristics and the setting (Isenberg (1986), Lopes (1987), 
Eckel et al. (2009) and Bougheas et al. (2013)). Hence, some 
groups, such as the religious, are more sensitive to the frame and 
context than others. This can have important repercussions, not 
only in the lab, but in ‘real life’. For instance, women or the 
religious may be more reluctant to take on a risky financial 
investment if it is framed as a gamble. 
To summarize, Figure 3.4 plots the average allocation to the risky 
task over the two experiments and frames including gender and 
ethical beliefs. In the investment frame we see remarkable 
consistency across different groups and settings. With the 
gambling frame by contrast we see huge variation depending on 
individual beliefs and the setting. This illustrates that attitudes 
to gambling do appear to vary widely and that eliciting risk 
preferences using a gambling frame may lead to systematic bias. 
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3.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we ran simple incentivised laboratory experiments 
using the seminal Gneezy and Potters (1997) framework to test 
whether religious, or ethical, priming and decision-task framing 
could influence the appetite for risk among participants. We find 
evidence to suggest that reframing an identical numerical 
problem into an investment decision results in greater risk-taking 
than when it is presented as a gamble. We also find that priming 
participants about religion and ethics causes a dynamic effect 
where the reaction to losses was stronger for those that were 
primed. In our second experiment we find that risk-taking drops 
dramatically in the Mosque for those exposed to the gambling 
frame. 
Overall, our findings corroborate the results of previous studies 
that show context is an important determinant of risk-taking 
(Schubert et al. (1999), Weber et al. (2002) and Dohmen et al. 
(2010)). More specifically, we highlight two conclusions that can 
be drawn from our work. First, we find that choices in the 
investment frame are relatively stable across personal 
characteristics (most notably gender), beliefs (ethical and 
religious) and setting (Mosque, lab or classroom) while those in 
the gambling frame are not. This suggests that individuals are 
particularly sensitive to a gambling frame, potentially because of 
the social and religious norms around gambling. Second, we argue 
that risk preference elicitation tasks that are framed in terms of 
gambling, as many are, likely lead to systematic bias. We should, 
therefore, look to test and develop methods that avoid a gambling 
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This experiment on decision making consists of eight rounds. At 
the beginning of each round, you are to be endowed with 100 
tokens. You then have the opportunity to invest in a project. For 
instance, you might imagine that you can make a business 
investment into the Research and Development programme of one 
of the fastest tech start-ups specialising in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI). You are asked to choose a portion of your endowment 
(between 0 and 100 tokens) to invest with. There is a 33% chance 
of success and 67% chance of failure in the project. If the project is 
a success, you receive 2.5 times the amount you invested, which 
amounts to a 250% return on investment. In contrast, if the 
programme fails, you lose the entire amount invested. Whatever 
sum you decide not to invest with is safely stored and for yours to 
keep. At the end of each round you will be told whether the 
project was a success or failure as well as your consequent returns 
from investment. The earnings from each round will be added 
together to determine your final payment.  
 
 












This experiment on decision making consists of eight rounds. At 
the beginning of each round, you are to be endowed with 100 
tokens. You then have the opportunity to gamble by betting on a 
lottery. You are asked to choose a portion of your endowment 
(between 0 and 100 tokens) to gamble with. There is a 33% chance 
of winning and 67% chance of losing the bet. If the bet is won, you 
receive 2.5 times the amount you gambled with, which amounts to 
a 250% return. In contrast, if the bet is lost, you lose the entire 
amount gambled. Whatever sum you decide not to gamble with is 
safely stored and for yours to keep. At the end of each round you 
will be told whether the bet was won or lost as well as your 
consequent returns from gambling. The earnings from each round 
will be added together to determine your final payment.  
 
 














This experiment consists of one decision. You are endowed with 
100 tokens (worth £5). You then have the opportunity to invest in 
a project. For instance, you might imagine that you can make a 
business investment into the Research and Development 
programme of one of the fastest tech start-ups specialising in 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). You are asked to choose a portion of 
your endowment (between 0 and 100 tokens) to invest with. There 
is a 33% chance of success and 67% chance of failure in the 
project. If the project is a success, you receive 2.5 times the 
amount you invested, which amounts to a 250% return. In 
contrast, if the programme fails, you lose the entire amount 
invested. For example, if you decide to invest 10 tokens and the 
project is successful, your earnings would be calculated as the 
return on investment i.e. 25, plus your endowment of 100, 
totalling 125. If the project fails, you would lose the 10 tokens you 
invested and thus your total earnings would be 90. Whatever sum 
you decide not to invest is yours to keep.  
 











This experiment consists of one decision. You are endowed with 
100 tokens (worth £5). You have the opportunity to gamble by 
betting on a lottery. You are asked to choose a portion of your 
endowment (between 0 and 100 tokens) to gamble with. There is a 
33% chance of winning and 67% chance of losing the bet. If the bet 
is won, you receive 2.5 times the amount you gambled with, which 
amounts to a 250% return. In contrast, if the bet is lost, you lose 
the entire amount gambled. For example, if you decide to bet 10 
tokens and the gamble is successful, your earnings would be 
calculated as the amount won i.e. 25, plus your endowment of 100, 
totalling 125. If the gamble is lost, you would lose the 10 tokens 
you bet and thus your total earnings would be 90. Whatever sum 
you decide not to gamble with is yours to keep.  
 









CHAPTER FOUR  
 
4. Does Insurance and the Prospect of 




We report the results of a simple laboratory experiment in which 
we explore the extent to which altering subject choice-sets and the 
context in which the decision is made influences the level of 
prosocial and anti-social behaviour among competing individuals. 
We find that extending the available choice-set by including the 
option to insure crowds out voluntary donations by winners even 
when insurance constitutes a dominated strategy. Furthermore, 
switching the context of the problem from potentially having one’s 
endowment stolen to having it burned by an opponent lowers 
prosociality in terms of average donation size. Our data shows 
considerable evidence of both sabotage and antisocial behaviour 
by contest losers that is consistent across treatments. One 
implication of our results is that behaviour can be susceptible to 
changes in choice-sets even when the added options do not 
represent monetarily advantageous strategies. This provides 
further support to the growing consensus on the situational-













The economics literature has traditionally focused on the study of 
agents with relatively simple self-interested material motivations. 
The findings of Smith (1962) illustrated that if subjects trade a 
homogenous good of which all aspects are fully contractible then 
experimental markets are quick to converge to the competitive 
equilibrium. As the equilibrium was computed based on the 
assumption that all players were exclusively self-interested, and 
the fact that numerous studies successfully corroborated this 
result, the findings of Smith (1962) were used to support the 
notion that self-interest provided a good description of behaviour 
(see Davis and Holt 1993). However, an extensive body of research 
based on laboratory experiments has subsequently documented 
considerable evidence showing the significance of interdependent 
utility, or so-called other-regarding preferences, during the 
decision-making process of individuals under various situations, 
for purposes such as inequity aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 
(1998), Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Charness and Rabin 
(2002))22, altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002), fairness, 
reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter 2000), relative standing 
(Kirchsteiger (1994) and Charness and Rabin (2002)), norm-
breaking (Lopez-Perez 2008), social reputation, egocentrism (Cox 
et al. 2002) or even spite and envy (Zizzo and Oswald (2001), 
Herrmann et al. (2008) Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) and Abbink 
and Herrmann (2011)). 
Other-regarding preferences have therefore been recognised as 
being important for a range of social and economic outcomes, such 
as public life and politics (Fehr and Fischbacher 2002), tax-
compliance (Alm et al. 1995), income redistribution (Fong et al. 
2005), law enforcement (Lind and Tyler 1988) and workplace 
relations (Krueger and Mas 2004). 
                                                   
22 A number of influential economists such as Adam Smith (1759), 
Gary Becker (1974), Kenneth Arrow (1981), Paul Samuelson 
(1993) and Amartya Sen (1995) had mentioned that individuals 
may in fact care about the well-being of others and that this could 




Given the substantial evidence on the existence of interdependent 
utility, much of the academic research has now shifted focus 
towards developing a deeper understanding of the determinants 
and conditions under which these preferences could have 
important economic and social implications. For example, despite 
the common finding of positive contributions in various public 
goods experiments or evidence of sharing in the classical dictator 
game, a series of papers have shown that adapting the choice-set 
available to subjects can significantly alter their behaviour. List 
(2007) and Bardsley (2008) show that extending the dictator game 
by allowing dictators to take money from receivers considerably 
lowers giving. More generally, differences in the type and extent 
of other-regarding behaviour across studies have also been 
attributed to issues such as monitoring and anonymity 
considerations (Hoffman and McCabe (1994) and Eckel and 
Grossman (1996), Bandiera et al. (2005) and Benz and Meier 
(2008)), the decision context, self-selection of participants, stake-
sizes, the artificial restriction of choice sets that the lab imposes 
and experimenter scrutiny or demand effects (Levitt and List 
(2007), Orne (1962), List (2007), Bardsley (2008), Smith (2010), 
Oechssler (2010) and Zizzo (2010)), the process that generates the 
initial distribution of wealth in these experiments (Cherry et al. 
(2002), Rotemberg (2006) and Erkal et al. (2011)), reputational 
concerns (List 2006) and the number of decision makers i.e. 
unilateral versus bilateral action (Simunovic et al. (2013)). 
A particular other-regarding preference that has attracted 
growing attention recently is that relating to antisocial behaviour, 
which is based upon negative utility interdependence. Antisocial 
behaviour is now being recognized as an important social and 
economic problem in the real world. There is an abundance of 
examples that showcase the existence of such behaviour within 
everyday life, such as littering, graffiti, vandalism, damaging 
private properties, theft, bullying, harassment, cyber-crime, 
viruses and malware. According to the British Crime Survey 
(2016), around 1.8m incidents of antisocial behaviour were 
recorded by police between 2012 and 2013. Since data on 
antisocial behaviour is restricted to those incidents that have 
been reported, the actual number of incidents is likely to be 
higher than what has been reported.  
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These actions impose not only private costs upon those that are 
directly affected, but also external or third-party costs to society. 
In an attempt to quantify such costs, Cohen (1998) estimated that 
a typical career criminal causes around $1.3m to $1.5m in 
external costs to society. The corresponding figure for heavy drug-
users was between $370,000 and $970,000. Overall, Cohen’s 
(1998) calculations suggest that the monetary value of saving a 
high-risk youth from such lifestyle would be in the region of 
$1.7m to $2.3m.  
To provide a more concrete perspective of the costs associated 
with antisocial behaviour, data from the UK shows that 
government agencies in England and Wales spend around £3.4m 
a year in responding to reports of antisocial behaviour. In 2003, 
the Home Office formed the antisocial behavioural unit with an 
annual budget of £25m to design and implement the 
Government’s policy on antisocial behaviour (HoC 2007). Clearly 
then, understanding what drives individuals to carry out such 
actions has serious real-world applications. 
This chapter contributes towards the literature on social-
preferences and other-regarding utility in the following ways. 
First, while previous studies focus on studying whether 
individuals are willing to give or take money under various 
settings, we further test whether people are sufficiently concerned 
about the possibility of others taking or sabotaging their earnings 
and as a result willing to invest resources to avoid this. More 
specifically, in our no insurance treatments we allow subjects to 
simultaneously transfer i.e. give or take money from an opponent 
at a fixed cost, or do nothing. We then introduce a treatment 
whereby the available choice-set is extended to include the option 
of purchasing insurance against the risk of subjects having money 
taken away from them. This allows us to test how changes in the 
available choice-set influences behaviour.  
Secondly, given the recent growth in interest regarding anti-social 
behaviour within the lab, we study whether the decision to take 
from an opponent is influenced by whether the amount taken is 
kept or burned. Zizzo and Oswald (2001) found that 62.5% of 
participants chose to burn their opponents’ money in an 
incentivised experiment despite the fact that such a decision 
implied a net monetary cost to them. Importantly, Zizzo and 
Oswald (2001) created the initial allocation of funds across 
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subjects through a betting stage, which was followed by the 
random endowment of arbitrary gifts to some participants in 
order to provide them with an unfair advantage. As this was 
common knowledge, the authors argue that the fundamental 
driver of burning was inequity aversion and subjects’ dislike for 
the unfairness involved in the process.   
Given that there is a robust finding within the experimental 
literature showing that behaviour varies depending on the way in 
which the initial distribution of wealth is generated (e.g. Durante 
et al. (2014) and Akbas et al. (2014)), our experimental design 
further involves subjects initially participating in a winner-takes-
all competition in order to earn their endowments. The 
competition was set up so that half of the subjects received ‘easier’ 
questions, which means that the allocation of endowments was 
essentially exogenous. Even so, subjects may have felt as though 
they ‘earned’ their endowment. If individuals believe that 
inequality reflects differences in effort as opposed to luck or 
privilege, this may affect their willingness to redistribute 
(Durante et al. 2014). Prior literature has shown that other-
regarding behaviour is mitigated when participants earn their 
endowments (see Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Hoffman et al. 
(1994), Ruffle (1998), Cherry et al. (2002) and Carpenter et al. 
(2010)). For instance, Erkal et al. (2011) show that after 
competing in an experimental tournament, those ranked first are 
significantly less likely to redistribute their earnings compared to 
those of any other rank.  
Furthermore, by allowing subjects in our experiment to give, take, 
do-nothing and, in a particular treatment, purchase insurance, we 
arguably provide subjects with a more complete choice-set to 
choose from. This could aid in our understanding of how 
individual’s behave when they are faced with a more realistic 
scenario that consists of multiple possible options rather than a 
simple binary choice, which may be relatively more prone to 
experimenter demand effects.  
Therefore, the combination of offering subjects a broader choice-
set, the existence of an effort stage and the strategic concerns 
created by the bilateral design of our experiment i.e. simultaneous 
action by subjects, could offer valuable insights into the stability 
or dynamics of social preferences under a setting that is different 




4.2. FURTHER RELATED LITERATURE 
 
As alluded to above, a plethora of studies have found evidence in 
support of the existence of other-regarding preferences. The 
literature on social-preferences has traditionally placed greater 
emphasis on studying pro-social behaviour. That is, voluntary 
behaviour intended to benefit others through actions such as 
sharing, donating and co-operating for reasons such as warm 
glow, prestige, fairness, social pressure and philanthropy (see 
Brown, Meer and Williams 2012). For example, it has been found 
that in the classical dictator game, where an individual decides 
what proportion of a monetary endowment they would like to 
share with an anonymous person, people often violate traditional 
assumptions of self-interest by making positive transfers to the 
other player. This is despite the fact that the other player is 
simply a passive participant who cannot punish the dictator for 
not sharing the endowment (see Engel 2011 for a review). Several 
extensions have been made to the traditional dictator game to 
find evidence of how reducing dictator-recipient social distance 
and increasing emotional feelings towards the recipient can 
increase giving (see Eckel and Grossman (1996), Hoffman et al. 
(1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999) and Branas-Garza et al. (2012)).  
More recently, there has been a growing interest in exploring the 
so-called darker or negative departures from the customary 
assumption of rational self-interest. Research on anti-social 
preferences looks into the willingness of individuals to make 
others worse off for reasons such as inequality-aversion, envy, 
spite and even pure nastiness. The established literature shows 
that subjects are in fact willing to behave antisocially even if this 
implies that they must incur a net monetary cost in doing so (e.g. 
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) and Abbink and Sadrieh (2009)).  
While the experimental research on anti-social behaviour is very 
limited, researchers have argued that a supposed “homo-rivalis” 
or “homo-maliciosus” (Herrmann and Orzen 2008) may provide 
better explanations for various social dilemmas in comparison to 
the standard homo-economicus. For example, if attitudes towards 
income redistribution were purely based on rational self-interest, 
then anyone earning less than the average level of income should 
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favour redistribution, since they would benefit from such a policy. 
That is, an increase in income inequality skews the distribution of 
income rightwards. Therefore, as inequality increases, a larger 
share of the population has income beneath the mean, which 
implies that the support for redistribution should rise. However, 
empirically this hasn’t been the case. For instance, Kuziemko et 
al. (2014) find that agents exhibit last place aversion. This result 
holds across both laboratory settings and in everyday social 
environments. People near the bottom of the income distribution 
oppose redistribution due to fears that it could result in people 
below them catching up or even overtaking them and thus leave 
them at the bottom of the status hierarchy.  
Muller et al. (2016) argue that antisocial preferences appear to be 
linked to resource scarcity and competition pressures. In other 
words, antisocial preferences follow an evolutionary logic similar 
to that found across nature. That is, by harming others, one may 
be able to reduce competition and therefore such behaviour should 
co-vary with competition intensity. This would be analogous to 
bacteria that release toxins to kill closely-related species (Muller 
et al. 2016). If this is indeed the case then trends in wage 
stagnation and anaemic long-term economic growth in certain 
parts of the world could increase competition pressures and make 
antisocial preferences a lot more important to understand.  
The research on anti-social preferences within the realm of 
experimental economics was initiated in a seminal paper by Zizzo 
and Oswald (2001). In their study, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) 
introduce a one-shot version of the money burning game, which 
follows a simple two-stage process. In the first stage, the authors 
create a wealth distribution among participants through having 
them engage in a betting game. However, some subjects receive 
an arbitrary gift, which provides them with an unfair advantage 
over other participants. These gifts, which boost their recipients’ 
endowment, were public knowledge in that all participants were 
both aware of this feature of the game and the exact amounts 
allocated or given to these more fortunate players.  
Subsequent to this initial betting stage, subjects were then 
allowed to burn i.e. reduce the money-holdings of other subjects, 
under complete anonymity, for a given price. Zizzo and Oswald 
(2001) vary this price or cost of burning to gauge the extent of 
negative utility interdependence between subjects. In other 
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words, to assess how the amount of burning varies with the cost of 
burning.  
Given the set-up of their experiment, standard economic 
assumptions would predict there to be no burning given that 
burning here incurs an own cost for no material benefit in return. 
However, the authors find substantial evidence of burning. More 
precisely, they report that 62.5% of participants chose to burn 
despite the fact that such a decision implied a net monetary cost 
to them. Furthermore, on average each subject had 48.7% of their 
earnings burnt.  
While Zizzo and Oswald (2001) don’t find any significant 
correlation between the price of burning and the decision to burn, 
they do find evidence suggesting that the rationale behind most of 
the burning was driven by whether or not the money had been 
received deservedly or otherwise. Therefore, rather than the 
burning being driven purely by spite or envy, they argue that 
money was burned primarily due to concerns for fairness as 
participants appeared to use the information regarding unearned 
gifts in making their decisions on whether or not to burn.  
In a subsequent paper, Zizzo (2004) extends the design of Zizzo 
and Oswald (2001) to provide a more focused analysis on whether 
agents indeed take into consideration distributional and 
procedural fairness when making decisions on burning the 
money-holdings of other participants, as indicated in Zizzo and 
Oswald (2001). In the new set-up, Zizzo (2004) gives agents the 
ability to change the wealth distribution by paying to reduce and 
redistribute the money of other participants. Furthermore, half of 
the sessions included the possibility of stealing from others. 
Standard economic assumptions would suggest that self-
interested agents should do nothing in the non-stealing condition, 
since this would imply a net-cost to them, and that they should 
steal everything from everybody in the stealing condition. Zizzo 
(2004) reports substantial evidence of stealing when it is allowed 
but notes that this is always much lower than 100%. However, 
Zizzo (2004) argues that this is unlikely to be purely motivated by 
self-interest as moving from the stealing to non-stealing condition 
increases burning rates. More precisely, the burning ratio is only 
8% when stealing is allowed compared to an average of 20% in the 
non-stealing setting. Therefore, since burning appears to be an 
imperfect substitute for stealing, some stealing is likely to have 
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been motivated by negative utility interdependence but some 
burning may have stemmed from a good motive, namely the 
aversion to unfairness.   
In order to isolate anti-social behaviour stemming from pure envy 
and spite rather than any pecuniary, fairness or reciprocity type 
motives, Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) introduce the joy-of-
destruction game. The game has two stages. First, two players 
earn an endowment, which is equal in expectation, through the 
completion of some tasks. Subsequent to this, both players can 
then mutually and simultaneously destroy each other’s 
endowments. Destruction is costless and entails no material 
benefit for the destroying party, and thus the presence of 
destruction would provide stronger evidence of pure spite and 
nastiness among participants. Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) use a 
repeated interaction framework to observe the dynamics of play. 
For example, whether the opportunity to retaliate could trigger 
the escalation into an ongoing vendetta or perhaps have a 
deterrent effect. Furthermore, the authors use two variants of the 
game. In the “open” treatment, destruction is perfectly observable 
after the completion of each round. In the “hidden” treatment, the 
destruction is veiled by an additional random destruction. That is, 
in the hidden setting, there is some positive probability that the 
endowment of agents is destroyed by “nature.” However, the 
targeted individual can only observe the total damage to their 
endowment and cannot identify its source. Hence, in this 
treatment it became possible to damage someone’s endowment 
under anonymity.  
Similar to the experiments by Zizzo and Oswald (2001) and Zizzo 
(2004), standard economic assumptions would predict there to be 
no destruction. The authors find that the overall frequency of 
destruction is on average 8.5% of all decisions made under the 
open treatment. Furthermore, they observe that destruction rates 
are higher in the earlier rounds but are quick to fade away. 
However, in the hidden treatment, an average of 39.4% of all 
decisions involved destruction. Also, unlike the open treatment, 
they find no evidence of destruction rates falling over subsequent 
periods.  
Abbink and Herrmann (2011) use a one-shot version of the joy-of-
destruction game whereby two players are given equal 
endowments and subsequently engage in the simultaneous 
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decision on whether or not to reduce the payoff of the other player 
by incurring an own cost. Similar to Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) 
the authors use an open and hidden treatment where there exists 
some positive probability that nature would partly destroy the 
opponent’s endowment.  
Abbink and Herrmann (2011) argue that the hidden feature 
should increase burning rates. This is because if nature were to 
destroy part of the opponent’s income, then it could perhaps lower 
the moral costs of burning. In other words, if there is a chance 
that the target loses their money anyway, and the source of this 
loss isn’t identifiable, then the scruples subjects have to harm 
other subjects are reduced, and thus they could become 
considerably nastier. While the findings do show that burning 
rates are higher in the hidden treatment, at 10.8%, their 
explanation seems debatable. More precisely, if one knows that 
another person could be inflicted with punishment, this could 
actually elicit feelings of greater sympathy towards such an 
individual and thus increase the moral costs of imposing further 
harm upon them.  
Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) extended the joy-of-destruction game 
used by Abbink and Herrmann (2011) to study the role of 
experimenter demand effects. Karakostas and Zizzo (2016) found 
that 60% of subjects chose to reduce their opponent’s earnings 
when an indirect yet unequivocal cue to destroy was given to 
them. The authors argue that compliance norms and social image 
towards the authority can be influential in determining the 
choices individuals decide to make. 
Abbink and Herrmann (2009) design the vendetta game to 
investigate antisocial preferences and conflict. In this game, two 
groups of four players interact with each other over ten identical 
rounds. In every round, each player receives an equal endowment 
and subsequently decides on whether or not they would like to 
pay to reduce the payoff of members of the other group. Lowering 
the other group’s payoff would entail no material benefit for the 
destroyer or their group but would in fact lower their own 
monetary earnings. Therefore, any evidence of burning could be 
interpreted as purely representing antisocial behaviour. The 
authors also add an additional treatment whereby they include an 
incentive to destroy money. This takes the form of a prize draw 
where one out of however many members of a particular group 
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that decided to burn could win a prize of five points. However, this 
prize is lower than the fixed cost of burning and thus still implies 
a net cost to the participant in monetary terms. Abbink and 
Herrmann (2009) argue that this treatment could mirror symbolic 
rewards from committing destructive acts such as social prestige 
or honour, and could perhaps incentivise or nudge those more 
inclined but hesitant to destroy towards doing so. The authors 
find that the introduction of a symbolic reward increases the 
frequency of hostile acts to an average of 40% over the ten rounds 
compared with 13% in their baseline treatment. However, both 
treatments displayed similar dynamics of play. Specifically, 
although destruction rates remained significantly higher in the 
prize treatment throughout the experiment, these rates seemed to 
drop across both treatments after the first two periods, which 
could be attributed to the fear of retaliation.  
Abbink, Masclet and Van-Veelen (2011) provide the first study on 
the role of framing when studying anti-social preferences. That is, 
to explore the influence of context, the authors reframe the simple 
money-burning task by altering the domain from that of gains to 
that of losses. For example, in the treatment representing losses, 
the question was framed as an option of paying to reduce the 
opponent’s payoff whereas in the second treatment, the same task 
was framed as an option of being paid to increase the opponent’s 
payoff.  
Furthermore, Abbink, Masclet and Van-Veelen (2011) adjust the 
initial endowments of the participants to study whether starting 
from a point of advantageous or disadvantageous inequality had 
any impact on the decision to burn. While the authors find similar 
destruction rates overall, with burning taking place on average in 
25.2% of cases within the negative framing framework and 24% in 
the positive framework, they find differences in the behavioural 
patterns of participants. More precisely, within the negative 
framing setting, they find that subjects exhibit equity aversion 
rather than inequity aversion, while in the positive setting, the 
relationship between advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality is reversed. That is, while antisocial behaviour in the 
negative setting is seemingly being driven by what the authors 
argue is aggressive competitiveness i.e. the wish to enhance an 
already advantageous position; they find that in the positive 
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frame, antisocial behaviour is driven by the desire to close an 
unfavourable income gap.  
Kessler, Ruiz-Martos and Skuse (2012) conduct a one-shot 
experiment with the destructor game. In this game, subjects first 
earn an endowment based on the completion of some tasks. 
Following this, participants are randomly paired and assigned the 
roles of a destructor and a passive subject. Each destructor then 
decides the percentage of their passive partner’s earnings to 
destroy, with destruction being costless and hidden. In order to 
exclude inequity and equity aversion motives for destruction, only 
1000 tokens earned from the initial tasks were vulnerable for 
destruction, with the total earnings of the passive subject 
remaining hidden. Each destructor could choose to destroy either 
0%, 20% or 40% of the passive players endowment of 1000 tokens. 
Furthermore, for 20% of all passive players, “nature” destroys 
either 20% or 40% of the endowment, with equal probability. 
However, with the maximum destruction inflicted upon any 
passive participant capped at 40%, if both destructor and nature 
chose to destroy 40% of the passive player’s earnings, then 
nature’s destruction would be ineffective.  
Using a large sample of 1212 students, the authors find that 
15.5% of destructors chose to destroy their passive partner’s 
endowment. Specifically, 8.7% of destructors destroyed 20% and 
6.8% destroyed the maximum possible 40% of their partner’s 
endowment. Following the experiment, participants were asked to 
complete various personality-related questionnaires on 
neuroticism and psychopathy. From this data, Kessler, Ruiz-
Martos and Skuse (2012) find that destructive behaviour isn’t 
significantly associated to any particular personality or 
psychopathic characteristics.  
In a seminal study, Herrmann et al. (2008) document the 
widespread existence of antisocial punishment, which they define 
as the sanctioning of people who behave pro-socially. Using a 
public goods experiment with the added possibility of punishing 
group members, they investigate how an individual who has 
contributed a given amount to the public good punishes group 
members who either contributed less, the same amount or more 
than them. Importantly, the authors also study how this decision 
varies across cultural settings. Using a large sample of 1120 
undergraduate students who then act in an identical environment 
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i.e. a laboratory setting, the authors find considerable and 
significant cross-societal heterogeneity in terms of differences in 
cooperation levels and anti-social punishment. For instance, while 
some participant pools showed little evidence of antisocial 
punishment, others seemed to punish those behaving more pro-
socially than themselves as harshly as they did free-riders. 
Furthermore, contributions were highly and significantly 
different across pools, with the most co-operative pool 
contributing on average 90% of their endowment, which was 3.1 
times higher than the least co-operative pool, with an average of 
29%. Moreover, not only do Herrmann et al. (2008) find 
differences in punishment, but they also find differences in how 
participants react to punishment. That is, while punishment had 
an efficiency enhancing property in certain pools, in that it 
induced free-riders to increase contributions, participants from 
some pools took punishment a lot more negatively, which resulted 
in an increase in anti-social punishment. The authors argue that 
this is likely due to the way in which punishment is perceived 
across different cultures, with some reacting positively by 
increasing contributions and others seeking out revenge.  
Fehr (2018) studies whether increasing inequality causes an 
increase in antisocial behaviour towards others. Subjects were 
randomly matched into groups of four and subsequently took part 
in a task to earn money. Fehr (2018) implements two treatments 
which involve paying a bonus to the highest performing member 
and allowing members to cheat by paying to artificially increase 
their performance before their scores are revealed. Following the 
completion of this task, subjects were given information regarding 
their performance relative to other group members and were 
given the opportunity to pay to burn up to half of the income of 
another group member. Only the decision of one randomly 
selected group member was implemented. Fehr (2018) finds 
evidence to suggest that the extent of antisocial behaviour 
depends upon whether the increase in inequality can be 
attributed to effort and how transparent the cause of the 
inequality was.  
To summarise, previous studies have found evidence of both 
prosocial and anti-social behaviour within a lab-setting. As 
described above, the existence of such preferences has typically 
been tested by presenting subjects with narrow choice-sets such 
105 
 
as the binary choice of either doing nothing or burning an 
opponent’s endowment. Under such a setting, evidence of burning 
would then be used in support of the proposition that agents do 
exhibit antisocial preferences. Moreover, a growing strand of 
literature has shown that the preferences and decisions of agents 
are in general sensitive to changes in the context and situation in 
which they are made. Our study contributes to the existing 
literature in a few ways.  
First, we attempt to mitigate any potential experimenter demand 
effects by offering subjects a broader choice-set which includes the 
option to give, take, do nothing and insure. In other words, if the 
decision to be made by subjects involves two options i.e. to steal 
money or do nothing, then this could act as a cue as to what 
constitutes appropriate behaviour within the experimental setting 
and thus influence the behaviour of subjects (see Zizzo 2010). 
Therefore, framing the question more naturally by allowing 
subjects the option to give, take, do nothing, insure, as well as 
implementing an initial effort stage whereby subjects may feel as 
though the endowment is earned rather than arbitrarily allocated, 
could arguably bring behaviour into closer alignment with a 
subject’s true preferences.  
The main area of novelty in our experiment lies in the 
introduction of an option for subject’s to purchase insurance. 
Allowing subjects to insure could provide insight not only into 
whether there is a shift towards insuring and the determinants of 
insurance demand, particularly when insurance is a dominated 
strategy in monetary terms, but also how this impacts the extent 
to which subjects choose the other three options available to them. 
More precisely, as subjects in our experiment can only choose one 
option i.e. give, take, do nothing or insure (in the insurance 
treatment), it is of interest to examine whether the shift towards 
insurance is driven by a reduction in taking, the choice to do 
nothing or the crowding out of prosocial giving.  
Additionally, by incorporating both a take-and-keep treatment 
where subjects can keep any money they take from their opponent 
and a take-and-burn treatment whereby the endowment is simply 
burned, we are able to provide insight into whether the switch 
from take-and-keep to take-and-burn impacts the degree of 
antisocial and prosocial behaviour symmetrically. This would also 
enable us to explore if subjects are willing to trust their opponent 
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to not engage in burning (as this always implies a net monetary 
loss for both parties) and jointly maximize payoffs through doing 
nothing, or whether insurance serves an important and justified 
role under such circumstances.  
 
4.3. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
 
Our experimental study employs a 2 x 2 design, crossing the type 
of taking i.e. take-and-keep or take-and-burn, with the ability to 
insure i.e. insurance or no insurance. This gives us four 
treatments, as outlined in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Insurance vs No Insurance 
Keep vs Burn No Insurance Insurance 
Take-and-Keep Give-Take (GT) Give-Take-Insure (GTI) 
Take-and-Burn Give-Burn (GB) Give-Burn-Insure (GBI) 
 
Table 4.1. Treatments 
 
The experiment consisted of three stages. In the first stage of our 
experiment, we generate an initial distribution of earnings by 
asking subjects to complete a cyber-security themed multiple-
choice problem set consisting of fifteen questions. Subjects were 
randomly assigned an opponent from within the experimental 
session. One member of the pair was randomly allocated Quiz A 
while the other was given Quiz B, with the difference between the 
two being that the questions in Quiz A were intended to be more 
difficult than those in Quiz B23. The endowment earned was 
therefore exogenously determined by random allocation to Quiz A 
or Quiz B, hence, there is no endogeneity problem. After each pair 
had completed their respective question sets, their payoffs were 
determined based on a winner-takes-all tournament model 
whereby the player within each pair that had answered the most 
questions correctly was allocated £10 and their opponent was 
                                                   
23 The instructions explicitly said that the other person may have 
different questions to you and so there was no deception 
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given nothing24. However, each subject was also allocated a £5 
participation fee which was added to their earnings from this 
round to determine the player’s endowment for the subsequent 
round.  
Once all participants had completed the first stage of the 
experiment, we moved onto the second stage. In the second stage, 
subjects were again randomly paired up with another individual 
from within the experimental session and were made aware that 
their opponent in the second stage differed from their opponent in 
the first stage of the experiment. Each pair intentionally consisted 
of one winner from the first stage, who we refer to as the “rich” 
subjects or players and one loser from the first stage, who we label 
as being the “poor” subjects or players. Both players were then 
told the payoff they had earned from the first stage as well as the 
payoff of their opponent.  
It is important to note that in stage 1, subjects that were 
randomly allocated the easier questions i.e. Quiz B, always won 
the initial competition. As such, these subjects were always the 
“rich” players in stage 2, whilst those allocated the more difficult 
questions i.e. Quiz A, were invariably the “poorer” players. 
Additionally, whilst subjects were told the payoff of their 
opponent at the beginning of stage 2, they were not informed 
about the varying levels of difficulty of to the problem sets that 
both they and their opponent had completed. To be more specific, 
the information set of each subject solely consisted of a) their own 
payoff and b) their opponent’s payoff. That said, given the 
instructions from stage 1, subjects would have also known that 
the rich player was a winner in the stage 1 competition whilst the 
poorer player must’ve lost against their opponent in stage 1.  
Given that we are introducing a novel experiment through 
incorporating a blocking or insurance strategy, our primary 
objective for this particular study was to provide a simple setup in 
order to test whether blocking is indeed an important component 
of the give, take and do nothing mix. However, there are several 
interesting future extensions of our benchmark setup. For 
instance, changing the information set could provide us with 
important insights. In our experiment, subjects don’t have 
                                                   
24 The instructions indicated that in the case of a tie one subject 
would randomly be chosen to receive the £15. 
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information regarding the cause of inequality i.e. effort or luck. 
With a large enough sample, one could easily adapt our design so 
as to test whether providing subjects with such information at the 
beginning of stage 2 has any significant effect on behaviour. 
Moreover, another interesting extension would be to provide 
information on the opponent’s personal characteristics, such as 
social group e.g. gender or religion. This could contribute to the 
literature exploring whether subjects behave differently or in a 
discriminatory way when interacting with in-group versus out-
group members i.e. interaction between people within the same, 
versus different, social groups25.   
Subjects were subsequently asked to choose one option from the 
choice-set presented to them. In the no insurance treatments, 
subjects were given the option to a) take up to £2.50 from their 
opponent at a cost of 10p for every 50p taken b) give up to £2.50 to 
their opponent at a cost of 10p for every 50p given or c) do 
nothing. In the insurance treatments, subjects had a further 
choice of d) paying £1.00 to insure themselves by blocking their 
opponent from being able to take their money. That is, as the 
choices of subjects were not revealed to their opponents, if a 
player chose to purchase insurance, any attempt to take their 
money would still incur the fixed cost of taking i.e. 10p per 50p 
taken, however, the subject trying to take would be blocked from 
being able to access the insured player’s endowment.  
Importantly, in the burning treatments, the amounts taken 
(option (a)) were not transferred to or kept by the taker. Rather, 
subjects were given the option to pay, under the same price 
structure as in the no-burning treatments, to simply reduce, or 
“burn”, up to £2.50 of their opponent’s endowment.  
It is worth noting that the label of insurance on our additional 
strategy is derived from the underlying motivation of our study. 
However, given our design, this strategy doesn’t involve many 
aspects of insurance that are found in the real-world economy, 
such as risk-pooling. Therefore, although we refer to our 
additional strategy as insurance throughout this chapter, one may 
consider the label of blocking more accurate, as subjects are 
essentially given the ability to use a prevention mechanism 
                                                   
25 See, for example, Chakravarty et al. (2019).  
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(perfect prevention in our case) that allows them to unilaterally 
block their opponent from accessing their endowment.  
To reinforce the discussion above, let 𝑒𝑖 denote the endowment of 
the two subjects. Let 𝑔𝑖 and 𝑡𝑖 denote the amount subject 𝑖 gives 
and takes, respectively. Finally, let 𝑠𝑖 be an indicator variable 
that says whether or not subject 𝑖 paid for insurance. In the Give-
Take treatment the payoff of subject 1 matched with subject 2 (in 
pounds sterling) is 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 − 1.2𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 + 0.8𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝐵 (4.1) 
 
In the Give-Burn treatment the payoff of subject 1 is 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 − 1.2𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.2𝑡𝐴 − 𝑡𝐵 (4.2) 
 
In the Give-Take-Insure treatment the payoff of subject 1 is 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 − 1.2𝑔𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.2𝑡𝐴 + 𝑡𝐴(1 − 𝑠𝐵) − 𝑡𝐵(1 − 𝑠𝐴) − 𝑠𝐴 
 
(4.3) 
In the Give-Burn-Insure treatment the payoff of subject 1 is 




It is worth noting that whilst subjects can engage in transfers so 
as to equalise their payoffs in the Give-Take treatment, the richer 
player will always earn more than the poorer player in the Give-
Burn treatment. Specifically, assuming that the rich player 
decides to give the maximum amount of £2.50 to their poorer 
opponent and that the poor player takes the maximum amount of 
£2.50 from their richer counterpart, then from equation (4.1) 
above, their respective payoffs in the Give-Take treatment can be 
calculated as: 
𝑢𝑅𝑖𝑐ℎ = 15 − 1.2(2.50) − 2.50 = 9.50 
 
(4.5) 
𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 5 + 2.50 + 0.8(2.50) = 9.50 
 
(4.6) 
Since subjects cannot take and keep money in the Give-Burn 
treatment, any amount taken by the poor player would reduce 
inequality by less than it would have in the Give-Take treatment. 
It is clear from equation (4.2) that under the assumption that the 
rich player gives £2.50 and the poor player takes £2.50 in the 
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Give-Burn treatment, the former’s payoff function would be 
identical to that in equation (4.5) whilst the poor player’s payoff 
would now be calculated as: 
𝑢𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑟 = 5 + 2.50 − 0.2(2.50) = 7.00 
 
(4.7) 
It is important to reiterate that subjects could only choose one of 
the options available and therefore couldn’t simultaneously give, 
take or insure. The instructions are made available in the 
appendix.   
Following the completion of the second stage of the experiment, 
subjects moved onto the final stage in which they answered a 
questionnaire that was intended to gather information on 
demographic and other control variables. The experiment was run 
using pen and paper on the campus of the University of Kent in 
Canterbury, United Kingdom. We were able to recruit 78 
participants who consisted of both undergraduate and 
postgraduate students from within the university. The sample 
size breakdown is reported in Table 4.2.  The final earnings were 
calculated as the initial endowment the players had earned in 
Stage 1 plus a £5 participation fee and the net transfer from the 
second stage.  
 





Total  78 
 
Table 4.2. Sample Size Breakdown 
 
4.4. THEORETICAL RESULTS 
 
Four models of social-preferences are particularly relevant to the 
experimental design of our study. First, the model of narrow self-
interest, which serves as a useful benchmark against other 
models of social-preferences in terms of expected behaviour, is 
based upon the assumption that agents are solely concerned with 
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the maximization of their personal monetary payoffs. In 
accordance with this model, the preferences of agents can be 
represented by the following straightforward utility function: 
𝑈𝐴 = 𝑢𝐴 
 
(4.8) 
Where 𝑢𝐴 indicates the monetary payoff of the agent. As 
described, the utility of agents is increasing in only their own 
monetary payoff. In other words, the higher an individual’s 
monetary payoff, the higher is their utility.  
While the model of narrow self-interest is commonly applied 
throughout the economic literature, numerous studies have found 
the assumption of agents being entirely self-regarding to be overly 
simplistic and inaccurate across a multiplicity of contexts. As 
mentioned earlier, prior literature has provided strong evidence 
for the existence of so-called other regarding preferences. The 
seminal model of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) 
provides an extension to the model of narrow self-interest by 
postulating that individuals are not only positively concerned 
about their own monetary payoffs but are also negatively affected 
by the difference between their own payoff and that of the other.  
Therefore, if agents display inequality aversion i.e. they dislike 
inequality, then they may be willing to sacrifice a percentage of 
their own wealth or endowment for the purpose of reaching a 
more egalitarian distribution of outcomes through reallocation. 
Under a simple two-person setting, the utility function of agents 
within the model of inequality-aversion can be written as: 
𝑈𝐴(𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴 − 𝑎𝐴 max{𝑢𝐵 − 𝑢𝐴, 0} − 𝛽𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵 , 0} 
 
(4.9) 
Where 𝑢𝐴 indicates the monetary payoff to Person A and 𝑢𝐵 
denotes the payoff to Person B. The second term on the right hand 
side of the equation measures the loss of utility from 
disadvantageous inequality. The larger the parameter 𝑎𝐴, which 
is sometimes referred to as a measure of envy, the more Person A 
dislikes disadvantageous inequality. Similarly, the third term 
measures the loss of utility from advantageous inequality. The 
larger the parameter 𝛽𝐴, also described as a parameter measuring 
the degree of guilt, the more Person A dislikes advantageous 
inequality. In their original study, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
assume that 0 ≤ 𝛽 < 1, which not only implies that agents do not 
enjoy advantageous inequality but that they also wouldn’t be 
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willing to burn their own money to mitigate an advantageous 
position. An additional assumption made by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) is that 𝑎𝐴 ≥ 𝛽𝐴. In other words, individuals dislike 
disadvantageous inequality i.e. being poorer than the other, more 
than they dislike advantageous inequality i.e. being richer than 
the other.  
While the assumption that agents hold a greater aversion towards 
disadvantageous inequality in comparison to advantageous 
inequality has a strong intuitive appeal and is also supported by 
prior findings in social psychology (Messick and Sentis (1985) and 
Loewenstein et al. (1989)), more recent studies have found this 
assumption to be regularly violated empirically (Dannenberg et 
al. (2007), Bellemare et al. (2008), Blanco et al. (2011) and Yang 
et al. (2016)).  
A further important form of other-regarding preferences that has 
received widespread empirical support is that of altruism. The 
model of altruism posits that agents are not only concerned about 
their own wealth or payoffs but that they also care positively 
about the payoff of others. In this study, we consider a model of 
altruism based upon a restricted version of the Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) model presented above. Under the simple two-individual 
setting in this model, the utility function of agents is written as: 
𝑈𝐴(𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴 − 𝜃𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵 , 0} 
 
(4.10) 
Where the parameter 𝜃 measures, and is increasing in, the degree 
of altruism. It is assumed that 0 < 𝜃𝐴 ≤ 1. Hence, the larger the 
parameter of altruism the more the subject cares about the 
monetary payoff of the other. If 𝜃 = 1 then the subject cares about 
the monetary payoff of the other as much their own payoff. As 
shown in (4.10), the utility of agents is decreasing in the amount 
of advantageous inequality whilst being unaffected by 
disadvantageous inequality, which differentiates this model of 
altruism from the model of inequality-aversion described above. 
That is, if Person A is richer than Person B, then the second term 
on the right hand side of equation (4.10) is positive. In contrast, if 




The final model of social-preferences we take into consideration is 
that of spite (or envy)26. This model assumes that an agent’s 
utility is a positive function of their personal monetary payoff but, 
as spiteful or envious agents dislike being worse off than others, 
their utility is decreasing in the size of any disadvantageous 
inequality. Similar to the model of altruism presented above, the 
model of envy constitutes a restricted form of the Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) model of inequality-aversion. In the two-person 
case, the utility function of agents is expressed as: 
𝑈𝐴(𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵) = 𝑢𝐴 − 𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢𝐵 − 𝑢𝐴, 0} 
 
(4.11) 
Where the parameter 0 <  ≤ 1 provides a measure of the degree 
of envy. If  = 1, the subject cares about disadvantageous 
inequality as much as their own monetary payoff. As described, 
an envious agent’s utility is decreasing in both the degree of envy 
and the extent of disadvantageous inequality. If the subject has a 
higher payoff than their opponent i.e. 𝑢𝐵 − 𝑢𝐴 < 0, then the second 
term on the right hand side of the equation becomes irrelevant 
and the utility function becomes identical to that in the model of 
narrow self-interest as in (4.8). 
4.4.1. Theoretical Results for Self-Motivated 
 
We take it as given that there will be heterogeneity across the 
population in terms of social-preferences. Therefore, some people 
behave as if maximising their personal monetary payoff, others 
inequality averse and so on. In the following, we derive results 
regarding the possible behaviour of subjects in our experiment 
based on the four models of social-preferences. These results are 
also summarised in Table 4.3. We begin with a result that 
requires no proof.  
Proposition 1: An individual who is concerned with maximizing 
their personal monetary payoff should take the maximum £2.50 
in the Give-Take treatment and do nothing in the Give-Burn 
treatment.  
You can see that in the treatments without insurance, the optimal 
behaviour of a selfish individual does not depend on the behaviour 
of their opponent. Once we add insurance this changes. Now 
                                                   
26 Note that for the purposes of this study we use the terms spite 
and envy interchangeably.  
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optimal behaviour depends upon an individual’s belief about the 
likelihood that their opponent will take or insure. To formally 
capture this, let 𝑝𝑎 denote the probability individual A puts on 
their opponent choosing to take £2.50.27 Let 𝑞𝑎 denote the 
probability they assign to their opponent insuring. The expected 
payoff of person A if they decide to take £2.50 in the GTI 
treatment is then given by: 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.5 + 2.50(1 − 𝑞𝐴) − 2.50𝑝𝐴 
 
(4.12) 
Since any amount taken wouldn’t be transferred to person A in 
the GBI treatment but would still incur the cost of burning, the 
expected payoff from choosing to take in the GBI treatment would 
then be: 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.5 − 2.50𝑝𝐴 
 
(4.13) 
The expected payoff from choosing to insure remains constant 
across both the GTI and GBI treatment: 
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 1 
 
(4.14) 
As does that from doing nothing:  
𝑢𝐴 = 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 2.50𝑝𝐴 
 
(4.15) 
Consider, first, the GTI treatment. Comparing equations (4.12) 
and (4.14) we see that take is preferred to insure if  
𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.5 + 2.50(1 − 𝑞𝐴 − 𝑝𝐴) > 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 1 
 
(4.16) 
Which must the case (because 1 ≥ 𝑞𝐴 + 𝑝𝐴). Hence it is never 
optimal for a self-regarding player to insure. It then follows that a 
self-regarding subject would take if the expected payoff from 
doing so is higher than the expected payoff of doing nothing i.e. 
𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 0.5 + 2.50(1 − 𝑞𝐴) − 2.50𝑝𝐴 > 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 2.50𝑝𝐴 
 
(4.17) 
This simplifies to 𝑞𝐴 < 0.8. Hence, if the self-regarding subject 
expects that there is less than 80% chance of their opponent 
insuring, then they should take. If they believe that there is over 
80% chance of their opponent insuring they should do nothing. 
                                                   
27 For simplicity we assume that the opponent either takes the 
maximum £2.50 or nothing. 
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This result implies that selfish subjects have a strong incentive to 
take. 
Proposition 2: An individual who is concerned with maximizing 
their personal monetary payoff should not insure in the Give-
Take-Insure treatment. They should take unless they believe the 
probability their opponent will insure is 80% or more.  
Consider now the GBI treatment. In this case, comparing 
equations (4.13) and (4.15) we see that doing nothing is better 
than take. From equations (4.13) and (4.14) we see that a selfish 
subject does best to do nothing if 
𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 2.50𝑝𝐴 > 𝑒𝐴 + 𝑔𝐵 − 1 
 
(4.18) 
Which simplifies to 𝑝𝐴 < 0.4. In other words, as long as the selfish 
player attaches a probability of less than 40% to their opponent 
choosing to take, they should do nothing. If they assign a 
probability higher than 40%, they should insure.  
Proposition 3: An individual who is concerned with maximizing 
their personal monetary payoff should not take in the Give-Burn-
Insure treatment. They should insure if they believe the 
probability their opponent will take is more than 40%.  
4.4.2. Theoretical Results for Social-Preferences 
 
The results for selfish subjects already tell us a lot about subjects 
with social-preferences. For instance, for a poor altruistic subject, 
since 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢𝐴 − 𝑢𝐵 , 0} = 0 (see (4.10)), the utility function and thus 
optimal strategy always coincides with that of a selfish subject. 
Likewise, for a rich, envious subject, since 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑢𝐵 − 𝑢𝐴, 0} = 0, the 
optimal strategy coincides with that of a selfish subject. 
For a first consequence of inequality aversion and envy consider a 
poor inequality averse (or envious) individual in the Give-Burn 
treatment. If they do nothing their payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 5 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 𝑎𝐴(15 − 1.2𝑔𝐵 − 0.2𝑡𝐵 − 5 − 𝑔𝐵 + 𝑡𝐵) 
 
(4.19) 
If they burn the £2.50 their payoff is  





Comparing equations (4.19) and (4.20) we get that it is optimal to 
burn if 
4.5 − 𝑎𝐴(8 − 2.2𝑔𝐵 + 0.8𝑡𝐵) > 5 − 𝑎𝐴(10 − 2.2𝑔𝐵 + 0.8𝑡𝐵) (4.21) 
This simplifies to 𝑎𝐴 > 0.25. A value of 𝑎𝐴 = 0.25 would be 
interpreted as a relatively low level of inequality aversion. We 
see, therefore, that a poor subject who is inequality averse or 
envious should burn. Recall that a selfish or altruistic subject 
would not.  
Proposition 4: A poor individual who is inequality averse or 
envious should burn in the Give-Burn treatment.  
Consider next a rich inequality averse individual in the Give-Take 
treatment. If they give £2.50 their payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 12 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 𝛽𝐴(12 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 7.5 + 1.2𝑔𝐵 − 0.8𝑡𝐵) 
 
(4.22) 
If they take £2.50 their payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 17 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 𝛽𝐴(17 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 2.5 + 1.2𝑔𝐵 − 0.8𝑡𝐵) 
 
(4.23) 
If they do nothing their payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 15 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 𝛽𝐴(15 + 𝑔𝐵 − 𝑡𝐵 − 5 + 1.2𝑔𝐵 − 0.8𝑡𝐵) 
 
(4.24) 
Comparing equations (4.22), (4.23) and (4.24) we get that it is 
optimal to give if 
12 − 𝛽𝐴(4.5 + 2.2𝑔𝐵 − 1.8𝑡𝐵) > 15 − 𝛽𝐴(10 + 2.2𝑔𝐵 − 1.8𝑡𝐵) (4.25) 
This simplifies to 𝛽𝐴 > 6/11. It is optimal to do nothing if 6/11 >
𝛽𝐴 > 4/9 and to take if 4/9 > 𝛽𝐴. Depending on the level of 
altruism a rich inequality averse individual may, therefore, decide 
to do nothing or give. Repeating this exercise for the Give-Burn 
treatment you can see that it is optimal for the rich individual to 
give if 𝛽𝐴 > 6/11 and to do nothing otherwise. 
In interpretation, a value of 𝛽𝐴 around 0.5 would be relatively 
high and so subjects with a low level of inequality aversion or 
altruism would still take in the GT treatment and do nothing in 
the GB treatment. Only those with a high level of inequality 
aversion or altruism would give.   
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Proposition 5: A rich individual who is sufficiently inequality 
averse (𝛽𝐴 > 6/11) or altruistic (𝜃𝐴 > 6/11), should give in the 
Give-Take and Give-Burn treatments.  
It remains to consider the effect of insurance on those with social 
preferences. If a rich inequality averse individual is willing to give 
money to their opponent then it follows that they gain utility from 
their opponent taking money (see equation (4.22)). It is, therefore, 
clearly not in their interests to insure. This holds in both the GTI 
and GBI treatments.  
Proposition 6: A rich individual who is sufficiently inequality 
averse (𝛽𝐴 > 6/11) or altruistic (𝜃𝐴 > 6/11), should never insure.  
The logic of Proposition 2 applies in the case of inequality 
aversion. So, in the GTI treatment a poor individual would never 
insure. A poor individual would consider insurance in the GBI 
treatment. To illustrate, consider an individual with 𝑎𝐴 > 0.25, 
meaning that burn is preferred to doing nothing. Again, let 𝑝𝑎 
denote the probability individual A puts on their opponent 
choosing to take £2.50. Let 𝑞𝑎 denote the probability they assign 
to their opponent insuring. Let ℎ𝑎 denote probability of giving 
£2.50. If individual A burns the £2.50 their expected payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 4.5 + 2.5ℎ𝑎 − 2.5𝑝𝑎 − 𝑎𝐴(12.5 − 3ℎ𝑎 − 0.5𝑝𝑎 + 1.5𝑞𝑎
− 4.5 − 2.5ℎ𝑎 + 2.5𝑝𝑎) 
 
(4.26) 
If they insure their expected payoff is  
𝑈𝐴 = 4 + 2.5ℎ𝑎 − 𝑎𝐴(15 − 3ℎ𝑎 − 0.5𝑝𝑎 − 𝑞𝑎 − 4 − 2.5ℎ𝑎) 
 
(4.27) 
Comparing equations (4.26) and (4.27) we get that it is optimal to 
insure if 
4 − 𝑎𝐴(11 − 0.5𝑝𝑎 − 𝑞𝑎) > 4.5 − 2.5𝑝𝑎 − 𝑎𝐴(8 + 1.5𝑞𝑎 + 2𝑝𝑎) (4.28) 
This simplifies to 2.5𝑝𝑎(1 + 𝑎𝐴) > 0.5 + 𝑎𝐴(3 − 2.5𝑞𝑎). Suppose, for 
example, that 𝑎𝐴 = 0.5, then, it would be optimal to insure if 𝑝𝑎 >
0.53 − 0.33𝑞𝑎. 
Proposition 7: A poor individual will never insure in the Give-
Take-Insure treatment. They may insure in the Give-Burn-Insure 
treatment if they consider the probability their opponent will take 





The 7 propositions above are summarised in Table 4.3. Building 
on these propositions we suggest the following testable 
hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is based upon what we would 
expect if subjects are selfish: 
Treatment 
Preferences Player GT GB GTI GBI 
Selfish 
Rich Take Nothing Take or Nothing Nothing or Insure 
Poor Take Nothing Take or Nothing Nothing or Insure 
Inequality-Averse 
Rich Give Give Give Give 
Poor Take Burn Take Burn 
Altruism 
Rich Give Give Give Give 
Poor Take Nothing Take or Nothing Nothing or Insure 
Spite 
Rich  Take Nothing Take or Nothing Nothing or Insure 
Poor Take Burn Take Burn 
 
Table 4.3. Summary of Propositions 
 
Hypothesis 1: Subjects will take in the GT and GTI treatments 
and do nothing in the GB and GBI treatments.  
Since it is never optimal for selfish subjects to give or burn, 
evidence of either would imply that subjects hold other-regarding 
preferences. The only caveat is the GBI treatment where it can be 
optimal for a selfish subject to insure if they believe their 
opponent will burn. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects will not insure in the GTI treatment. And 
will only insure in the GBI treatment if they expect their 
opponent to burn.  
We have shown that it is never optimal for selfish, inequality-
averse, altruistic or spiteful agents to insure in the GTI 
treatment. This is a clear prediction from our theoretical analysis. 
Another clear prediction of our analysis concerns rich subjects.  
Hypothesis 3: Rich subjects should never burn their opponent’s 
money.  
Evidence of burning by the rich would add support to the so-called 
“nastiness hypothesis” (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009) which 
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postulates that antisocial behaviour is driven by an intrinsic 
pleasure derived from lowering the well-being of others rather 
than purposes such as eliminating inequality (Zizzo and Oswald 
2001).  
Our final hypothesis is based on the original assumption made by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and earlier studies finding that subjects 
tend to show a general tendency towards holding a greater 
aversion towards disadvantageous inequality than to 
advantageous inequality (Messick and Sentis (1985) and 
Loewenstein et al. (1989)). 
Hypothesis 4: Overall, subjects will give less than they will take.  
As explained earlier, the more recent literature has found 
evidence that individuals may holder a stronger aversion to 
advantageous inequality. If so, then we could see higher levels of 




Figure 4.1. Observed Choices across Treatments 
Figure 4.1 reports the distribution of choices i.e. the fraction of 
subject’s who chose to give, take, do nothing or insure across 
treatments. You can see that around 50% of subjects choose to 
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theoretical analysis would predict. To explore this and other 
findings, we consider, in turn, giving, taking and insurance. 
4.5.1. Giving 
 
Finding 1: We observe that, on average, around one in ten 
subjects decided to give money to their opponent.    
Our results show that approximately 13% of subjects, on average, 
decided to transfer money to their opponents (p  =  0.00, T-Test on 
giving being above 0). This finding indicates the existence of some 
form of altruistic or inequality-averse preferences and provides 
support against the model of narrow self-interest (see Hypothesis 
1) according to which subjects should have never voluntarily 
transferred money towards their opponent (see Table 4.3).  
Figure 4.2 shows the fraction of rich and poor subjects that chose 
to give across treatments. Giving was, as expected, 
overwhelmingly driven by rich players. 9% of poor subjects chose 
to give in the GT treatment (p  =  0.32, T-Test) whereas there was 
no giving by poor subjects in any other treatment. By comparison, 
36% of rich players gave money to their opponents in the GT 
treatment (p = 0.04, T-Test) and 30% of rich subjects gave in the 
GB treatment (p = 0.08, T-Test). Giving by the rich fell to 10% in 
the GTI treatment (p = 0.34, T-Test) and 13% in the GBI 
treatment (p = 0.35, T-Test).   
 
















Finding 2: Extending the choice-set to include the option to insure 
lowers giving.  
The fraction of subjects that decided to give money to their 
opponents fell from 23% in the GT treatment to 5% in the GTI 
treatment (giving in the GT versus GTI treatment, p = 0.10 
Proportions Test, p = 0.08 T-Test) and from 15% in the GB 
treatment to 6.25% in the GBI treatment (p = 0.41 Proportions 
Test, p = 0.38 T-Test). If we compare the proportion of subjects 
willing to give in the no insurance treatment i.e. GT plus GB with 
the proportion of subjects willing to give in the insurance 
treatment i.e. GTI plus GBI, we find that extending the choice-set 
to include the option to insure significantly lowers the fraction of 
subject’s willing to give from 19% to 6% (p = 0.08 Proportions 
Test, p = 0.06 T-Test). Our results show a marginally significant 
reduction in the fraction of rich subjects willing to give from 33% 
in the no insurance treatment to 11% in the insurance treatment 
(p  =  0.10 Proportions Test,  0.07 T-Test). 
Our theoretical analysis suggested that the introduction of an 
insurance option, ceteris paribus, shouldn’t influence subjects’ 
willingness to give. Basically, if a subject is willing to give then 
they should also be willing to let their opponent take. The 
apparent reversal in generosity observed in our experiment is 
consistent with the so-called contextual preference reversal and 
reference dependence of preferences (see Easterlin (1995), Clark 
and Oswald (1996), Kahneman et al. (2000), Laynard (2003), List 
(2007) and Bardsley (2008)). In particular, the choice set may 
have served as an indicator of appropriate behaviour and social 
norms. For instance, the option of insurance may have led to 
subjects to put more weight on their opponent taking, which then 
crowds out a desire to give.     
Finding 3: There is no statistically significant difference in giving 
between the taking and burning treatments.   
Overall, we find that 11% of subjects gave in the burn treatment 
whereas 14% of subjects chose to give in the taking treatment 
(giving in the taking versus burn treatment, p = 0.68 Proportions 
Test, p  =  0.11 T-Test). Similarly, 24% of rich subjects chose to 
give in the take-and-keep treatment whereas 22% gave in the 
burn treatment (p  =  0.91 Proportions Test, p  =  0.91 T-Test). 
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Thus, while expanding the available choice-set by offering the 
option to insure crowds out giving, we find no evidence to suggest 
that the switch from take-and-keep to take-and-burn influences 
the choice to give. 
4.5.2. Taking  
 
Finding 4: Extending the choice-set to include the option to insure 
has no significant effect on taking.  
On average, 32% of subjects decided to take money from their 
opponents (p  =  0.01, T-Test on taking being above 0). Overall, we 
find no significant difference in the proportion of subjects that 
decided to take in the insurance and no insurance treatments (p  
=  0.45 Proportions Test, 0.46 T-Test). This result holds across 
rich and poor subjects. In particular, although the fraction of rich 
players that took fell from 24% in the no insurance treatment to 
11% in the insurance treatment, we do not find evidence of a 
statistically significant difference across treatments (taking by 
the rich in the insurance versus no insurance treatment, p  =  0.30 
Proportions Test, p  = 0.30 T-Test). The fraction of poor subjects 
that took also fell insignificantly from 48% in the no-insurance 
treatment to 44% in the insurance treatment (p  =  0.84 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.84 T-Test).  
Finding 5: Taking was significantly lower in the burning 
treatment relative to the take-and-keep treatment. 
 













We find evidence of a reduction in the fraction of subjects that 
decided to take from 40% in the taking treatment to 22% in the 
burning treatment (taking in the taking versus burn treatment, p  
=  0.09 Proportions Test, p  =  0.07 T-Test). Interestingly, this 
result doesn’t hold when we compare the behaviour of rich and 
poor players. In particular, as shown in Figure 4.3, we find that 
the fraction of rich subjects that took fell from 29% in the taking 
treatment to 6% in the burning treatment (p  =  0.06 Proportions 
Test, p  =  0.05 T-Test) while the fraction of poor subjects that 
took fell insignificantly from 52% in the taking treatment to 39% 
in the burning treatment (p  =  0.40 Proportions-Test, p  =  0.40 T-
Test). Moreover, while taking by the poor is individually 
significant in every treatment (p  =  0.01 (GT), p  =  0.04 (GB), p  =  
0.02 (GTI), p  =  0.08 (GBI)), our results suggest that taking by 
the rich is only significant in the GT treatment (p  =  0.04). 
Our finding of there being no statistical difference in the fraction 
of poor subjects that took across the taking and burning 
treatments lends support to the notion that burning is primarily 
driven out of an aversion towards disadvantageous inequality 
(Zizzo and Oswald 2001) rather than pure nastiness (Abbink and 
Sadrieh 2009). That is, the absence of any significant burning by 
rich subjects implies that we do not find evidence in support of the 
so-called nastiness hypothesis which postulates that observed 
antisocial behaviour is triggered by an intrinsic pleasure derived 
from lowering the well-being of others. Rather, the decrease in the 
fraction of rich subjects that took in the burn treatment relative to 
the take-and-keep treatment suggests that taking by the rich was 
primarily motivated by self-interest rather than pure nastiness, 
which adds support towards Hypothesis 3. 
The fact that we do not observe any significant difference in 
taking across the take-and-keep and burn treatments among poor 
subjects raises an interesting question regarding the external 
validity and thus real-world implications of our findings. That is, 
we show that in a lab setting, subjects were willing to incur a net 
personal cost in order to counter disadvantageous inequality. This 
finding is in line with a number of studies that have shown that 
individuals derive utility from relative status (Frank (1985), 
Robson (1992), Solnick and Hemenway (2007) and Grolleau and 
Said (2009)), that they dislike being of a lower rank than others 
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(Bault et al. (2008) and Ferrer-i-Carbonnel (2005)) and that they 
are willing to invest resources to prevent themselves from being 
beneath others (Beckman et al. (2002) and Zizzo and Oswald 
(2001)).  
However, while taking money in the take-and-keep treatment 
involved a reallocation of wealth and possible net advantage in 
monetary terms for the taker, evidence of burning implies that 
agents were willing to waste resources and lower the level of 
tangible welfare in order to improve their relative position in the 
income hierarchy. At a more practical level, there are numerous 
documented accounts of hostility towards individuals that are 
more successful than the perpetrators (Smith 1990, Mui 1995 and 
Fehr 2015).  
Several authors have argued that such sabotaging behaviour 
targeted at better-off individuals can discourage 
entrepreneurship, innovation, economic growth and development 
(Schoeck (1966), Mui (1995), Caplan et al. (2005) and Fehr 
(2018)). The ramifications of such behaviour are therefore likely to 
have a negative feedback effect on saboteurs in the longer-run. In 
combination with the common finding within the empirical 
literature showing that poorer households tend to depict a higher 
degree of impatience in terms of their time-preferences (see 
Carvalho 2010), if poorer agents don’t place a high enough weight 
on future prospects, then this result may further suggest that 
poorer agents are more willing to directly inflict punishment upon 
others and inadvertently promote self-sabotage in the longer-term 
as a consequence.  
Moreover, this result could also be relevant for discussions on 
organizational settings. For instance, several organizations 
commonly implement tournament or competition-type 
compensation schemes whereby earnings and promotions are 
dependent upon relative performance comparisons (Bognanno 
2001, Bothner, Kang and Stuart 2007 and Casas-Arce and 
Martinez-Jerez 2009). However, in combination with earlier 
studies, our results suggest that such setups could elicit negative 
emotions and interactions which may ultimately hamper 





4.5.3. Transfer Amounts  
 
Finding 6: Subjects that chose to give transferred less money in 
the burning treatments in comparison to the taking treatments 
whereas there is no significant difference in the amounts taken 
across the taking and burning treatments.  
Figure 4.4 reports the distribution of the amounts taken across 
treatments. The data shows a strong negative distribution for the 
amounts taken. 82% of subjects that took decided to take the full 
amount in the take-and-keep treatment and 75% took the full 
amount in the burning treatment. We find no significant 
difference in the proportion of subjects taking the maximum 
amount possible in the burning and taking treatments (p  =  0.67 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.68 T-Test).  
Figure 4.5 highlights the distribution of the amounts given across 
treatments. As shown, the distribution of the amount given is 
substantially less skewed in comparison to the distribution of the 
amounts taken. While our results showed no significant difference 
in the proportion of subjects that decided to take the full amount 
across the take-and-keep and burning treatments, we find a 
significant reduction in the fraction of subjects that gave the full 
amount, from 67% in the take-and-keep treatments, to no subject 
transferring the maximum amount of £2.50 in the burning 
treatments (giving in the taking versus burn treatments, p  =  
0.04 Proportions Test, p  =  0.00 T-Test). 
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Figure 4.5. Amount Given across Treatments 
 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 display the distribution of the amounts given 
and taken by rich players across the take-and-keep and burning 
treatments. Similar to above, we find that the distribution of the 
amounts taken displays greater skewness in comparison to the 
distribution of the amounts given. 67% of rich subjects who took 
decided to take the full amount in the taking treatment whereas 
there was only a single rich player that took in the burning 
treatment (taking maximum £2.50 (by rich) in taking versus 
burning treatment, p  =  0.49 Proportions Test, p  =  0.49 T-Test). 
80% of rich subjects that gave decided to transfer the full amount 
in the take-and-keep treatment whereas no rich player decided to 
transfer the full amount in the burning treatment (giving full-
amount in taking versus burning treatments, p  =  0.02 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.00 T-Test). 91% of poor subjects who took 
decided to take the maximum amount in the taking treatment 
whereas 71% did so in the burning treatment (p  =  0.28 
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Figure 4.6. Amount Given by Rich across Treatments  
 
Figure 4.7. Amount Taken by Rich across Treatments  
Analogous to our observation under Finding 2, the reduction in 
the amount voluntarily transferred towards the opponent in the 
burning treatments relative to the taking treatments highlights 
how a change in the context of the experiment can influence the 
level of prosociality. That is, the perception of benevolence or 
fairness may indeed be context-specific in which case the switch to 
burning could influence one’s perception of generosity. More 
specifically, one possible example of this could be that if burning 
has a framing effect whereby subjects feel more vulnerable or as if 
the situation involves greater risk, then transferring £1.00 in such 
an environment may be perceived as being equally as kind as 




















Finding 7: We observe that on average subjects take/burn a larger 
amount of money than they give.  
Overall, we find that 55% of rich subjects that chose to give 
transferred £1.00 or less and 45% gave the maximum amount of 
£2.50. In contrast, 28% of rich subjects who took, took £1.00 or 
less whereas 72% took the full amount. Similarly, 83% of poor 
subjects that decided to take, took the maximum amount of £2.50 
and 6% took £1.00 or less28. This result provides support towards 
Hypothesis 4 and earlier literature regarding the assumption of 
agents finding disadvantageous inequality more problematic than 
advantageous inequality (Messick and Sentis (1985), Loewenstein 
et al. (1989) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)).  
Given that 55% of rich subjects that chose to give in our 
experiment only transferred £1.00 or less, this amounts to 6.7% of 
their wealth. 45% of rich subjects transferred £2.50 i.e. 16.7% of 
their initial wealth. In comparison, Engel (2011) conducts a meta-
analysis of over 100 experiments finding that within the dictator 
game, on average, dictators choose to transfer 28.35% of the 
endowment. Although we set an upper-limit on giving, 55% of 
those that gave transferred over four times less than the average 
amount observed in the dictator game. This finding is in line with 
studies showing that changes to the available choice-set and the 
context in which the decision is made can cause significant 
differences in behaviour and distributional outcomes (List (2007), 
Bardsley (2008) and Dohmen et al. (2011)).  
4.5.4. Insurance 
 
Finding 8: We observe that the fraction of subjects that purchased 
insurance was high and insignificantly different across the GTI 
and GBI treatments.  
Overall, we find that 44% of subjects purchased insurance (p  =  
0.00, T-Test on overall significance of insurance) when it was 
made available. The purchase of insurance was higher, though 
insignificantly, at 56.25% in the GBI treatment compared to 35% 
in the GTI treatment (insurance in GTI versus GBI treatment, p  
=  0.20 Proportions Test, p  =  0.19 T-Test). As Figure 4.8 reports, 
                                                   
28 There was only one case of a poor subject giving money to their 
opponent and this was a transfer of £1.50. 
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no poor subject purchased insurance in the GTI treatment 
whereas 38% did so in the GBI treatment. In contrast, the 
purchase of insurance was stable across the taking and burning 
treatments for rich players. 70% of rich subjects purchased 
insurance in the GTI treatment and 75% did so in the GBI 
treatment. Hence, our findings suggest that poor players were 
significantly more likely to purchase insurance in the burning 
treatment i.e. GTI versus GBI (p  =  0.04 Proportions Test, p  =  
0.03 T-Test) whereas we find no significant difference in the 
proportion of rich subjects purchasing insurance across the taking 
and burning treatment (p  =  0.81 Proportions Test, p  =  0.81 T-
Test).  
Figure 4.8. Insurance by Rich and Poor 
The high level of observed insurance purchases by the rich in the 
GTI treatment provides an interesting refutation of Hypothesis 2. 
That is, based on the four models of social preferences covered 
earlier, we showed that it was never optimal for subjects to 
purchase insurance in the GTI treatment. For subjects that are 
purely concerned with their personal monetary earnings, taking 
the maximum amount from the opponent provides a superior 
‘alternative’ strategy to insuring for £1.00, as the net-loss from 
doing so cannot exceed £0.50.  
One possible interpretation of this result is that in reality subjects 
perceive there to be a difference between taking and insuring. 
While insurance involves the protection of one’s own earnings, 














psychological perspective, there is an important distinction 
between these two options. Moreover, as subjects don’t know with 
any certainty the strategy of their opponent, insurance provides 
them with the ability to completely eliminate uncertainty. This is 
important not only from a financial standpoint i.e. by removing 
uncertainty regarding final payoffs, but is also important for 
behavioural reasons.  
Specifically, if the subject expects their opponent to take with 
some positive probability and chooses take as an alternative 
strategy to insuring, then there is still a possibility that their 
expectation was incorrect, in which case taking from a poor 
subject who in fact hadn’t decided to take may lead to feelings of 
guilt and regret for the richer player. Hence, although the four 
models of social preferences presented earlier may not capture 
such motives, the high levels of observed insurance may have 
been driven by a combination of emotional and property-right 
based reasoning.  
4.5.5. Do Nothing 
 
Finding 9: We observe a significant increase in the fraction of 
subjects that chose to do nothing and a simultaneous reduction in 
the fraction of subjects that took in the GB treatment relative to 
the GT treatment.  
The proportion of subjects that decided to do nothing rose from 
32% in the GT treatment to 60% in the GB treatment (p  =  0.07 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.06 T-Test). In contrast, the fraction of 
subjects that decided to take fell from 45% in the GT treatment to 
25% in the GB treatment (taking in the GT versus GB treatment, 
p  =  0.17 Proportions Test, p  =  0.17 T-Test) while the difference 
in the level of giving was far less pronounced as 15% of subjects 
gave in the GB treatment compared to 23% in the GT treatment 
(p  =  0.52 Proportions-Test, p  =  0.53 T-Test). 
Since burning money under all circumstances implied a net 
monetary cost to the taker, this finding suggests that part of our 
subject pool was indeed motivated purely by self-interest. This 
provides some support towards Hypothesis 1 and the predictions 
derived from the model of narrow self-interest.  
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Finding 10: Extending the choice-set to include the option to 
insure significantly lowers the fraction of subjects that choose to 
do nothing.  
Comparing the incidence of choosing to do nothing across the 
insurance and no insurance treatments, we find a significant 
reduction from 45% of subjects in the no insurance treatment to 
22% of subjects choosing to do nothing in the insurance treatment 
(p  =  0.03 Proportions Test, p  =  0.03 T-Test).  Moreover, the 
fraction of rich subjects that chose to do nothing fell substantially 
from 43% in the no insurance treatment to 6% in the insurance 
treatment (p  =  0.01 Proportions Test, p  =  0.00 T-Test) whilst 
the fraction of poor subjects that chose to do nothing fell 
insignificantly from 48% in the no insurance treatment to 39% in 
the insurance treatment (p  =  0.58 Proportions Test, p  =  0.57 T-
Test). 
Findings 2, 4 and 10 jointly show that expanding the available 
choice-set by including the option to insure resulted in a 
significant reduction in the fraction of subjects that chose to give 
and do nothing but had no effect on the proportion of subjects that 
decided to take. One possible interpretation of this result is that 
the shift towards insurance was primarily driven by a reduction 
in the proportion of subjects that decided to do nothing coupled 
with the crowding out of giving, and so a reduction in prosocial 
behaviour, whilst having no impact on taking. Given that we also 
found a decrease in the fraction of subjects that gave the 
maximum amount to their opponents in the burning treatment 
relative to the taking treatment whilst finding no significant 
difference in the fraction of subjects that took the maximum 
amount (see Finding 6), these results imply that the preference 
for altruism or acting upon advantageous inequality-aversion is 
relatively weaker and less stable than the desire to mitigate 
disadvantageous inequality (Messick and Sentis (1985), 
Loewenstein et al. (1989) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). More 
broadly, this result highlights the fact that altering the choice-set 
available to subjects can have an impact on the degree of 
altruism, as shown in several previous studies (List (2007), 
Bardsley (2008)). 
The data in Figure 4.1 shows that overall, around 35% of subjects 
decided to do nothing. While doing nothing can certainly 
represent selfishness or reciprocity motives, another potentially 
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relevant explanation for this option being chosen so frequently 
could be related to the perception of fairness regarding the way in 
which the endowment was earned. For example, Akbas, Ariely 
and Yuksel (2014) argue that the perceived fairness of income 
distributions depends on the beliefs about the process that 
generated the inequality. Specifically, they outline two crucial 
factors of the process that affect fairness views. These are 
procedural justice i.e. equal treatment of all participants and 
agency i.e. one’s ability to make their own choices. If people feel 
they were treated fairly and received compensation for what they 
earned, then they may choose to do nothing. In other words, the 
inequality in our experiment, unlike several previous studies, 
could be considered a fair and natural outcome in which rewards 
were distributed according to differences in performance. This 
could potentially affect the incentive of subjects to counter such 
inequality.  
4.5.6. Gender   
 
There is considerable experimental evidence to suggest that 
gender is an important determinant of a variety of economic and 
strategic decisions (Eckel and Grossman 1998, Croson and Gneezy 
2009), and on subjects’ beliefs about the altruistic behaviour of 
men and women (Aguiar et al. 2009). Chowdhury et al. (2016) run 
a dictator game with both give and take frames finding that 
females allocate significantly more under the taking frame than 
in the giving frame whereas males display the exact opposite 
behaviour. The authors argue that using a taking frame makes 
male subjects significantly more selfish while making females 
more egalitarian, in comparison to the giving frame. More 
generally, females have been found to display greater altruism 
than their male counterparts in dictator games (see Engel 2011 
for a review).  
Findings from the literature cited above could translate into 
gender differences between a take-and-keep and take-and-burn 
treatment. Experimental studies on gender differences in anti-
social behaviour are limited. Abbink and Hermann (2011) and 
Kessler et al. (2012) find no evidence of a gender-effect in 
antisocial behaviour. However, Ghiglieri (1999) showed in a non-
experimental study that males tend to display more aggression in 
comparison to females. Hence, we test whether the context of the 
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experiment i.e. taking versus burning has an asymmetric effect on 
males and females.  
Finding 11: Overall, there is no significant gender-effect in terms 
of differences in the fraction of males and females that chose to 
give, take, insure or do nothing.  
Figure 4.9 reports the overall distribution of choices made by 
males and females across treatments. We find no significant 
difference in the fraction of males and females that decided to give 
(overall fraction women that gave versus men, p  =  0.93 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.93 T-Test), take (p  =  0.93 Proportions 
Test, p  =  0.93 T-Test), insure (p  =  0.50 Proportions Test, p  =  
0.49 T-Test) or do-nothing (p  =  0.58 Proportions Test, p  =  0.58 
T-Test).  
 
Figure 4.9. Overall Choices by Gender 
This result holds in most cases when we compare behaviour 
within particular treatments. As reported in Table 4.4, we are 
only able to find a significant difference in behaviour in the GBI 
treatment. Specifically, 30% of women decided to take in the GBI 
treatment whereas no male chose to take. Likewise, 30% of 
females chose to insure in the GBI treatment whereas the 














Male vs. Female 
  Proportions Test Bootstrapped T-Test 
  Give Take Do Nothing Insure Give Take Do Nothing Insure 
GB 0.21 0.42 0.85 - 0.26 0.37 0.85 - 
GT 0.32 0.34 0.89 - 0.33 0.32 0.90 - 
GBI 0.42 0.14 0.14 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.04 0.00 
GTI 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.64 0.29 0.14 0.10 0.64 
 




Several studies have found there to be a relationship between an 
individual’s belief-system, such as their religiosity, and 
prosociality. For example, it has been shown that the use of a 
religious prime increases allocations in the anonymous dictator 
game (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007), promotes the willingness to 
volunteer (Sasaki et al. (2013) and Batara (2016)), increases 
honesty (Randolph-Seng and Nielsen 2007) and the intention to 
help others (Pichon, Boccato and Saroglou 2007) as well as 
improve willingness to help and helping behaviours in general 
(Pichon and Saroglou (2009), Ruffle and Sosis (2010) and Ahmed 
and Salas (2013)).  
In an attempt to understand the motivation behind some of the 
decisions made by subjects in our experiment, we use a more 
general measure of an individual’s values. Specifically, 
participants were asked a series of questions after the completion 
of the main experiment and from this data, we define “ethical” 
subjects as those who either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement that ethical or moral issues do not influence where 
or how they decide to spend their money.  
Finding 12: We observe that ethical subjects were significantly 
less likely to burn and more likely to give than not-ethical 
subjects. Furthermore, there is a significant reduction in taking 
from ethical subjects between the taking and burning treatment 
whereas there is no significant difference in taking for not-ethical 
subjects. There is no significant difference in giving by ethical 
subjects between the taking and burning treatments whilst giving 
is insignificant for not-ethical subjects across both treatments.  
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As shown in Figure 4.10, on average, 20% of ethical subjects chose 
to give money to their opponents, whereas the corresponding 
figure was 5% for those who didn’t identify as being ethical 
(ethical versus not-ethical giving p  =  0.06 Proportions Test, p  =  
0.05 T-Test). 24% of ethical subjects decided to take from their 
opponents which is lower than the 41% of not-ethical subjects that 
decided to take (ethical versus not-ethical taking p  =  0.13 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.13 T-Test).  
 
Figure 4.10. Choices by Ethical Participants  
From Table 4.5, when comparing behaviour between the burning 
and take-and-keep treatments, we find no significant difference in 
the fraction of ethical subjects that chose to give (p  =  0.82 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.81 T-Test). However, we do find that the 
fraction of ethical subjects that took fell from 36% in the take-and-
keep treatment to 11% in the burning treatment (p  =  0.05 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.04 T-Test). In contrast, for not-ethical 
subjects, we find no significant difference in the fraction of 
subjects that gave (p  =  0.18 Proportions Test, p  =  0.13 T-Test) 
or took (p  =  0.55 Proportions Test, p  =  0.54 T-Test) across the 


















  Take-and-Keep Take-and-Burn 
  Ethical Not-Ethical Ethical Not-Ethical 
Give 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.00 
Take 0.36 0.45 0.11 0.35 
 
Table 4.5. Choices by Ethical and Not-Ethical Subjects (Fraction) 
 
In the burning treatments, on average, 21% of ethical subjects 
chose to transfer money to their opponents whereas no not-ethical 
subject gave during this treatment (p  =  0.05 Proportions Test, p  
=  0.03 T-Test). In contrast, only 11% of ethical subjects took 
during the burning treatments whilst 35% of not-ethical subjects 
decided to burn their opponents endowment (p  =  0.07 
Proportions Test, p  =  0.07 T-Test). In the take-and-keep 
treatments, we find no evidence of any difference in either the 
fraction of taking (p  =  0.57 Proportions Test, p  =  0.56 T-Test) or 
giving (p  =  0.45 Proportions Test, p  =  0.45 T-Test) between 
ethical and not-ethical subjects).  
Therefore, Finding 12 corroborates the literature cited above by 
illustrating a positive relationship between an individual’s value-
system and the level of prosociality.  
4.5.8. Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.6 reports the results from a simple regression analysis. As 
shown, giving and doing nothing are significantly lower in the 
insurance treatment whilst there is no significant effect on the 
level of taking. This adds support to our earlier assertion that the 
shift towards insurance was driven by a reduction in doing 
nothing and the crowding out of giving (see Under Finding 10).  
Moreover, taking was lower whilst insurance purchases and 
choosing to do nothing were higher in the burning treatment. As 
explained earlier, insurance was only optimal in the GBI 
treatment according to the model of self-interest (conditional upon 
subjects expecting their opponents to take). The reduction in 
taking and increase in doing nothing and insurance implies that 
some subjects had indeed acted based on self-interest. 
Interestingly, the higher insurance purchases in the burning 
treatment implies that subjects had a sufficiently high level of 
distrust in their opponent that they had expected them to 
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willingly incur a net personal cost in order to sabotage their 
earnings. From the perspective of a rich player, ex-post, the 
purchase of insurance during the GBI treatment seems justified 
based on our findings on the behaviour of poor subjects in the 
burn treatment.  
Our results show that poor subjects were significantly less likely 
to have purchased insurance and give money but more likely to 
have taken in comparison to rich subjects. Finding 5 showed that 
there was no significant difference in taking by the poor between 
the take and burn treatments. Hence, from our earlier predictions 
(see Table 4.3), these results suggest that the models of 
inequality-aversion and envy provide a more accurate description 
of the observed behaviour of poorer subjects in comparison to the 
model of narrow self-interest. In combination with Findings 1 and 
5, we observe evidence of both altruism and selfishness from rich 
players. 
Risk-aversion is an important determinant of the demand for 
insurance (see Outreville 2013). Risk-averse agents agree to pay 
an insurance premium that is in excess of the mathematical 
expectation of loss29. Numerous studies have documented 
evidence of agents displaying some positive degree of risk-
aversion (Gneezy and Potters (1997), Eckel and Grossman (2002) 
and Holt and Laury (2002)). Table 4.6 shows that the purchase of 
insurance was higher for those that self-reported a higher degree 
of risk-aversion30 as well as for those that had expected to be 
taken from. This result indicates that a key determinant of 
insurance demand was the desire for greater certainty regarding 
the final allocation of subject endowments. 
 
                                                   
29 The maximum amount of money that can be taken from any 
subject is £2.50. If a player anticipates this, they would be better 
off (in the GTI treatment) taking an equal amount from their 
opponent which would leave both 50p worse off. However, the 
purchase of insurance at £1.00 would be indicative of risk-
aversion as it would suggest that subjects were willing to pay a 
premium in order to ensure they have certainty regarding their 
final payoff. 
30 Risk-aversion here is based on a self-reported measure where 
subjects were asked to rank their appetite for risk on a scale 
ranging from 1-10 with 1 being fully risk-averse and 10 
representing a risk-lover.   
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  Give Take Do Nothing Insure 
Burning -0.035 -0.22** 0.176* 0.272* 
  (0.065) (0.094) (0.104) (0.141) 
Insurance -0.14** -0.08 -0.245***   
  (0.065) (0.093) (0.094)   
Poor -0.131** 0.377*** -0.012 -0.42*** 
  (0.067) (0.110) (0.123) (0.134) 
Female -0.011 0.057 -0.001 -0.121 
  (0.070) (0.097) (0.102) (0.129) 
Ethical 0.072 -0.04 0.116 -0.278** 
  (0.063) (0.098) (0.109) (0.128) 
Risk-Aversion 0.001 0.032 0.004 -0.077* 
  (0.020) (0.023) (0.028) (0.045) 
Expected Taking 0.015 0.03*** -0.409*** 0.269** 
  (0.063) (0.110) (0.131) (0.124) 
Reciprocal Takers -0.305*** 0.22** 0.076 0.144 
  (0.091) (0.110) (0.120) (0.141) 
Loss-Averse -0.13 -0.01 0.212** 0.05 
  (0.089) (0.101) (0.108) (0.192) 
Self-Regarding  -0.005 0.059 -0.035 -0.338* 
  (0.049) (0.128) (0.143) (0.171) 
Constant 0.522*** -0.22 0.396* 0.932** 
  (0.019) (0.196) (0.225) (0.384) 
No. of Observations 78 78 78 36 
 
Table 4.6. OLS Regression Results31 
 
Several studies have found that females display a lower level of 
risk-tolerance in comparison to their male counterparts (Booth 
and Nolen (2012) and Croson and Gneezy (2009)). As an 
individual’s degree of risk-aversion is a positive determinant of 
insurance demand, it then follows that the demand for insurance 
should be greater among females than males. However, our 
findings do not support this view as we do not find any evidence of 
females being more likely to purchase insurance than their male 
counterparts. This result does however support a growing strand 
of literature showing that gender-specific differences, as well as 
general differences in preferences, are domain-specific (See 
Dohmen et al. 2011).  
                                                   
31 (Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects 




Traditional economic theory posits that immoral behaviour, such 
as lying and stealing, is a product of both income effects and the 
probability of being caught and punished (Becker 1968). More 
recently, this standard theory has been questioned with the 
concept of non-pecuniary moral costs associated with lying and 
stealing being incorporated into the decision model (Gneezy 
(2005), Levitt and List (2007), Fischbacher and Heusi (2008), 
Mazar et al. (2008) and Lundquist et al. (2009)). In a sense, the 
standard assumption can be thought of as being based on the 
assumption that agents are self-regarding. In an attempt to 
capture agents who behave in such a manner, we asked subjects 
in our post-experiment questionnaire whether they felt that it 
was justified to do anything in the pursuit of success as long as 
they could get away with their actions. Subjects that either 
agreed or strongly agreed with this statement were labelled as 
being “self-regarding”.  
We consider the variable “ethical” introduced earlier a proxy for 
those that are more likely to take into consideration the non-
pecuniary costs of stealing. From Table 4.6, we see that both 
ethical and self-regarding participants were significantly less 
likely to purchase insurance. Although we are unable to find 
statistical significance in any other regression for these two 
variables, it is interesting to note that our results show a negative 
coefficient on giving and doing nothing but a positive coefficient 
on taking for self-regarding subjects. In contrast, we find the 
complete opposite for ethical subjects whereby the coefficients on 
giving and doing nothing are positive whilst the coefficient on 
taking is negative. 
As in Finding 12, this result suggests that part of the observed 
heterogeneity in preferences is likely to be based upon an 
individual’s ethical and moral code. Ethical subjects are more 
likely to behave altruistically by donating a portion of their 
endowments to their poorer opponents and less likely to steal 
from their opponent. Based on self-reported responses, self-
regarding subjects are willing to behave antisocially by engaging 
in activities, albeit illicit, in order to improve their own situation.  
Subjects were also asked in the post-experiment questionnaire 
how they would have responded if they were told with complete 
certainty that their opponent had chosen to take money from 
them. Participants that either agreed or strongly agreed that they 
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would have also chosen to take money from their opponent were 
categorised as “reciprocal takers”. Note that there is a distinction 
between those that had expected to be taken from and those that 
would reciprocate taking. While the former may have also 
responded by taking during the experiment, their decision was 
based on an expectation regarding their opponent’s strategy. In 
comparison, reciprocal taking is based upon a hypothetical 
scenario in which there is complete certainty regarding the 
opponent’s actions. Therefore, whilst those that were categorised 
as reciprocal takers may have also expected their opponent to 
have taken during the experiment, the probability they had 
assigned to their opponent choosing to take may have been 
sufficiently low so as to have prevented them from taking during 
the experiment.   
Table 4.6 shows that those expecting to be taken from were 
significantly less likely to do nothing and more likely to take and 
purchase insurance Reciprocal takers were significantly less 
likely to give and more likely to take. We do not find a significant 
insurance effect for reciprocal takers. However, we find that the 
coefficient for reciprocal takers in the taking regression is over 
seven times higher than that on those that expected to be taken 
from. 
This result reinforces our assertion under Finding 8 that the high 
levels of insurance purchases observed in the GTI game may have 
been a consequence of uncertainty regarding the opponent’s 
choice. In order to avoid the regret or guilt of taking from an 
opponent that didn’t take, subjects may have opted for insurance. 
In other words, at least some subjects that had an expectation of 
being taken from didn’t have an expectation that was sufficiently 
high to trigger taking i.e. the optimal strategy in monetary terms. 
Hence, such subjects may have rather opted to purchase 
insurance.   
4.5.9. Insurance and Welfare 
 
Comparing the average payoffs across treatments for rich and 
poor subjects (see Table 4.7), our results show an insignificant 
increase in the average payoff for rich subjects from £13.68 in the 
no insurance treatment to £13.90 in the insurance treatment (p  =  
0.40 Mann-Whitney, p  =  0.64 T-Test), an increase from £13.56 in 
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the GT treatment to £13.74 GTI treatment (p  =  0.43 Mann-
Whitney, p  =  0.83 T-Test) and an increase from £13.81 in the GB 
treatment to £14.10 in the GBI treatment (p  =  0.44 Mann-
Whitney, p  =  0.78 T-Test). However, we do find weak evidence 
that the availability of insurance influences the average payoff for 
poor subjects. Specifically, the average payoff fell from £5.33 in 
the no insurance treatment to £4.94 in the insurance treatment (p  
=  0.10 Mann-Whitney, p  =  0.39 T-Test), from £5.85 in the GT 
treatment to £5.20 in the GTI treatment (p  =  0.20 Mann-
Whitney, p  =  0.39 T-Test) and fell from £4.77 in the GB 
treatment to £4.61 in the GBI treatment (p  =  0.27 Mann-
Whitney, p  =  0.60 T-Test). 
There is weak evidence to support the notion that the availability 
of insurance worsens inequality. From earlier results, we found 
that the availability of insurance had no significant impact on 
taking but led to a reduction in the fraction of rich players that 
chose to give and do nothing. Moreover, we reported a high and 
significant uptake of insurance by the rich. This implies that the 
shift towards insurance was partially driven by a reduction in the 
fraction of rich subjects that chose to do nothing and the crowding 
out of giving. Coupled with the inability of poor players to access 
the endowment of the insured rich and the fact that we find no 
difference in taking by the poor across the insurance and no 
insurance treatments, these factors may provide an explanation 
for the observed fall in the average payoff of poor subjects and the, 















Treatment Overall Rich Poor 
Insurance 9.42 13.90 4.94 
No Insurance 9.51 13.68 5.33 
Burning 9.32 13.94 4.70 
Taking 9.59 13.65 5.54 
GT 9.70 13.56 5.85 
GB 9.29 13.81 4.77 
GTI 9.47 13.74 5.20 
GBI 9.36 14.10 4.61 
 
Variance of Payoff 
Insurance 22.00 1.37 1.42 
No Insurance 20.79 3.13 2.96 
Burning 22.59 0.80 0.53 
Taking 20.27 3.59 3.45 
GT 20.15 4.98 4.57 
GB 22.55 1.36 0.84 
GTI 21.45 2.42 2.34 
GBI 24.15 0.14 0.19 
 
Table 4.7. Average Payoff across Treatments 
 
The results above suggest that the inclusion of insurance doesn’t 
improve welfare. That is, we do not find strong evidence of 
changes in the average payoff across the insurance and no 
insurance treatment. However, the welfare of agents isn’t solely a 
function of their average payoff. Rather, for risk-averse agents, 
the second moment i.e. the variance of their payoff is also a 
critical component of welfare. Although there is little evidence of 
any significant difference in the overall payoff variance, which 
was 20.79 in the no insurance treatment and 22.00 in the 
insurance treatment (p  =  0.35 Levene’s Test)32, at a more 
disaggregated level, we do find evidence of a significant reduction 
in the variance of payoffs for both rich and poor subjects. 
Specifically, the average variance of the payoff for rich players fell 
by 229% from 3.13 in the no insurance treatment to 1.37 in the 
insurance treatment (p  =  0.02 Levene’s Test) and by 209%, from 
2.96 in the no insurance treatment to 1.42 in the insurance 
treatment for poor players (p  =  0.07 Levene’s Test). Therefore, 
                                                   
32 Testing for the equality of variances based on Levene (1960). 
The null-hypothesis is that the two variances are equal.  
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despite there being no significant change in average payoffs, if the 
payoff variance is used as a measure of risk, then the average 
payoff per unit of risk i.e. average payoff divided by average 
variance increased from 7.73 in the no insurance treatment to 
11.88 in the insurance treatment for rich subjects and from 3.10 
to 4.15 for poor subjects.  
 
4.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Theories of other-regarding preferences typically predict that 
giving increases with an individual’s income. This has been 
attributed to various factors such as relative earnings (Bolton 
1991), inequality-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) and Alesina and Angeltos (2005)) and warm glow 
(Andreoni 1990). There exists a voluminous literature reinforcing 
the idea of positive other-regarding preferences by showing the 
existence of prosocial behaviour in the lab (Andreoni et al. (2007) 
and Engel (2011)). The more recent literature has found 
conflicting evidence of antisocial behaviour in the lab e.g. theft 
and sabotage of an opponent’s earnings. It has been argued that 
this so-called dark-side of human behaviour is motivated by 
inequality-aversion, envy and pure nastiness (Zizzo and Oswald 
(2001) and Abbink and Sadrieh (2009)).  
Developing a better understanding of antisocial preferences can 
provide valuable insights33. This is because the forces of spite and 
envy have been argued to have both socially destructive and 
constructive ramifications.  If agents are willing to expend 
resources to undermine the performance and success of others 
                                                   
33 A potentially interesting extension of our work, that is not 
explored here, could be to provide insight into the weight of 𝜃 on 
the opponent’s monetary gain and the range of its parameter 
value. For example, perhaps a separable preference that nests 
both an other-regarding and stealing aversion component such as: 
𝑈(𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑛) − 𝜃𝑈(𝐶𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) + 𝛾1𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑙  
Assuming an arbitrarily large dataset, one should be able to 




(Smith and Kim (2007) and Van de Ven, Zeelenberg and Pieters 
(2009)), then such behaviour could negatively impact societal 
cohesion and welfare as well as discouraging investment and 
productivity (Kebede and Zizzo 2015). On the other hand, envy 
has the potential to serve as a motivator for the envious to work 
harder in order to progress in the income and status hierarchies 
(Grolleau et al. 2009).  
Evidence regarding the impact of income inequality (which has 
been argued to be a major driver of spite and envy) on behaviour 
has been mixed. For instance, while it has been found that low-
income subjects are relatively more co-operative than their high-
income counterparts (Buckley and Croson 2006), other studies 
have shown there to be little difference between the willingness to 
harm others among low and high income subjects (Grossman and 
Komai 2016). With the growing levels of inequality across several 
countries (Piketty 2014), it has been argued that the social and 
economic consequences have become more pertinent to 
understand.  
More broadly, it has been shown that competitive environments 
can encourage sabotage (Charness et al. (2011), Balafoutas et al. 
(2012) and Jauernig and Uhl (2019)). For example, Harbring and 
Irlenbusch (2011) use an experimental tournament setting to 
show that wage differences between subjects increases sabotage. 
Gurr (1970) argues that the opportunity costs of the relatively 
disadvantaged decreases while their inclination to engage in 
violent demands for redistribution increases following an increase 
in inequality. Given that people may in general have some 
tendency to envy those that are in a better position than 
themselves (Tullock 2013), it is of interest to study the role of 
inequality derived from differences in performance on the 
behaviour of agents.  
In this study, we ran a simple incentivised laboratory experiment 
to test whether altering subject choice-sets and the context in 
which the decision is made (i.e. take-and-keep versus take-and-
burn) influences the level of prosociality after subjects have 
competed in a tournament setting. Consistent with previous 
findings, our results suggest that some agents do display other-
regarding preferences. However, we not only observe 
heterogeneity in preferences across subjects but also find that 
behaviour can be sensitive to changes in the exact context and 
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choice-set presented to subjects (List (2007), Bardsley (2008) and 
Dohmen et al. (2011)).  
We report evidence showing that altering subject choice-sets had 
an asymmetric effect on attitudes. Our data shows that an 
expansion of the available choice-set to include the option of 
insurance crowds out donations from competition winners (rich 
subjects) and shifting from the take-and-keep to the take-and-
burn treatment lowered the average size of donations. We find a 
high and significant uptake of insurance by tournament winners 
even in cases in which insuring was a dominated strategy in 
monetary terms. One interpretation of this finding is that rich 
subjects avoided stealing from poorer opponents due to 
uncertainty regarding their chosen action. Specifically, rich 
subjects may have preferred to incur an additional £0.50 cost to 
purchase insurance in order to avoid the ex-post regret or guilt of 
having taken from a poor opponent that didn’t choose to take. 
In contrast, our results show that neither an expansion of the 
choice-set nor a switch from the take-and-keep treatment to the 
take-and-burn treatment impacted taking by competition losers 
(poor subjects). This was both in terms of the fraction of poor 
subjects that took and the size of the amounts taken. Hence, we 
found that the aforementioned changes to the decision-task were 
more effective at lowering prosocial behaviour by competition 
winners whilst being less effective at having any impact on the 
antisocial behaviour of competition losers.  
In combination with the prior literature, an important 
overarching implication of our findings is that the situational 
instability of preferences observed in the lab is likely responsible 
for the lack of external validity of experimental studies. While the 
experimental literature has provided valuable insights through 
theory-testing, in order to address concrete real-world problems 
there is a need for greater emphasis on context-specific studies, 
the results of which may only have limited scope in terms of 
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In this part of the experiment you will be randomly paired with 
one other person in the experimental session. Below we have the 
payoff that you received in part 1 and the payoff that this other 
person received. 
 
You received   _________       The other person received   _________        
 
Both of you now have the option to transfer or take money from 
the other person. Specifically: 
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of your money and 
give it to the other person. If you chose this option then your 
payoff goes down by £0.60 (the £0.10 payment and £0.50 transfer) 
and the payoff of the other person goes up by £0.50. If you pay 
£0.20 then you give £1.00 to the other person, and so on. The most 
you can pay is £0.50 in which case you give £2.50.   
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of the money the other 
person has and move it to you. If you chose this option then your 
payoff goes up by £0.40 (the £0.50 minus the £0.10 payment) and 
the payoff of the other person goes down by £0.50. If you pay 
£0.20 then you can take £1.00 from the other person, and so on. 
The most you can pay is £0.50 in which case you take £2.50. 
The other person has the same options as you. Your final payoff 
will be determined by your respective choices.  
 
Do you want to give, take or do nothing? (Please tick one option):  
 




If you chose Give/Take, then how much do you want to 
Give/Take? (Please tick one option): 
 




























In this part of the experiment you will be randomly paired with 
one other person in the experimental session. Below we have the 
payoff that you received in part 1 and the payoff that this other 
person received. 
 
You received   _________       The other person received   _________        
 
Both of you now have the option to transfer or take money from 
the other person. Specifically: 
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of your money and 
give it to the other person. If you chose this option then your 
payoff goes down by £0.60 (the £0.10 payment and £0.50 transfer) 
and the payoff of the other person goes up by £0.50. If you pay 
£0.20 then you give £1.00 to the other person, and so on. The most 
you can pay is £0.50 in which case you give £2.50.   
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of the money the other 
person has and reduce their payoff. If you chose this option 
then your payoff goes down by £0.10 and the payoff of the other 
person goes down by £0.50. If you pay £0.20 then you can take 
£1.00 from the other person, and so on. The most you can pay is 
£0.50 in which case you take £2.50. 
The other person has the same options as you. Your final payoff 
will be determined by your respective choices.  
 
Do you want to give, take or do nothing? (Please tick one option):  
 




If you chose Give/Take, then how much do you want to 
Give/Take? (Please tick one option): 
 
 £0.00    £0.50    £1.00    £1.50    £2.00    £2.50 
























4.8.3. Instructions in Give-Take-Insure (GTI) Treatment   
 
Part 3 
In this part of the experiment you will be randomly paired with 
one other person in the experimental session. Below we have the 
payoff that you received in part 1 and the payoff that this other 
person received. 
 
You received   _________       The other person received   _________     
Both of you now have the option to transfer or take money from 
the other person. Specifically: 
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of your money and 
give it to the other person. If you chose this option then your 
payoff goes down by £0.60 (the £0.10 payment and £0.50 transfer) 
and the payoff of the other person goes up by £0.50. If you pay 
£0.20 then you give £1.00 to the other person, and so on. The most 
you can pay is £0.50 in which case you give £2.50.   
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of the money the other 
person has and move it to you. If you chose this option and it is 
not blocked (see below) then your payoff goes up by £0.40 (the 
£0.50 minus the £0.10 payment) and the payoff of the other 
person goes down by £0.50. If you pay £0.20 then you can try to 
take £1.00 from the other person, and so on. The most you can pay 
is £0.50 in which case you can take £2.50 
For a payment of £1.00 you can block the other person taking 
money from you. Specifically, if you pay £1.00 then even if the 
other person chooses to take money from you then this is blocked. 
Similarly, if the other person pays £1.00 then you are blocked 
from taking money from them. 
The other person has the same options as you. Your final payoff 
will be determined by your respective choices.  




  Give    Take    Insure    Do Nothing 
 
If you chose Give/Take, then how much do you want to 
Give/Take? (Please tick one option): 
 
























4.8.4. Instructions in Give-Burn-Insure (GBI) Treatment   
 
Part 3 
In this part of the experiment you will be randomly paired with 
one other person in the experimental session. Below we have the 
payoff that you received in part 1 and the payoff that this other 
person received. 
 
You received   _________       The other person received   _________        
Both of you now have the option to transfer or take money from 
the other person. Specifically: 
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of your money and 
give it to the other person. If you chose this option then your 
payoff goes down by £0.60 (the £0.10 payment and £0.50 transfer) 
and the payoff of the other person goes up by £0.50. If you pay 
£0.20 then you give £1.00 to the other person, and so on. The most 
you can pay is £0.50 in which case you give £2.50.   
For a payment of £0.10 you can take £0.50 of the money the other 
person has and reduce their payoff. If you chose this option 
then your payoff goes down by £0.10 and the payoff of the other 
person goes down by £0.50. If you pay £0.20 then you can take 
£1.00 from the other person, and so on. The most you can pay is 
£0.50 in which case you take £2.50. 
For a payment of £1.00 you can block the other person taking 
money from you. Specifically, if you pay £1.00 then even if the 
other person chooses to take money from you then this is blocked. 
Similarly, if the other person pays £1.00 then you are blocked 
from taking money from them. 
The other person has the same options as you. Your final payoff 
will be determined by your respective choices.  
Do you want to give, take, insure or do nothing? (Please tick one 
option):  
 




If you chose Give/Take, then how much do you want to 
Give/Take? (Please tick one option): 
 

























4.8.5. Post-Experiment Questionnaire  
 
For the final part of this experiment, please answer the following 
questions to the best of your knowledge.  
 
1. Gender 
 Male   
 Female  
 
2. Religious Affiliation  
 Christian (Protestant) 








 Other  
 
3. Ethical or moral issues do not 
influence where or how I decide to 
spend my money: 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
4. When I am faced with a financial 
decision, I am generally more 
concerned about the possible losses 
than probable gains.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
5. I feel it is justified to do anything I 
can get away with in order to succeed.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
  
6. It is morally justifiable to hurt others 
in pursuit of my own goals.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
7. It is morally justifiable to steal from 
others in pursuit of my own goals.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
8. Exploiting others to achieve success 
and improve one’s social situation is 
justifiable.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
9. Cheating isn’t justified because it is 
unfair to others.  
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 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
10. Whether cheating is judged to be 
moral or immoral depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the 
action.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree  
 
11. In Part 2 of the experiment, did you 
expect the other person to: 
A. Give  
B. Take 
 
12. Which of the following objectives is 
most important for you? 
 Maximizing my own outcomes 
regardless of others.  
 Maximizing my own outcomes 
relative to others.  
 Maximizing joint outcomes.  
 
13.  In Part 2 of the experiment, I was 
worried about the possibility of the 
other person taking my money. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
14. In Part 2 of the experiment, I felt 
envious towards the other person.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
15.  If given the option, I would be willing 
to pay to reduce someone else’s 
income out of spite/envy.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
16. If income inequality reflected 
differences in effort as opposed to 
luck or privilege, this would affect my 
willingness to redistribute or donate 
money.  
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
17. If given the option, I would be willing 
to pay to reduce someone else’s 
income for issues relating to fairness. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
 Disagree 




  Give Take Insure Do Nothing 
Q1 [Female] (-) (+) (-) (+) 
Q2 [Religious] (-) (+) (+) (-) 
Q3 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (-) (-) (+) 
Q4 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (-) (+) (+) 
Q5 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (+) (-) (+) 
Q6 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Q7 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (-) (-) (+) 
Q8 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (-) (+) (-) 
Q9 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (+) (-) (-) 
Q10 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (-) (+) (-) 
Q11 [Take] (+) (+) (+) (-) 
Q12 [Own Outcomes] (-) (-) (+) (-) 
Q12 [Relative Outcomes] (+) (+) (-) (+) 
Q12 [Joint Outcomes] (+) (-) (-) (-) 
Q13 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (-) (+) (+) 
Q14 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (+) (-) (+) 
Q15 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (-) (+) (-) 
Q16 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Q17 [Strongly Agree and Agree] (-) (+) (+) (+) 
 
Table A1. Correlations between Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Responses and Choices during Experiment 
 
Note: Table A1 provides the direction of correlation between 
giving, taking, insuring and doing nothing with responses to our 
post-experiment questionnaire. The table is to be read as follows. 
Question 17 asks, “If given the option, I would be willing to pay to 
reduce someone else’s income for issues relating to fairness”. 
Subjects were then asked to respond based on a Likert scale i.e. 
strongly agree to disagree. The correlations shown for this 
question are for those that had either strongly agreed or agreed 
with the above statement. In other words, the correlation between 
giving with those that strongly agreed or agreed with the 
statement was negative, whilst it was positive for those that 









This thesis covered three independent research questions.  
Chapter two argued that the regulatory constraints imposed by 
the Shariah on Islamic securities and investors, such as the 
prohibition of trade in derivative contracts, impedes the ability of 
Islamic portfolio managers to utilise important risk-management 
strategies. In light of this, chapter two studied a) whether 
diversifying across asset-classes by including commodities and 
Sukuk (Islamic Bonds) could improve the performance of an 
equity-only Islamic portfolio b) the benefits of diversification over 
historically significant bull and bear markets to test the relevance 
of diversification during volatile and trending markets c) the 
dynamic conditional correlation between the aforementioned 
asset-classes to study how the relationship across markets is 
affected during crisis regimes and d) given that Islamic portfolios 
are vulnerable to extreme events, I employed a convenient tail-
risk measure of performance which includes the importance of an 
assets skewness and kurtosis to study whether taking into 
account the shape of the returns’ distribution provides further 
insight into the potential benefits of diversification. 
The results from chapter two showed that in terms of improving 
risk-return profiles, the benefit of diversifying beyond an equity-
only portfolio is limited during normal times but advantageous 
during crisis periods. The most important finding from chapter 
two relates to the estimation of portfolio tail-risk. In particular, I 
demonstrated that using a standard two-moment Value-at-Risk 
measure, which assumes normally distributed returns, rather 
than a four-moment Value-at-Risk measure, which incorporates 
an assets skewness and kurtosis, can lead to a substantial 
underestimation of portfolio risk during the most extreme market 
conditions.  
The aforementioned results have important practical implications 
for portfolio managers and practitioners within the Islamic 
Finance sector. As argued in chapter two, Shariah-compliant 
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securities are likely to deviate from a normal distribution as well 
as being vulnerable to extreme shocks for reasons such as market 
thinness, shortages of liquidity, the lack of product 
standardisation, underdeveloped secondary markets and the 
inability to diversify across a more comprehensive range of 
market sectors. Hence, our results provide important insights into 
the benefits of asset-class diversification and highlight the 
importance of taking into consideration a more complete 
description of the distribution of returns.  
Given the distinctive characteristics and requirements of Shariah-
compliant assets, an interesting avenue for future research, which 
has so far received little attention, is the study and development 
of risk-factor models specific to Shariah-based securities. With the 
growing relevance of assets such as Sukuk, it has become 
increasingly important to determine the risk-factors and relative 
importance of market and institutional factors in influencing the 
prices of niche Islamic securities. Such research could further 
support practitioners in improving the management of risk in 
their portfolios.  
In chapter three, we explored the extent to which elicited 
measures of risk-aversion are influenced by religious priming and 
the way in which the decision-task is framed. Using the seminal 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) framework, we found that risk-taking 
is significantly higher when an identical task is framed in terms 
of an investment rather than a gamble. Furthermore, our results 
suggest that using a religious prime or setting (a Mosque) 
significantly lowers risk-taking in the gambling frame whilst 
having no effect in the investment frame. The elicited measures of 
risk-aversion were influenced by a range of factors including 
gender, ethical standards and setting in the gambling frame 
whereas we observed no such effect in the investment frame. We 
argue that this sensitivity towards a gambling frame is due to 
social and religious norms around gambling. This is an important 
result as it suggests that risk-preference elicitation tasks that are 
framed in terms of gambling, as many are, likely lead to 
systematic bias. Hence, an important implication derived from 
our experiments in chapter three is that we should look to test 
and develop methods of measuring risk-preferences that avoid a 
gambling frame. Overall, our findings corroborate the results of 
previous studies that show the fundamental importance of context 
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in determining individual risk-taking (Weber 2012, Dohmen et al. 
2011, Schubert et al. 1999). 
Chapter four presented the results from a simple incentivised 
laboratory experiment that tested whether altering subject choice-
sets influences the level of prosociality. Subsequent to an effort-
stage where subjects competed in a winner-takes-all tournament 
to earn their endowment, subjects had the opportunity to do 
nothing, give or take money from their opponent or in the 
insurance treatment, insure. We additionally tested for any 
differences in the observed behaviour of subjects when any 
amount stolen from their opponent was kept versus when it was 
burned (wasted).  
We report several interesting findings. First, consistent with 
previous studies, we find strong evidence of agents displaying 
both positive and negative other-regarding preferences, which 
contradicts the model of narrow self-interest (e.g. Zizzo and 
Oswald (2001), Andreoni et al. (2007), Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) 
and Engel (2011)). Second, we observe that the behaviour of 
subjects can be sensitive to changes in the choice-set they are 
presented with, even when the options added onto the choice-set 
constitute monetarily dominated strategies. Moreover, our results 
suggest that altering choice-sets had an asymmetric effect on the 
attitudes of competition winners and losers. Particularly, 
expanding the available choice-set to include the option of 
insurance crowded out donations from competition winners and 
shifting from the take-and-keep to take-and-burn treatment 
lowered the average size of donations. In contrast, neither the 
expansion of the choice-set nor the switch from the take-and-keep 
treatment to the take-and-burn treatment had any impact on 
stealing by competition losers. This was both in terms of the 
fraction of subjects that decided to steal and the size of the 
amounts stolen. Hence, we found that the aforementioned 
changes to the decision-task were more effective at lowering 
prosocial behaviour by competition winners whilst being less 
effective at having any impact on the antisocial behaviour of 
competition losers.  
Similar to chapter three, the results from chapter four corroborate 
the findings from previous studies showing that behaviour can be 
sensitive to changes in the exact context and choice-set presented 
to subjects (List (2007), Bardsley (2008) and Dohmen et al. 
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(2011)). More broadly, in combination with the prior literature, an 
important overarching implication of our findings from chapters 
three and four is that the situational instability of preferences 
observed in the lab is likely responsible for the lack of external 
validity of experimental studies. While the experimental 
literature has provided valuable insights through theory-testing, 
in order to address concrete real-world problems there is a need 
for greater emphasis on context-specific studies, the results of 
which may only have limited scope in terms of generalizability 
(see Guala and Mittone 2005).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
